kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
 messages from 2020-04-06 23:17:07 to 2020-04-27 16:49:21 UTC [more...]

[PATCH 00/18] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack
 2020-04-27 16:48 UTC  (70+ messages)
` [PATCH v10 00/12] "
  ` [PATCH v10 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS
` [PATCH v11 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
  ` [PATCH v11 02/12] scs: add accounting
  ` [PATCH v11 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging
  ` [PATCH v11 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled
  ` [PATCH v11 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS
  ` [PATCH v11 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended
  ` [PATCH v11 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted
  ` [PATCH v11 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v11 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code
  ` [PATCH v11 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v11 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI
  ` [PATCH v11 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS
` [PATCH v12 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v12 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
  ` [PATCH v12 02/12] scs: add accounting
  ` [PATCH v12 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging
  ` [PATCH v12 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled
  ` [PATCH v12 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS
  ` [PATCH v12 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended
  ` [PATCH v12 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted
  ` [PATCH v12 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v12 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code
  ` [PATCH v12 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v12 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI
  ` [PATCH v12 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS
` [PATCH v13 00/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v13 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)
  ` [PATCH v13 02/12] scs: add accounting
  ` [PATCH v13 03/12] scs: add support for stack usage debugging
  ` [PATCH v13 04/12] scs: disable when function graph tracing is enabled
  ` [PATCH v13 05/12] arm64: reserve x18 from general allocation with SCS
  ` [PATCH v13 06/12] arm64: preserve x18 when CPU is suspended
  ` [PATCH v13 07/12] arm64: efi: restore x18 if it was corrupted
  ` [PATCH v13 08/12] arm64: vdso: disable Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v13 09/12] arm64: disable SCS for hypervisor code
  ` [PATCH v13 10/12] arm64: implement Shadow Call Stack
  ` [PATCH v13 11/12] arm64: scs: add shadow stacks for SDEI
  ` [PATCH v13 12/12] efi/libstub: disable SCS

[PATCH v5 0/6] implement KASLR for powerpc/fsl_booke/64
 2020-04-27 13:34 UTC  (7+ messages)

[RFC PATCH 00/21] Improve list integrity checking
 2020-04-24 17:39 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 03/21] list: Annotate lockless list primitives with data_race()

[PATCH] arm64: add check_wx_pages debugfs for CHECK_WX
 2020-04-24 10:52 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [PATCH v2] "
      `  "

[PATCH v13 0/8] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances
 2020-04-23 20:03 UTC  (9+ messages)
` [PATCH v13 1/8] proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
` [PATCH v13 2/8] Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock
` [PATCH v13 3/8] proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
` [PATCH v13 4/8] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
` [PATCH v13 5/8] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
` [PATCH v13 6/8] docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
` [PATCH v13 7/8] proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
` [PATCH v13 8/8] proc: use named enums for better readability

[PATCH v12 0/7] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances
 2020-04-23 20:01 UTC  (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v12 1/7] proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
` [PATCH v12 2/7] proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
  ` [PATCH v13 "
` [PATCH v12 3/7] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
` [PATCH v12 4/7] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
` [PATCH v12 5/7] docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
` [PATCH v12 6/7] proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
` [PATCH v12 7/7] proc: use named enums for better readability

[PATCH 0/9] Function Granular Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization
 2020-04-22 22:17 UTC  (23+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/9] objtool: do not assume order of parent/child functions
` [PATCH 2/9] x86: tools/relocs: Support >64K section headers
` [PATCH 3/9] x86/boot: Allow a "silent" kaslr random byte fetch
` [PATCH 4/9] x86: Makefile: Add build and config option for CONFIG_FG_KASLR
` [PATCH 5/9] x86: make sure _etext includes function sections
` [PATCH 6/9] x86/tools: Adding relative relocs for randomized functions
` [PATCH 7/9] x86: Add support for function granular KASLR
` [PATCH 8/9] kallsyms: hide layout
` [PATCH 9/9] module: Reorder functions

[PATCH v2 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
 2020-04-21  7:02 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/38] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
 2020-04-20 17:43 UTC  (16+ messages)

gcc extended format checking plugin
 2020-04-19 22:34 UTC 

[PATCH RESEND v11 0/8] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances
 2020-04-19 14:19 UTC  (16+ messages)
` [PATCH RESEND v11 1/8] proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
` [PATCH RESEND v11 2/8] proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
` [PATCH RESEND v11 3/8] proc: move hide_pid, pid_gid from pid_namespace to proc_fs_info
` [PATCH RESEND v11 4/8] proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
` [PATCH RESEND v11 5/8] proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
` [PATCH RESEND v11 6/8] docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
` [PATCH RESEND v11 7/8] proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
` [PATCH RESEND v11 8/8] proc: use named enums for better readability

[PATCH] gcc-plugins: latent_entropy: remove unneeded semicolon
 2020-04-18  7:05 UTC 

[PATCH] gcc-plugins: structleak: remove unneeded variable 'ret'
 2020-04-18  7:05 UTC 

[PATCH v3 0/5] hardening : prevent write to proces's read-only pages
 2020-04-16 15:59 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/2] hardening : prevent write to read-only pages of user process
` [PATCH v4 2/2] Hardening x86: Forbid writes to read-only memory pages of a process

[PATCH v16 00/10] Landlock LSM
 2020-04-16 10:39 UTC  (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v16 01/10] landlock: Add object management
` [PATCH v16 02/10] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
` [PATCH v16 03/10] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
` [PATCH v16 04/10] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
` [PATCH v16 05/10] fs,landlock: Support filesystem access-control
` [PATCH v16 06/10] landlock: Add syscall implementation
` [PATCH v16 07/10] arch: Wire up landlock() syscall
` [PATCH v16 08/10] selftests/landlock: Add initial tests
` [PATCH v16 09/10] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
` [PATCH v16 10/10] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation

[PATCH v3 0/5] hardening : prevent write to proces's read-only pages
 2020-04-13 17:13 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/5] Hardening x86: Forbid writes to read-only memory pages of a process
` [PATCH v3 2/5] Hardening PowerPC: "
` [PATCH v3 3/5] Hardening um: "
` [PATCH v3 4/5] Hardening unicore32: "
` [PATCH v3 5/5] Hardening : PPC book3s64: "

[PATCH v1 0/1] hardening : prevent write to proces's read-only pages
 2020-04-13 14:59 UTC 

Coccinelle rule for CVE-2019-18683
 2020-04-11  5:07 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [Cocci] "

[PATCH v1] prevent write to proces's read-only pages
 2020-04-10 18:15 UTC 

[Cocci] Coccinelle rule for CVE-2019-18683
 2020-04-10 13:16 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH v15 08/10] selftests/landlock: Add initial tests
 2020-04-10  8:45 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [selftests/landlock] d9d464ccf6: kernel-selftests.landlock.test_base.fail

[PATCH] x86/mm/init: Stop printing pgt_buf addresses
 2020-04-09 22:35 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH v10 0/9] proc: modernize proc to support multiple private instances
 2020-04-09 14:32 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [PATCH v10 8/9] proc: use human-readable values for hidehid

[PATCH] gcc-common.h: 'params.h' has been dropped in GCC10
 2020-04-07 17:48 UTC  (4+ messages)

[PATCH] gcc-plugins/stackleak: Avoid assignment for unused macro argument
 2020-04-07 16:33 UTC  (3+ messages)

[RFC PATCH 0/5] Prevent write to read-only pages (text, PLT/GOT
 2020-04-07 16:25 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 1/5] security : hardening : prevent write to proces's read-only pages from another process

[PATCH v3 0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
 2020-04-06 23:16 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 4/5] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
` [PATCH v3 5/5] arm64: entry: "


This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).