From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 16:14:16 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e3bbc79a-fd7e-6cae-6385-97dca1fc7f85@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190206170151.00c92333@lwn.net>
On 07.02.2019 3:01, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
> On Fri, 1 Feb 2019 10:30:58 +0300
> Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
>> Elaborate on possible perf_event/Perf privileged users groups
>> and document steps about creating such groups.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst
>> index 7da7fa459718..fe90f8952be9 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst
>> @@ -73,6 +73,48 @@ enable capturing of additional data required for later performance analysis of
>> monitored processes or a system. For example, CAP_SYSLOG capability permits
>> reading kernel space memory addresses from /proc/kallsyms file.
>>
>> +perf_events/Perf privileged users
>> +---------------------------------
>> +
>> +Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and file system
>> +ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of perf_events/Perf privileged
>> +users who are permitted to execute performance monitoring without *scope* limits.
>> +The following steps can be taken to create such a group of privileged Perf user
>> +
>> +1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users group to
>> + Perf tool executable and limit *access* to the executable for other users in
>> + the system:
>> +
>> +::
>> +
>> + # groupadd perf_users
>> + # ls -alhF
>> + -rwxr-xr-x 2 root root 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf
>> + # chgrp perf_users perf
>> + # ls -alhF
>> + -rwxr-xr-x 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf
>> + # chmod o-rwx perf
>> + # ls -alhF
>> + -rwxr-x--- 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf
>
> Since we're giving basic sysadmin info here, we should probably say
> explicitly that this will block access to the perf binary to anybody who
> is not in the perf_users group.
We already say that above:
"limit *access* to the executable for other users in the system".
Let's have it this way then:
"limit access to the executable for other users in the system
who are not in the perf_users group".
>
>> +2. Assign required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and enable
>
> Assign *the* required
Accepted.
>
>> + members of perf_users group with performance monitoring privileges [6]_ :
>> +
>> +::
>> +
>> + # setcap "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf
>> + # setcap -v "cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf
>> + perf: OK
>> + # getcap perf
>> + perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_syslog+ep
>> +
>> +As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting performance
>> +monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf tool executable that,
>> +when executes, passes perf_events subsystem *scope* checks.
>> +
>> +This specific *access* control management is only available to superuser or root
>
> Why the *emphasis* here? We prefer to minimize this kind of markup
> whenever possible.
Avoided emphasis here and in the other places of this paragraph.
>
> Thanks,
>
> jon
>
Thanks,
Alexey
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-07 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-01 7:23 [PATCH v1 0/3] admin-guide: extend perf-security with resource control, data categories and privileged users Alexey Budankov
2019-02-01 7:29 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control Alexey Budankov
2019-02-06 23:58 ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-02-07 13:14 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-02-01 7:30 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] perf-security: document collected perf_events/Perf data categories Alexey Budankov
2019-02-01 7:30 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control Alexey Budankov
2019-02-07 0:01 ` Jonathan Corbet
2019-02-07 13:14 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
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