kernelnewbies.kernelnewbies.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu
To: Lev Olshvang <levonshe@yandex.com>
Cc: linux-il <linux-il@cs.huji.ac.il>,
	kernelnewbies <kernelnewbies@kernelnewbies.org>
Subject: Re: Security-What can be done in kernel to disable forever executable memory modificaton
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2019 14:54:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11945.1547322849@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <589971547299140@myt5-f9d71769b752.qloud-c.yandex.net>

On Sat, 12 Jan 2019 16:19:00 +0300, Lev Olshvang said:

> The fact that the text segment could be modified is bad news from the
> security standpoint.

We've known that for at least a decade now. Maybe longer. And we
already had this discussion once, about a week ago.

> I am not sure whether it is actually happening, perhaps instead new pages are
> allocated, sort of COW (copy on write).

In which case, you should probably stop and verify if it's happening.

> And here I am getting to the point :

> Is there any way to disable the change of permission bits of PTE? Is it
> possible in the hardware (ARM) or should kernel be patched?

Are you sure you want to disable *all* changes of a PTE?
Hint: Figure out how shared libraries are loaded before you go any further.

_______________________________________________
Kernelnewbies mailing list
Kernelnewbies@kernelnewbies.org
https://lists.kernelnewbies.org/mailman/listinfo/kernelnewbies

      reply	other threads:[~2019-01-12 19:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-12 13:19 Security-What can be done in kernel to disable forever executable memory modificaton Lev Olshvang
2019-01-12 19:54 ` valdis.kletnieks [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=11945.1547322849@turing-police.cc.vt.edu \
    --to=valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu \
    --cc=kernelnewbies@kernelnewbies.org \
    --cc=levonshe@yandex.com \
    --cc=linux-il@cs.huji.ac.il \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).