From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 13:20:58 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLB=so4r169pq1KF3Kyfh2Kw_t6ZXGavpzVO2sg3=D1tw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190220184859.GA6429@openwall.com>
On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 10:49 AM Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 10:09:34AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > + if (WARN_ONCE((val & cr4_pin) != cr4_pin, "cr4 bypass attempt?!\n"))
> > + goto again;
>
> I think "goto again" is too mild a response given that it occurs after a
> successful write of a non-pinned value to CR4. I think it'd allow some
> exploits to eventually win the race: make their desired use of whatever
> functionality SMEP, etc. would have prevented - which may be just a few
> instructions they need to run - before the CR4 value is reverted after
> "goto again". I think it's one of those cases where a kernel panic
> would be more appropriate.
It will not land upstream with a BUG() or panic(). Linus has
explicitly stated that none of this work can do that until it has
"baked" in the kernel for a couple years.
In his defense, anyone sufficiently paranoid can already raise the
priority of a WARN() into a panic via sysctl kernel.panic_on_warn (and
kernel.panic_on_oops).
> Also, WARN_ONCE possibly introduces a delay sufficient to realistically
> win this race on the first try. If we choose to warn, we should do it
> after having reverted the CR4 value, not before.
Isn't cr4 CPU-local though? Couldn't we turn off interrupts to stop the race?
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-20 21:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-20 18:09 [PATCH v2] x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits Kees Cook
2019-02-20 18:48 ` Solar Designer
2019-02-20 21:20 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-02-21 13:06 ` Solar Designer
2019-02-21 16:11 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-02-21 17:37 ` Kees Cook
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