messages from 2018-02-05 18:23:16 to 2018-02-19 16:55:06 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/38] Hardened usercopy whitelisting
2018-02-19 16:55 UTC (2+ messages)
` [PATCH] signals: Move put_compat_sigset to compat.h to silence hardened usercopy
[PATCH 00/23] kconfig: move compiler capability tests to Kconfig
2018-02-19 15:18 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH 20/23] gcc-plugins: always build plugins with C++
` [PATCH 21/23] gcc-plugins: move GCC version check for PowerPC to Kconfig
` [PATCH 22/23] gcc-plugins: test GCC plugin support in Kconfig
[PATCH 0/4] leaking_addresses: simplify and optimize
2018-02-19 2:50 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/4] leaking_addresses: do not parse binary files
` [PATCH 2/4] leaking_addresses: simplify path skipping
` [PATCH 3/4] leaking_addresses: cache architecture name
` [PATCH 4/4] leaking_addresses: add scan_once array
Hello world! Student interested in getting involved
2018-02-17 15:22 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH RFC v8 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-02-16 18:10 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC v8 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
` [PATCH RFC v8 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
` [PATCH RFC v8 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter()
` [PATCH RFC v8 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
` [PATCH RFC v8 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
` [PATCH RFC v8 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
[PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-02-16 8:55 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references
[PATCH v2 0/8] Add kvzalloc_struct to complement kvzalloc_array
2018-02-15 17:36 UTC (20+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/8] mm: Add kernel-doc for kvfree
` [PATCH v2 2/8] mm: Add kvmalloc_ab_c and kvzalloc_struct
` [PATCH v2 3/8] Convert virtio_console to kvzalloc_struct
` [PATCH v2 4/8] Convert dax device "
` [PATCH v2 5/8] Convert infiniband uverbs "
` [PATCH v2 6/8] Convert v4l2 event "
` [PATCH v2 7/8] Convert vhost "
` [PATCH v2 8/8] Convert jffs2 acl "
[PATCH 0/2] Add kvzalloc_struct to complement kvzalloc_array
2018-02-15 17:06 UTC (18+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] mm: Add kernel-doc for kvfree
` [PATCH 2/2] mm: Add kvmalloc_ab_c and kvzalloc_struct
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-14 22:27 UTC (30+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory)
[RESEND][PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
2018-02-14 20:06 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] exec: Pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions
` [PATCH 2/3] exec: Introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread()
` [PATCH 3/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec
[RFC] Warn the user when they could overflow mapcount
2018-02-14 14:05 UTC (17+ messages)
` [RFC] Limit mappings to ten per page per process
[PATCH 2/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-13 15:26 UTC (4+ messages)
[RFC PATCH v15 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-13 2:43 UTC (26+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[RFC PATCH v16 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-12 23:52 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
Updating wikis request
2018-02-12 23:03 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 00/12] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
2018-02-12 16:00 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 05/12] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 09/12] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 10/12] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers
` "
[RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-12 15:28 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-02-11 21:35 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
[RFC PATCH v14 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-11 2:01 UTC (26+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[PATCH 4.9 53/92] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-09 13:39 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.9 54/92] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.9 55/92] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.9 56/92] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 57/92] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.9 58/92] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 59/92] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 60/92] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 61/92] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.9 62/92] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 63/92] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.9 64/92] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.9 65/92] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.9 66/92] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-02-07 1:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` "
[PATCH 1/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-06 0:54 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
2018-02-05 18:23 UTC
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