kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
[RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization
 2019-02-21 13:20 UTC  (28+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call

[PATCH v2] x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits
 2019-02-21 13:06 UTC  (4+ messages)

[PATCH 0/7] Kernel Userspace Protection for radix
 2019-02-21 12:56 UTC  (10+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/7] powerpc: Add framework for Kernel Userspace Protection
` [PATCH 2/7] powerpc: Add skeleton for Kernel Userspace Execution Prevention
` [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/mm: Add a framework for Kernel Userspace Access Protection
` [PATCH 4/7] powerpc/64: Setup KUP on secondary CPUs
` [PATCH 5/7] powerpc/mm/radix: Use KUEP API for Radix MMU
` [PATCH 6/7] powerpc/lib: Refactor __patch_instruction() to use __put_user_asm()
` [PATCH 7/7] powerpc/64s: Implement KUAP for Radix MMU

[PATCH 0/6] lib: Add safe string funtions
 2019-02-21 12:02 UTC  (31+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] lib/string: Enable string selftesting
` [PATCH 2/6] lib/string: Fix erroneous 'overflow' documentation
` [PATCH 3/6] lib/string: Use correct docstring format
` [PATCH 4/6] lib/string: Add string copy/zero function
` [PATCH 5/6] lib: Fix function documentation for strncpy_from_user
` [PATCH 6/6] lib: Add function strscpy_from_user()

classes of methods for gaining access to kernel memory
 2019-02-21  1:17 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits
 2019-02-20 17:01 UTC  (5+ messages)

[PATCH v2 00/20] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns
 2019-02-20 16:14 UTC  (36+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 05/20] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching
` [PATCH v2 09/20] x86/kprobes: instruction pages initialization enhancements
` [PATCH v2 10/20] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading
` [PATCH v2 11/20] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker
` [PATCH v2 13/20] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation
` [PATCH v2 14/20] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages
` [PATCH v2 15/20] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms

[PATCH v2 0/3] [PATCH v2 0/3] Kernel Userspace Protection for Radix MMU
 2019-02-20 11:57 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 2/3] powerpc/lib: Refactor __patch_instruction() to use __put_user_asm()

[PATCH v3 0/3] admin-guide: extend perf-security with resource control, data categories and privileged users
 2019-02-18  8:56 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/4] perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control
` [PATCH v3 2/4] perf-security: document collected perf_events/Perf data categories
` [PATCH v3 3/4] perf-security: elaborate on perf_events/Perf privileged users
` [PATCH v3 4/4] perf-security: wrap paragraphs on 72 columns

[RFC PATCH v5 00/12] hardening: statically allocated protected memory
 2019-02-16 15:15 UTC  (16+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v5 02/12] __wr_after_init: linker section and attribute
` [RFC PATCH v5 03/12] __wr_after_init: Core and default arch
` [RFC PATCH v5 04/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: randomize mapping offset
` [RFC PATCH v5 05/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: enable
` [RFC PATCH v5 06/12] __wr_after_init: arm64: enable
` [RFC PATCH v5 07/12] __wr_after_init: Documentation: self-protection
` [RFC PATCH v5 08/12] __wr_after_init: lkdtm test
` [RFC PATCH v5 09/12] __wr_after_init: rodata_test: refactor tests
` [RFC PATCH v5 10/12] __wr_after_init: rodata_test: test __wr_after_init
` [RFC PATCH v5 11/12] __wr_after_init: test write rare functionality
` [RFC PATCH v5 12/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init

[PATCH 0/2] gcc-plugins: structleak: Generalize to all variable types
 2019-02-15 17:38 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] "
` [PATCH 2/2] lib: Introduce test_stackinit module

[RFC PATCH v8 00/14] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
 2019-02-15 14:47 UTC  (32+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v8 01/14] mm: add MAP_HUGETLB support to vm_mmap
` [RFC PATCH v8 02/14] x86: always set IF before oopsing from page fault
` [RFC PATCH v8 03/14] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
` [RFC PATCH v8 04/14] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO
` [RFC PATCH v8 05/14] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO
` [RFC PATCH v8 06/14] xpfo: add primitives for mapping underlying memory
` [RFC PATCH v8 07/14] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions
` [RFC PATCH v8 08/14] arm64/mm: disable section/contiguous mappings if XPFO is enabled
` [RFC PATCH v8 09/14] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol
` [RFC PATCH v8 10/14] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO
` [RFC PATCH v8 11/14] xpfo, mm: remove dependency on CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION
` [RFC PATCH v8 12/14] xpfo, mm: optimize spinlock usage in xpfo_kunmap
` [RFC PATCH v8 13/14] xpfo, mm: Defer TLB flushes for non-current CPUs (x86 only)
` [RFC PATCH v8 14/14] xpfo, mm: Optimize XPFO TLB flushes by batching them together

[PATCH 0/3] Minor bug fixes to leaking_addresses.pl
 2019-02-14  9:50 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [PATCH 3/3] leaking_addresses: Expand tilde in output file name

[RFC PATCH v4 00/12] hardening: statically allocated protected memory
 2019-02-12 22:39 UTC  (22+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] __wr_after_init: Core and default arch
` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: memset_user()
` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: randomize mapping offset
` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] __wr_after_init: x86_64: enable
` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] __wr_after_init: arm64: memset_user()
` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] __wr_after_init: arm64: enable
` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] __wr_after_init: Documentation: self-protection
` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] __wr_after_init: lkdtm test
` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] __wr_after_init: rodata_test: refactor tests
` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] __wr_after_init: rodata_test: test __wr_after_init
` [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] __wr_after_init: test write rare functionality
` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init

[RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
 2019-02-12 20:34 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v7 05/16] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO

[PATCH 0/3] gcc-plugins: Introduce stackinit plugin
 2019-02-12 17:54 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH v2 0/3] admin-guide: extend perf-security with resource control, data categories and privileged users
 2019-02-11 14:22 UTC  (6+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/4] perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control

page:  |  | latest

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).