From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:46:37 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Ynx1DUvDTL1R4Pj5@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220512023402.9913-3-coxu@redhat.com>
On 05/12/22 at 10:34am, Coiby Xu wrote:
> commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
> signature verify") adds platform keyring support on x86 kexec but not
> arm64.
>
> The code in bzImage64_verify_sig makes use of system keyrings including
> .buitin_trusted_keys, .secondary_trusted_keys and .platform keyring to
> verify signed kernel image as PE file. Make it generic so both x86_64
> and arm64 can use it.
>
> Note this patch is needed by a later patch so Cc it to the stable tree
> as well.
This note should not be added in log.
>
> Cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org
> Cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org # 34d5960af253: kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
> Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
> ---
You can put the note here, it won't be added to commit log when merged.
Maybe it can be removed when merged.
Otherwise, LGTM
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
> arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 20 +-------------------
> include/linux/kexec.h | 7 +++++++
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
> index 170d0fd68b1f..f299b48f9c9f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
> @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/efi.h>
> -#include <linux/verification.h>
>
> #include <asm/bootparam.h>
> #include <asm/setup.h>
> @@ -528,28 +527,11 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> -static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> -{
> - int ret;
> -
> - ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> - if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
> - ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> - VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> - }
> - return ret;
> -}
> -#endif
> -
> const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
> .probe = bzImage64_probe,
> .load = bzImage64_load,
> .cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> - .verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
> + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
> #endif
> };
> diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
> index 413235c6c797..da83abfc628b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kexec.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <asm/io.h>
>
> #include <uapi/linux/kexec.h>
> +#include <linux/verification.h>
>
> /* Location of a reserved region to hold the crash kernel.
> */
> @@ -202,6 +203,12 @@ int arch_kexec_apply_relocations(struct purgatory_info *pi,
> const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
> const Elf_Shdr *symtab);
> int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
> +int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel,
> + unsigned long kernel_len);
> +#endif
> +#endif
> int arch_kexec_locate_mem_hole(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
>
> extern int kexec_add_buffer(struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index 3720435807eb..754885b96aab 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -165,6 +165,23 @@ void kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
> +int kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
> + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> + if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
> + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
> + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
> + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> + }
> + return ret;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> static int kexec_image_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf,
> unsigned long buf_len)
> {
> --
> 2.35.3
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-12 2:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-12 2:33 [PATCH v7 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 2:33 ` [PATCH v7 1/4] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 2:34 ` [PATCH v7 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 2:46 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2022-05-12 3:52 ` Baoquan He
2022-05-12 4:33 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 6:22 ` Baoquan He
2022-05-12 6:54 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 2:34 ` [PATCH v7 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 2:34 ` [PATCH v7 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification Coiby Xu
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