From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>, Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>, "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, Cgroups <cgroups@vger.kernel.org> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 16:30:21 -0700 Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLnVyeAMPWwP=ovZuE+vmmqxSd4WyZ6O1inA1ie107k8Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-8-mic@digikod.net> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote: > Add eBPF functions to compare file system access with a Landlock file > system handle: > * bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file(prop, map, map_op, file) > This function allows to compare the dentry, inode, device or mount > point of the currently accessed file, with a reference handle. > * bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_beneath_with_struct_file(opt, map, map_op, file) > This function allows an eBPF program to check if the current accessed > file is the same or in the hierarchy of a reference handle. > > The goal of file system handle is to abstract kernel objects such as a > struct file or a struct inode. Userland can create this kind of handle > thanks to the BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM command. The element is a struct > landlock_handle containing the handle type (e.g. > BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS_FD) and a file descriptor. This could > also be any descriptions able to match a struct file or a struct inode > (e.g. path or glob string). > > Changes since v2: > * add MNT_INTERNAL check to only add file handle from user-visible FS > (e.g. no anonymous inode) > * replace struct file* with struct path* in map_landlock_handle > * add BPF protos > * fix bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file() > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> > Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> > Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> > Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWwTiz3kZTkEgOW24-DvhQq6LftwEXh77FD2G5o71yD7g@mail.gmail.com > --- > include/linux/bpf.h | 10 +++ > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 49 +++++++++++ > kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 21 +++++ > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 ++ > security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- > security/landlock/checker_fs.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/landlock/checker_fs.h | 20 +++++ > security/landlock/lsm.c | 6 ++ > 8 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 security/landlock/checker_fs.c > create mode 100644 security/landlock/checker_fs.h > [...] > diff --git a/security/landlock/checker_fs.c b/security/landlock/checker_fs.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..39eb85dc7d18 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/landlock/checker_fs.c > @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ > +/* > + * Landlock LSM - File System Checkers > + * > + * Copyright (C) 2016 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > + * > + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as > + * published by the Free Software Foundation. > + */ > + > +#include <linux/bpf.h> /* enum bpf_map_array_op */ > +#include <linux/errno.h> > +#include <linux/fs.h> /* path_is_under() */ > +#include <linux/path.h> /* struct path */ > + > +#include "checker_fs.h" > + > +#define EQUAL_NOT_NULL(a, b) (a && a == b) > + > +/* > + * bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file > + * > + * Cf. include/uapi/linux/bpf.h > + */ > +static inline u64 bpf_landlock_cmp_fs_prop_with_struct_file(u64 r1_property, > + u64 r2_map, u64 r3_map_op, u64 r4_file, u64 r5) > +{ > + u8 property = (u8) r1_property; > + struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r2_map; > + enum bpf_map_array_op map_op = r3_map_op; > + struct file *file = (struct file *) (unsigned long) r4_file; > + struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map); > + struct path *p1, *p2; > + struct map_landlock_handle *handle; > + int i; > + > + /* ARG_CONST_PTR_TO_LANDLOCK_HANDLE_FS is an arraymap */ > + if (unlikely(!map)) { > + WARN_ON(1); > + return -EFAULT; > + } Just some minor style/readability nits... This is more readable as: if (WARN_ON(!map)) return -EFAULT; (WARN_ON already includes the unlikely() and passes through the test result.) > + if (unlikely(!file)) > + return -ENOENT; > + if (unlikely((property | _LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_MASK) != _LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_MASK)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* for now, only handle OP_OR */ > + switch (map_op) { > + case BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_OR: > + break; > + case BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_UNSPEC: > + case BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_AND: > + case BPF_MAP_ARRAY_OP_XOR: > + default: > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + p2 = &file->f_path; > + > + synchronize_rcu(); > + > + for (i = 0; i < array->n_entries; i++) { > + bool result_dentry = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_DENTRY); > + bool result_inode = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_INODE); > + bool result_device = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_DEVICE); > + bool result_mount = !(property & LANDLOCK_FLAG_FS_MOUNT); > + > + handle = (struct map_landlock_handle *) > + (array->value + array->elem_size * i); > + > + if (handle->type != BPF_MAP_HANDLE_TYPE_LANDLOCK_FS_FD) { > + WARN_ON(1); > + return -EFAULT; > + } Same here... and in the other function (much of which seems to repeat -- can some of these checks be put into common functions?) -Kees -- Kees Cook Nexus Security
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-09-14 7:23 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 23:22 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:53 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 14:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 15:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 15:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-10-19 22:42 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 19:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn 2016-09-14 22:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 23:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 23:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 21:25 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-20 0:12 ` [kernel-hardening] lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-20 1:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon 2016-09-20 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:30 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-05 21:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 22:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 2:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-20 4:37 ` Sargun Dhillon 2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-10-03 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight
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