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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" <cgroups@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:43:54 -0700
Message-ID: <CALCETrXm18nNDY-a+toBEcjKKh+zOCVG0=t3ufkpROOHdqfqJQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-12-mic@digikod.net>

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 12:24 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
> A Landlock program will be triggered according to its subtype/origin
> bitfield. The LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SECCOMP value will trigger the
> Landlock program when a seccomp filter will return RET_LANDLOCK.
> Moreover, it is possible to return a 16-bit cookie which will be
> readable by the Landlock programs in its context.

Are you envisioning that the filters will return RET_LANDLOCK most of
the time or rarely?  If it's most of the time, then maybe this could
be simplified a bit by unconditionally calling the landlock filter and
letting the landlock filter access a struct seccomp_data if needed.


>
> Only seccomp filters loaded from the same thread and before a Landlock
> program can trigger it through LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SECCOMP. Multiple
> Landlock programs can be triggered by one or more seccomp filters. This
> way, each RET_LANDLOCK (with specific cookie) will trigger all the
> allowed Landlock programs once.

This interface seems somewhat awkward.  Should we not have a way to
atomicaly install a whole pile of landlock filters and associated
seccomp filter all at once?

--Andy

  reply index

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-14  7:23 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:51   ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:22     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:28       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:51         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:53   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 22:02     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 14:54   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:10     ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-09-14  7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 22:42     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 19:07   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-09-14 22:39     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:06   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:02     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:24       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:25         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20  0:12           ` [kernel-hardening] lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20  1:10             ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 16:58               ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:43   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-09-14 22:34     ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:52       ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:05         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:16   ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:43   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-05 20:58     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:25       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:11     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15  1:25       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  2:19         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  2:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:00             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:08               ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:31                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15  4:38                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15  4:48                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 19:41                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20  4:37                         ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 17:02                           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35         ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:29   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:14     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15  1:19       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:46         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:01           ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:20   ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 22:46     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14  7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight

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