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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
	 James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	 Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	 Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
	 Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>, Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>,
	 Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	 linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 17:00:43 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=Xf5yEuz7JyOt-gmNx1uSM6mmM57_jFxCi+9VPZ4PSwJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190626144943.GY17798@dhcp22.suse.cz>

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 4:49 PM Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed 26-06-19 14:19:42, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> [...]
> > diff --git a/mm/dmapool.c b/mm/dmapool.c
> > index 8c94c89a6f7e..fe5d33060415 100644
> > --- a/mm/dmapool.c
> > +++ b/mm/dmapool.c
> [...]
> > @@ -428,6 +428,8 @@ void dma_pool_free(struct dma_pool *pool, void *vaddr, dma_addr_t dma)
> >       }
> >
> >       offset = vaddr - page->vaddr;
> > +     if (want_init_on_free())
> > +             memset(vaddr, 0, pool->size);
>
> any reason why this is not in DMAPOOL_DEBUG else branch? Why would you
> want to both zero on free and poison on free?
This makes sense, thanks.

> >  #ifdef       DMAPOOL_DEBUG
> >       if ((dma - page->dma) != offset) {
> >               spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags);
>
> [...]
>
> > @@ -1142,6 +1200,8 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
> >       }
> >       arch_free_page(page, order);
> >       kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
> > +     if (want_init_on_free())
> > +             kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
>
> same here. If you don't want to make this exclusive then you have to
> zero before poisoning otherwise you are going to blow up on the poison
> check, right?
Note that we disable initialization if page poisoning is on.
As I mentioned on another thread we can eventually merge this code
with page poisoning, but right now it's better to make the user decide
which of the features they want instead of letting them guess how the
combination of the two is going to work.
> >       if (debug_pagealloc_enabled())
> >               kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0);
> >
> --
> Michal Hocko
> SUSE Labs



-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
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Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg

  reply	other threads:[~2019-06-26 15:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-26 12:19 [PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 12:19 ` [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 " Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 14:49   ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-26 15:00     ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2019-06-26 15:42       ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-27 13:09         ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 18:15   ` Qian Cai
2019-06-26 20:23     ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  6:15       ` Michal Hocko
2019-06-27 16:23         ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27  8:18     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 23:28   ` Andrew Morton
2019-06-27 10:05     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-27 13:17     ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 12:19 ` [PATCH v8 2/2] mm: init: report memory auto-initialization features at boot time Alexander Potapenko
2019-06-26 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 0/3] add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options Alexander Potapenko

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