messages from 2018-02-04 17:00:55 to 2018-02-14 20:06:36 UTC [more...]
[RESEND][PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
2018-02-14 20:06 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] exec: Pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions
` [PATCH 2/3] exec: Introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread()
` [PATCH 3/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
[PATCH 0/2] Add kvzalloc_struct to complement kvzalloc_array
2018-02-14 20:06 UTC (14+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] mm: Add kernel-doc for kvfree
` [PATCH 2/2] mm: Add kvmalloc_ab_c and kvzalloc_struct
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-14 19:48 UTC (27+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory)
[RFC] Warn the user when they could overflow mapcount
2018-02-14 14:05 UTC (17+ messages)
` [RFC] Limit mappings to ten per page per process
[PATCH 2/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-13 15:26 UTC (4+ messages)
Hello world! Student interested in getting involved
2018-02-13 11:38 UTC (3+ messages)
[RFC PATCH v15 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-13 2:43 UTC (26+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-12 23:52 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
Updating wikis request
2018-02-12 23:03 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 00/12] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
2018-02-12 16:00 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 05/12] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 09/12] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 10/12] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers
` "
[RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-12 15:28 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-02-11 21:35 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
[RFC PATCH v14 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-11 2:01 UTC (26+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[PATCH 4.9 53/92] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-09 13:39 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.9 54/92] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.9 55/92] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.9 56/92] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 57/92] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.9 58/92] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 59/92] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 60/92] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 61/92] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.9 62/92] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 63/92] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.9 64/92] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.9 65/92] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.9 66/92] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-02-07 1:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` "
[PATCH 1/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-06 0:54 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 4.15 29/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-05 18:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.15 30/60] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.15 31/60] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
[PATCH 4.14 33/64] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-05 18:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.14 34/64] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.14 35/64] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.14 36/64] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 37/64] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.14 38/64] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 39/64] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 40/64] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 41/64] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.14 42/64] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 43/64] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.14 44/64] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.14 45/64] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.14 46/64] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.14 47/64] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
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