From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Igor Stoppa Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 07/12] __wr_after_init: Documentation: self-protection Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:41:36 +0200 Message-Id: In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: Igor Stoppa , Andy Lutomirski , Nadav Amit , Matthew Wilcox , Peter Zijlstra , Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Mimi Zohar , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Ahmed Soliman , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Update the self-protection documentation, to mention also the use of the __wr_after_init attribute. Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa CC: Andy Lutomirski CC: Nadav Amit CC: Matthew Wilcox CC: Peter Zijlstra CC: Kees Cook CC: Dave Hansen CC: Mimi Zohar CC: Thiago Jung Bauermann CC: Ahmed Soliman CC: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org CC: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com CC: linux-mm@kvack.org CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --- Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst index f584fb74b4ff..df2614bc25b9 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst @@ -84,12 +84,14 @@ For variables that are initialized once at ``__init`` time, these can be marked with the (new and under development) ``__ro_after_init`` attribute. -What remains are variables that are updated rarely (e.g. GDT). These -will need another infrastructure (similar to the temporary exceptions -made to kernel code mentioned above) that allow them to spend the rest -of their lifetime read-only. (For example, when being updated, only the -CPU thread performing the update would be given uninterruptible write -access to the memory.) +Others, which are statically allocated, but still need to be updated +rarely, can be marked with the ``__wr_after_init`` attribute. + +The update mechanism must avoid exposing the data to rogue alterations +during the update. For example, only the CPU thread performing the update +would be given uninterruptible write access to the memory. + +Currently there is no protection available for data allocated dynamically. Segregation of kernel memory from userspace memory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- 2.19.1