messages from 2018-01-16 21:03:13 to 2018-01-28 19:00:35 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] x86/pti-ish syscall cleanups
2018-01-28 19:00 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-01-28 18:36 UTC (29+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/12] Documentation: document array_idx
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/12] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 11/12] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork
2018-01-26 22:31 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-01-26 19:41 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users
2018-01-26 19:07 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on
2018-01-26 19:02 UTC (26+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] A problem met when using crash with randomized kernel
2018-01-26 8:32 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-01-25 22:37 UTC (26+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-01-25 15:13 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Write-once memory
2018-01-24 18:05 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [GIT PULL] spectre variant1 mitigations for 4.16
2018-01-24 14:47 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 00/10] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-01-23 10:17 UTC (27+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 09/10] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
2018-01-21 1:22 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/36] Hardened usercopy whitelisting
2018-01-20 1:58 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] kmem_cache_attr (was Re: [PATCH 04/36] usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/9] core, x86: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-01-19 3:27 UTC (30+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/5] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel
2018-01-18 21:57 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-01-18 21:41 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/38] Hardened usercopy whitelisting
2018-01-18 21:36 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 27/38] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 0/7] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel
2018-01-17 15:01 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption
` [kernel-hardening] "
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