From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 564DC6FA1 for ; Mon, 3 Apr 2023 14:59:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 885FBC433EF; Mon, 3 Apr 2023 14:59:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1680533988; bh=iHxQ6TDni0DnO0ZD0cAtbe8dQJZb9kwWdQ0/MxSR+0k=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=fSr1Cq8zdGVk3tXS9FlFWGl6+w7/vu1+ZS71orOg2F5IaV8brAss157RL1duL94Po EtdZfuofj/suPv1Do/vje1jWFKrZ+T2aNHt12ohA71s5DBC1iC8W/ZDUQcSO7FZGEl E4QVesBinTNggRF4yYvmDjR15itjhvKmMYI1NMfTEBo3PCFJx64yIv97EtarU9P/Vj gmWk9hTwBH8npUeeebFBZCpvhDaRdjcci3N8JXCTREK+uwcneTUSkX+7I4+8HdnXZy 3y0/3nHR7vinrU5dx+si+5wgy9XWniygtDmHwqv6C27c5x4Znr8Ge9VPDkyHCzcJYL M94T7nzr4WijA== Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 07:59:46 -0700 From: Jakub Kicinski To: Sagi Grimberg Cc: Hannes Reinecke , Christoph Hellwig , Boris Pismenny , john.fastabend@gmail.com, Paolo Abeni , Keith Busch , linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Chuck Lever , kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev, "netdev@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/18] nvme-tcp: fixup send workflow for kTLS Message-ID: <20230403075946.26ad71ee@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <44fe87ba-e873-fa05-d294-d29d5e6dd4b5@grimberg.me> References: <20230329135938.46905-1-hare@suse.de> <20230329135938.46905-11-hare@suse.de> <634385cc-35af-eca0-edcb-1196a95d1dfa@grimberg.me> <20230330224920.3a47fec9@kernel.org> <7f057726-8777-2fd3-a207-b3cd96076cb9@suse.de> <44fe87ba-e873-fa05-d294-d29d5e6dd4b5@grimberg.me> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Mon, 3 Apr 2023 15:20:13 +0300 Sagi Grimberg wrote: > >> Some of the flags are call specific, others may be internal to the > >> networking stack (e.g. the DECRYPTED flag). Old protocols didn't do > >> any validation because people coded more haphazardly in the 90s. > >> This lack of validation is a major source of technical debt :( > > > > A-ha. So what is the plan? > > Should the stack validate flags? > > And should the rules for validating be the same for all protocols? > > MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST is not an internal flag, I thought it was > essentially similar semantics to MSG_MORE but for sendpage. It'd > be great if this can be allowed in tls (again, at the very least > don't fail but continue as if it wasn't passed). .. but.. MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST is supported in TLS, isn't it? Why are we talking about it?