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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 13:28:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKctN4SQr4H-jPywEw4Te+ObVZSV0bUR5MLqu1ZrgNEBA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1549628149-11881-2-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com>

On Fri, Feb 8, 2019 at 4:16 AM Elena Reshetova
<elena.reshetova@intel.com> wrote:
> --- a/mm/usercopy.c
> +++ b/mm/usercopy.c
> @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
>  static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len)
>  {
>         const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current);
> -       const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
> +       const void * const stackend = (void *)task_top_of_stack(current);
>         int ret;
>
>         /* Object is not on the stack at all. */

It seems like having task_top_of_stack() would be a nice refactoring
to have regardless of this feature (and splitting out would make this
patch a bit easier to read too).

-- 
Kees Cook

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-08 21:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-08 12:15 [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 13:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 13:20     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 14:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:13         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 18:25           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11  6:39             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-11 15:54               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 10:16                 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-14  7:52                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-19 14:47                     ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 22:20                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21  6:37                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-21 13:20                         ` Jann Horn
2019-02-21 15:49                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:15                   ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 22:53                     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 23:29                       ` Kees Cook
2019-02-27 11:03                         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-21  9:35                     ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 17:23                       ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:48                         ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 19:18                           ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 21:51         ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 15:15       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:38         ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 12:09           ` Greg KH
2019-02-11  6:05             ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 16:34   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:03     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:28   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-02-11 12:47     ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-20 22:04   ` Kees Cook

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