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From: Carter Cheng <>
To: Kees Cook <>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <>
Subject: Re: classes of methods for gaining access to kernel memory
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 03:36:21 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <>

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One of the papers I had a brief look at is this one-

On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 1:16 AM Kees Cook <> wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 21, 2019 at 8:20 AM Carter Cheng <>
> wrote:
> > I was looking over some recent papers for Usenix Security and there are
> a couple on data oriented programming and I have been wondering if there
> are known mitigation techniques for this kind of data corruption attack or
> other attacks that don't involve control flow hijacking.
> Can you share some URLs and/or examples? I'm sure other folks here
> would be interested to read those too.
> --
> Kees Cook

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      reply	other threads:[~2019-02-21 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-10 11:12 classes of methods for gaining access to kernel memory Carter Cheng
2019-02-21  1:17 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 16:20   ` Carter Cheng
2019-02-21 17:15     ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 19:36       ` Carter Cheng [this message]

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