* [PATCH v15 1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-27 19:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
` (6 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-01-27 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
We have a need in the TPM2 trusted keys to return the ASN.1 form of
the TPM key blob so it can be operated on by tools outside of the
kernel. The specific tools are the openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect
and the Intel tpm2-tss-engine. To do that, we have to be able to read
and write the same binary key format the tools use. The current ASN.1
decoder does fine for reading, but we need pieces of an ASN.1 encoder
to write the key blob in binary compatible form.
For backwards compatibility, the trusted key reader code will still
accept the two TPM2B quantities that it uses today, but the writer
will only output the ASN.1 form.
The current implementation only encodes the ASN.1 bits we actually need.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
v2: updated API to use indefinite length, and made symbol exports gpl
v3: add data length error handling
v4: use end_data instead of data_len pointer
v5: mention tools and space out code
v7: reverse christmas tree variable definitions and better spacing
v9: update comments, remove indefinite length, make encoder config dependent
v15: add review and tested
---
include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 32 +++
lib/Kconfig | 3 +
lib/Makefile | 1 +
lib/asn1_encoder.c | 454 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 490 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h
create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c
diff --git a/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..08cd0c2ad34f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/asn1_encoder.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H
+#define _LINUX_ASN1_ENCODER_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <linux/asn1_ber_bytecode.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+
+#define asn1_oid_len(oid) (sizeof(oid)/sizeof(u32))
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ s64 integer);
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ u32 oid[], int oid_len);
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len);
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data,
+ const unsigned char *end_data,
+ const unsigned char *string, u32 len);
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ const unsigned char *seq, int len);
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ bool val);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig
index 46806332a8cc..a5bd3a86226f 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/Kconfig
@@ -692,3 +692,6 @@ config GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
config PLDMFW
bool
default n
+
+config ASN1_ENCODER
+ tristate
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index afeff05fa8c5..b9a975daed16 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
diff --git a/lib/asn1_encoder.c b/lib/asn1_encoder.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..41e71aae3ef6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/asn1_encoder.c
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Simple encoder primitives for ASN.1 BER/DER/CER
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com
+ */
+
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_integer() - encode positive integer to ASN.1
+ * @data: pointer to the pointer to the data
+ * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data
+ * @integer: integer to be encoded
+ *
+ * This is a simplified encoder: it only currently does
+ * positive integers, but it should be simple enough to add the
+ * negative case if a use comes along.
+ */
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_integer(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ s64 integer)
+{
+ int data_len = end_data - data;
+ unsigned char *d = &data[2];
+ bool found = false;
+ int i;
+
+ if (WARN(integer < 0,
+ "BUG: integer encode only supports positive integers"))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return data;
+
+ /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and integer encoding */
+ if (data_len < 3)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ /* remaining length where at d (the start of the integer encoding) */
+ data_len -= 2;
+
+ data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, INT);
+ if (integer == 0) {
+ *d++ = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = sizeof(integer); i > 0 ; i--) {
+ int byte = integer >> (8 * (i - 1));
+
+ if (!found && byte == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * for a positive number the first byte must have bit
+ * 7 clear in two's complement (otherwise it's a
+ * negative number) so prepend a leading zero if
+ * that's not the case
+ */
+ if (!found && (byte & 0x80)) {
+ /*
+ * no check needed here, we already know we
+ * have len >= 1
+ */
+ *d++ = 0;
+ data_len--;
+ }
+
+ found = true;
+ if (data_len == 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ *d++ = byte;
+ data_len--;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ data[1] = d - data - 2;
+
+ return d;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_integer);
+
+/* calculate the base 128 digit values setting the top bit of the first octet */
+static int asn1_encode_oid_digit(unsigned char **_data, int *data_len, u32 oid)
+{
+ unsigned char *data = *_data;
+ int start = 7 + 7 + 7 + 7;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (*data_len < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* quick case */
+ if (oid == 0) {
+ *data++ = 0x80;
+ (*data_len)--;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while (oid >> start == 0)
+ start -= 7;
+
+ while (start > 0 && *data_len > 0) {
+ u8 byte;
+
+ byte = oid >> start;
+ oid = oid - (byte << start);
+ start -= 7;
+ byte |= 0x80;
+ *data++ = byte;
+ (*data_len)--;
+ }
+
+ if (*data_len > 0) {
+ *data++ = oid;
+ (*data_len)--;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ *_data = data;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_oid() - encode an oid to ASN.1
+ * @data: position to begin encoding at
+ * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data
+ * @oid: array of oids
+ * @oid_len: length of oid array
+ *
+ * this encodes an OID up to ASN.1 when presented as an array of OID values
+ */
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_oid(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ u32 oid[], int oid_len)
+{
+ int data_len = end_data - data;
+ unsigned char *d = data + 2;
+ int i, ret;
+
+ if (WARN(oid_len < 2, "OID must have at least two elements"))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (WARN(oid_len > 32, "OID is too large"))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return data;
+
+
+ /* need at least 3 bytes for tag, length and OID encoding */
+ if (data_len < 3)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ data[0] = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OID);
+ *d++ = oid[0] * 40 + oid[1];
+
+ data_len -= 3;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < oid_len; i++) {
+ ret = asn1_encode_oid_digit(&d, &data_len, oid[i]);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ data[1] = d - data - 2;
+
+ return d;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_oid);
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_length() - encode a length to follow an ASN.1 tag
+ * @data: pointer to encode at
+ * @data_len: pointer to remaning length (adjusted by routine)
+ * @len: length to encode
+ *
+ * This routine can encode lengths up to 65535 using the ASN.1 rules.
+ * It will accept a negative length and place a zero length tag
+ * instead (to keep the ASN.1 valid). This convention allows other
+ * encoder primitives to accept negative lengths as singalling the
+ * sequence will be re-encoded when the length is known.
+ */
+static int asn1_encode_length(unsigned char **data, int *data_len, int len)
+{
+ if (*data_len < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (len < 0) {
+ *((*data)++) = 0;
+ (*data_len)--;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0x7f) {
+ *((*data)++) = len;
+ (*data_len)--;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (*data_len < 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (len <= 0xff) {
+ *((*data)++) = 0x81;
+ *((*data)++) = len & 0xff;
+ *data_len -= 2;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (*data_len < 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (len <= 0xffff) {
+ *((*data)++) = 0x82;
+ *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *((*data)++) = len & 0xff;
+ *data_len -= 3;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (WARN(len > 0xffffff, "ASN.1 length can't be > 0xffffff"))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (*data_len < 4)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *((*data)++) = 0x83;
+ *((*data)++) = (len >> 16) & 0xff;
+ *((*data)++) = (len >> 8) & 0xff;
+ *((*data)++) = len & 0xff;
+ *data_len -= 4;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_tag() - add a tag for optional or explicit value
+ * @data: pointer to place tag at
+ * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data
+ * @tag: tag to be placed
+ * @string: the data to be tagged
+ * @len: the length of the data to be tagged
+ *
+ * Note this currently only handles short form tags < 31.
+ *
+ * Standard usage is to pass in a @tag, @string and @length and the
+ * @string will be ASN.1 encoded with @tag and placed into @data. If
+ * the encoding would put data past @end_data then an error is
+ * returned, otherwise a pointer to a position one beyond the encoding
+ * is returned.
+ *
+ * To encode in place pass a NULL @string and -1 for @len and the
+ * maximum allowable beginning and end of the data; all this will do
+ * is add the current maximum length and update the data pointer to
+ * the place where the tag contents should be placed is returned. The
+ * data should be copied in by the calling routine which should then
+ * repeat the prior statement but now with the known length. In order
+ * to avoid having to keep both before and after pointers, the repeat
+ * expects to be called with @data pointing to where the first encode
+ * returned it and still NULL for @string but the real length in @len.
+ */
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_tag(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ u32 tag, const unsigned char *string, int len)
+{
+ int data_len = end_data - data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (WARN(tag > 30, "ASN.1 tag can't be > 30"))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (!string && WARN(len > 127,
+ "BUG: recode tag is too big (>127)"))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return data;
+
+ if (!string && len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the
+ * tag and install a dummy length because the real
+ * data_len should be NULL
+ */
+ data -= 2;
+ data_len = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (data_len < 2)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ *(data++) = _tagn(CONT, CONS, tag);
+ data_len--;
+ ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ if (!string)
+ return data;
+
+ if (data_len < len)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ memcpy(data, string, len);
+ data += len;
+
+ return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_tag);
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_octet_string() - encode an ASN.1 OCTET STRING
+ * @data: pointer to encode at
+ * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data
+ * @string: string to be encoded
+ * @len: length of string
+ *
+ * Note ASN.1 octet strings may contain zeros, so the length is obligatory.
+ */
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_octet_string(unsigned char *data,
+ const unsigned char *end_data,
+ const unsigned char *string, u32 len)
+{
+ int data_len = end_data - data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return data;
+
+ /* need minimum of 2 bytes for tag and length of zero length string */
+ if (data_len < 2)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, OTS);
+ data_len--;
+
+ ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ if (data_len < len)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ memcpy(data, string, len);
+ data += len;
+
+ return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_octet_string);
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_sequence() - wrap a byte stream in an ASN.1 SEQUENCE
+ * @data: pointer to encode at
+ * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data
+ * @seq: data to be encoded as a sequence
+ * @len: length of the data to be encoded as a sequence
+ *
+ * Fill in a sequence. To encode in place, pass NULL for @seq and -1
+ * for @len; then call again once the length is known (still with NULL
+ * for @seq). In order to avoid having to keep both before and after
+ * pointers, the repeat expects to be called with @data pointing to
+ * where the first encode placed it.
+ */
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_sequence(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ const unsigned char *seq, int len)
+{
+ int data_len = end_data - data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!seq && WARN(len > 127,
+ "BUG: recode sequence is too big (>127)"))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return data;
+
+ if (!seq && len >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * we're recoding, so move back to the start of the
+ * sequence and install a dummy length because the
+ * real length should be NULL
+ */
+ data -= 2;
+ data_len = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (data_len < 2)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, CONS, SEQ);
+ data_len--;
+
+ ret = asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ if (!seq)
+ return data;
+
+ if (data_len < len)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ memcpy(data, seq, len);
+ data += len;
+
+ return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_sequence);
+
+/**
+ * asn1_encode_boolean() - encode a boolean value to ASN.1
+ * @data: pointer to encode at
+ * @end_data: end of data pointer, points one beyond last usable byte in @data
+ * @val: the boolean true/false value
+ */
+unsigned char *
+asn1_encode_boolean(unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *end_data,
+ bool val)
+{
+ int data_len = end_data - data;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return data;
+
+ /* booleans are 3 bytes: tag, length == 1 and value == 0 or 1 */
+ if (data_len < 3)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ *(data++) = _tag(UNIV, PRIM, BOOL);
+ data_len--;
+
+ asn1_encode_length(&data, &data_len, 1);
+
+ if (val)
+ *(data++) = 1;
+ else
+ *(data++) = 0;
+
+ return data;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asn1_encode_boolean);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v15 2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-27 19:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations James Bottomley
` (5 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-01-27 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
The TCG has defined an OID prefix "2.23.133.10.1" for the various TPM
key uses. We've defined three of the available numbers:
2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually
RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
TPM2_Load() operation.
2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually
RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
TPM2_Import() operation.
Both loadable and importable keys are specific to a given TPM, the
difference is that a loadable key is wrapped with the symmetric
secret, so must have been created by the TPM itself. An importable
key is wrapped with a DH shared secret, and may be created without
access to the TPM provided you know the public part of the parent key.
2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128
bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually
represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before
use.
The ASN.1 binary key form starts of with this OID as the first element
of a sequence, giving the binary form a unique recognizable identity
marker regardless of encoding.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
v3: correct OID_TPMImportableKey name
v7: add ack
v9: add review
---
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index 4462ed2c18cd..d06988d1565e 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ enum OID {
OID_SM2_with_SM3, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.501 */
OID_sm3WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.156.10197.1.504 */
+ /* TCG defined OIDS for TPM based keys */
+ OID_TPMLoadableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.3 */
+ OID_TPMImportableKey, /* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */
+ OID_TPMSealedData, /* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */
+
OID__NR
};
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 1/5] lib: add ASN.1 encoder James Bottomley
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 2/5] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-27 19:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
` (4 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-01-27 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually
recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this
hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
so before
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u
after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
directly supplied password:
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u
Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
for which form is input.
Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM
2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.
Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
v6: change comment, eliminate else clauses and add fixes tag
v7: fixes before signoff
v12: fix mismerge from v6 to make processing continue after blobauth
v14: add tested by
Merge with auth fix
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-----
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 ++++---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index a94c03a61d8f..b2ed3481c6a0 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
uint16_t keytype;
uint32_t keyhandle;
unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t blobauth_len;
unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 74d82093cbaa..f81637521a04 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -781,13 +781,33 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
return -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_blobauth:
- if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
- SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (res < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes passed in as
+ * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
+ * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
+ */
+ opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+
+ if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
+ memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ opt->blobauth_len);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+
break;
+
case Opt_migratable:
if (*args[0].from == '0')
pay->migratable = 0;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 38bb33333cdf..6c6dd88d7bf6 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1);
+
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
+ if (options->blobauth_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
@@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
- TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ options->blobauth_len);
rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
if (rc > 0)
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-27 19:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-30 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
` (3 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-01-27 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior
trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the
exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
don't have to keep passing it in each time.
This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
keys with passwords but no policy.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
v2: Updated encode API, added length checks
v5: correct export format after doing interoperability checks
v7: use prefix tpm2_key_ instead of tpmkey_ for functions
v8: resplit commit
v9: select ASN1_ENCODER
v11: add ASN.1 format description
v13: fix ASN.1 compiler dependency
v14: select OID_REGISTRY add tested by
v15: signed blob len
---
.../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 58 +++++
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 +
security/keys/Kconfig | 3 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 4 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 11 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 210 +++++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 1da879a68640..549aa1308949 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -207,3 +207,61 @@ about the usage can be found in the file
Another new format 'enc32' has been defined in order to support encrypted keys
with payload size of 32 bytes. This will initially be used for nvdimm security
but may expand to other usages that require 32 bytes payload.
+
+
+TPM 2.0 ASN.1 Key Format
+------------------------
+
+The TPM 2.0 ASN.1 key format is designed to be easily recognisable,
+even in binary form (fixing a problem we had with the TPM 1.2 ASN.1
+format) and to be extensible for additions like importable keys and
+policy::
+
+ TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
+ parent INTEGER
+ pubkey OCTET STRING
+ privkey OCTET STRING
+ }
+
+type is what distinguishes the key even in binary form since the OID
+is provided by the TCG to be unique and thus forms a recognizable
+binary pattern at offset 3 in the key. The OIDs currently made
+available are::
+
+ 2.23.133.10.1.3 TPM Loadable key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually
+ RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
+ TPM2_Load() operation.
+
+ 2.23.133.10.1.4 TPM Importable Key. This is an asymmetric key (Usually
+ RSA2048 or Elliptic Curve) which can be imported by a
+ TPM2_Import() operation.
+
+ 2.23.133.10.1.5 TPM Sealed Data. This is a set of data (up to 128
+ bytes) which is sealed by the TPM. It usually
+ represents a symmetric key and must be unsealed before
+ use.
+
+The trusted key code only uses the TPM Sealed Data OID.
+
+emptyAuth is true if the key has well known authorization "". If it
+is false or not present, the key requires an explicit authorization
+phrase. This is used by most user space consumers to decide whether
+to prompt for a password.
+
+parent represents the parent key handle, either in the 0x81 MSO space,
+like 0x81000001 for the RSA primary storage key. Userspace programmes
+also support specifying the primary handle in the 0x40 MSO space. If
+this happens the Elliptic Curve variant of the primary key using the
+TCG defined template will be generated on the fly into a volatile
+object and used as the parent. The current kernel code only supports
+the 0x81 MSO form.
+
+pubkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PRIVATE excluding the
+initial TPM2B header, which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octet
+string length.
+
+privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
+initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
+string length.
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index b2ed3481c6a0..b2d87ad21714 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
unsigned int key_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
unsigned char migratable;
+ unsigned char old_format;
unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
};
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 83bc23409164..f0912692469b 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+ select ASN1_ENCODER
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ select ASN1
help
This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
index 7b73cebbb378..f87c43f306d5 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile
@@ -5,4 +5,6 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o
-trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
+
+$(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h
+trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3f6a9d01d1e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+--- ASN.1 for for TPM 2.0 keys
+---
+
+TPMKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({tpm2_key_type}),
+ emptyAuth [0] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL,
+ parent INTEGER ({tpm2_key_parent}),
+ pubkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_pub}),
+ privkey OCTET STRING ({tpm2_key_priv})
+ }
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index f81637521a04..ad6cd0000d8e 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
goto out;
}
- if (!options->keyhandle) {
+ if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 6c6dd88d7bf6..b8ef087528e9 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation
*/
+#include <linux/asn1_encoder.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/tpm.h>
@@ -12,6 +14,10 @@
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "tpm2key.asn1.h"
+
static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1},
{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256},
@@ -20,6 +26,165 @@ static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
};
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
+
+static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u8 *src, u32 len)
+{
+ const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
+ u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
+ u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE;
+ u8 *priv, *pub;
+ u16 priv_len, pub_len;
+
+ priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+ priv = src;
+
+ src += priv_len;
+
+ pub_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2;
+ pub = src;
+
+ if (!scratch)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
+ asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
+
+ if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+ unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
+ /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
+ w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
+ if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode"))
+ return PTR_ERR(w);
+ work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Assume both octet strings will encode to a 2 byte definite length
+ *
+ * Note: For a well behaved TPM, this warning should never
+ * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on
+ */
+ if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE,
+ "BUG: scratch buffer is too small"))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+ work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
+ work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
+
+ work1 = payload->blob;
+ work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob),
+ scratch, work - scratch);
+ if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed"))
+ return PTR_ERR(work1);
+
+ return work1 - payload->blob;
+}
+
+struct tpm2_key_context {
+ u32 parent;
+ const u8 *pub;
+ u32 pub_len;
+ const u8 *priv;
+ u32 priv_len;
+};
+
+static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u8 **buf)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
+ u8 *blob;
+
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
+ payload->blob_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!blob)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ *buf = blob;
+ options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+
+ memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
+ blob += ctx.priv_len;
+
+ memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_parent(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+ const u8 *v = value;
+ int i;
+
+ ctx->parent = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
+ ctx->parent <<= 8;
+ ctx->parent |= v[i];
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ enum OID oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+
+ if (oid != OID_TPMSealedData) {
+ char buffer[50];
+
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ pr_debug("OID is \"%s\" which is not TPMSealedData\n",
+ buffer);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_pub(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->pub = value;
+ ctx->pub_len = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct tpm2_key_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->priv = value;
+ ctx->priv_len = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
*
@@ -63,7 +228,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
- unsigned int blob_len;
+ int blob_len = 0;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 hash;
int i;
@@ -79,6 +244,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -146,8 +314,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len);
- payload->blob_len = blob_len;
+ blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options,
+ &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4],
+ blob_len);
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
@@ -158,6 +327,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
else
rc = -EPERM;
}
+ if (blob_len < 0)
+ return blob_len;
+
+ payload->blob_len = blob_len;
return rc;
}
@@ -184,13 +357,34 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
+ u8 *blob;
int rc;
- private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]);
- if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2))
+ rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* old form */
+ blob = payload->blob;
+ payload->old_format = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
+ if (payload->blob_len < 4)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
+
+ /* must be big enough for following public_len */
+ if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
+ if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
- public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]);
blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
@@ -206,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->keyauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len);
+ tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) {
rc = -E2BIG;
@@ -219,6 +413,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
+ if (blob != payload->blob)
+ kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
if (rc > 0)
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-30 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-30 17:12 ` James Bottomley
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-01-30 16:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:06:16AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
> ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior
> trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
> representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
> export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
>
> The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the
> exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
> openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
> specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
> handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
> don't have to keep passing it in each time.
>
> This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
> keys with passwords but no policy.
>
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
This one had some coding style errors:
WARNING: Possible repeated word: 'for'
#147: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1:2:
+--- ASN.1 for for TPM 2.0 keys
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
#198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
^
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
#198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
^
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
#198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
^
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
#198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
^
ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
#198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
+static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
I fixed them by hand. I will apply these now to my master branch first,
but can you just sanity check that your changes still work for you?
Cutting hairs, but better to be safe than sorry when doing even a single
change to the source code.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
2021-01-30 16:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2021-01-30 17:12 ` James Bottomley
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-01-30 17:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
On Sat, 2021-01-30 at 18:29 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:06:16AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
> > ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with
> > prior
> > trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
> > representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
> > export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
> >
> > The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus
> > the
> > exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
> > openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
> > specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
> > handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
> > don't have to keep passing it in each time.
> >
> > This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
> > keys with passwords but no policy.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <
> > James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> > Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
>
> This one had some coding style errors:
>
> WARNING: Possible repeated word: 'for'
> #147: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1:2:
> +--- ASN.1 for for TPM 2.0 keys
>
> ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
> #198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
> +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
> ^
>
> ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
> #198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
> +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
> ^
>
> ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
> #198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
> +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
> ^
>
> ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
> #198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
> +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
> ^
>
> ERROR: space required after that ',' (ctx:VxV)
> #198: FILE: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c:29:
> +static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2,23,133,10,1,5 };
THat's actually deliberate. the OID representation is traditionally a
sequence of numbers separated by a full stop, so it should be
2.23.133.10.1.5
Since we use an array to represent each number, the closest seemed to
be replacing the '.' with ',' hence leaving no spaces. I don't think
it hugely matters, but just saying there was a reason for the style
deviation.
> I fixed them by hand. I will apply these now to my master branch
> first, but can you just sanity check that your changes still work for
> you?
>
> Cutting hairs, but better to be safe than sorry when doing even a
> single change to the source code.
OK, I'll rebase on your tree and see what happens.
James
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v15 5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 4/5] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-27 19:06 ` James Bottomley
2021-01-28 6:00 ` [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework Jarkko Sakkinen
` (2 subsequent siblings)
7 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-01-27 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a
key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using
party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other
consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the
key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to
migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only
sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound
to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't
load.
Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're
loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from
the last byte of old format keys.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
v2: added length checks to untrusted payload
v8: recover patch
v14: add tested by
---
include/linux/tpm.h | 2 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index c4ca52138e8b..f1e32bc7d618 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ struct tpm_buf {
};
enum tpm2_object_attributes {
+ TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM = BIT(1),
+ TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT = BIT(4),
TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6),
};
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index b8ef087528e9..5d4e1f3ebb19 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
int blob_len = 0;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 hash;
+ u32 flags;
int i;
int rc;
@@ -259,31 +260,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
if (options->blobauth_len)
tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
- tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
/* public */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+ /* key properties */
+ flags = 0;
+ flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+ flags |= payload->migratable ? (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
+ TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT) : 0;
+ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags);
+
/* policy */
- if (options->policydigest_len) {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+ if (options->policydigest_len)
tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
options->policydigest_len);
- } else {
- tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH);
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
- }
/* public parameters */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
@@ -357,8 +359,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len;
- u8 *blob;
+ u8 *blob, *pub;
int rc;
+ u32 attrs;
rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
if (rc) {
@@ -385,6 +388,16 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
+ pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
+ /* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
+ attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
+
+ if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
+ (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
+ payload->migratable = 0;
+ else
+ payload->migratable = 1;
+
blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG;
@@ -465,7 +478,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup(
(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
- if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) {
+ if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
@@ -476,9 +489,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
- memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
- payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
- payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
+ if (payload->old_format) {
+ /* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
+ memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
+ payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
+ payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * migratable flag already collected from key
+ * attributes
+ */
+ memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
+ payload->key_len = data_len;
+ }
}
out:
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2021-01-27 19:06 ` [PATCH v15 5/5] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
@ 2021-01-28 6:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-10 15:58 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations David Howells
2021-02-19 18:24 ` [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework Jarkko Sakkinen
7 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-01-28 6:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:06:12AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> v15: fix 0day sign issue and add reviews and testeds
>
> General cover letter minus policy bit:
>
> This patch updates the trusted key code to export keys in the ASN.1
> format used by current TPM key tools (openssl_tpm2_engine and
> openconnect). The current code will try to load keys containing
> policy, but being unable to formulate the policy commands necessary to
> load them, the unseal will always fail unless the policy is executed
> in user space and a pre-formed policy session passed in.
>
> The key format is designed to be compatible with our two openssl
> engine implementations as well as with the format used by openconnect.
> I've added seal/unseal to my engine so I can use it for
> interoperability testing and I'll later use this for sealed symmetric
> keys via engine:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/
>
> James
>
> ---
>
> James Bottomley (5):
> lib: add ASN.1 encoder
> oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
> security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
> security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
> security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
AFAIK, bug fixes should merged before functional changes and migratable
flag has a regression:
https://marc.info/?l=linux-integrity&m=160255753405345
I'll send an update to this series.
/Jarkko
>
> .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 58 +++
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +
> include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 32 ++
> include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +
> include/linux/tpm.h | 2 +
> lib/Kconfig | 3 +
> lib/Makefile | 1 +
> lib/asn1_encoder.c | 454 ++++++++++++++++++
> security/keys/Kconfig | 3 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 4 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 11 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 34 +-
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 269 ++++++++++-
> 13 files changed, 846 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h
> create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c
> create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1
>
> --
> 2.26.2
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2021-01-28 6:00 ` [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2021-02-10 15:58 ` David Howells
2021-02-10 16:12 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-19 18:24 ` [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework Jarkko Sakkinen
7 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2021-02-10 15:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: dhowells, linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen,
David Woodhouse, keyrings
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
> keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u
I presume there should be a space in there?
David
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
2021-02-10 15:58 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations David Howells
@ 2021-02-10 16:12 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-12 11:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-02-10 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, Jarkko Sakkinen, David Woodhouse, keyrings
On Wed, 2021-02-10 at 15:58 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
>
> > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32
> > blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001
> > " @u
>
> I presume there should be a space in there?
Um, yes. My screen wraps at 80 characters which has keyhandle=
conveniently on the next line.
James
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
2021-02-10 16:12 ` James Bottomley
@ 2021-02-12 11:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-02-12 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: David Howells, linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings
On Wed, Feb 10, 2021 at 08:12:19AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Wed, 2021-02-10 at 15:58 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> wrote:
> >
> > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32
> > > blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001
> > > " @u
> >
> > I presume there should be a space in there?
>
> Um, yes. My screen wraps at 80 characters which has keyhandle=
> conveniently on the next line.
>
> James
Please send a new revision. There was already two checkpatch errors I had
to fix manually and also found 3rd issue when working with Sumit's patches:
trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o tpm2key.asn1.o
Please line these up like
trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o
trusted-y += tpm2key.asn1.o
Is coherent with the line adding trusted_tpm1.o, and makes merging new
features easier (e.g. TEE).
I dropped current patches.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework
2021-01-27 19:06 [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework James Bottomley
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2021-02-10 15:58 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations David Howells
@ 2021-02-19 18:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-19 18:35 ` James Bottomley
7 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-02-19 18:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:06:12AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> v15: fix 0day sign issue and add reviews and testeds
>
> General cover letter minus policy bit:
>
> This patch updates the trusted key code to export keys in the ASN.1
> format used by current TPM key tools (openssl_tpm2_engine and
> openconnect). The current code will try to load keys containing
> policy, but being unable to formulate the policy commands necessary to
> load them, the unseal will always fail unless the policy is executed
> in user space and a pre-formed policy session passed in.
>
> The key format is designed to be compatible with our two openssl
> engine implementations as well as with the format used by openconnect.
> I've added seal/unseal to my engine so I can use it for
> interoperability testing and I'll later use this for sealed symmetric
> keys via engine:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/
>
> James
>
> ---
>
> James Bottomley (5):
> lib: add ASN.1 encoder
> oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
> security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
> security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
> security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
This is online again in the master branch.
I've mangled the commits as follows:
1. Fixed my emails to jarkko@kernel.org.
2. Adjusted the Makefile, i.e. separate lines for each entry.
3. Fixed the checkpatch issues.
I guess we could potentially re-consider this to rc2 pull? With all the
mangling required, did not make sense to include this to the first pull.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework
2021-02-19 18:24 ` [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2021-02-19 18:35 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-20 2:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2021-02-19 18:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jarkko Sakkinen
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
On Fri, 2021-02-19 at 20:24 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:06:12AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > v15: fix 0day sign issue and add reviews and testeds
> >
> > General cover letter minus policy bit:
> >
> > This patch updates the trusted key code to export keys in the ASN.1
> > format used by current TPM key tools (openssl_tpm2_engine and
> > openconnect). The current code will try to load keys containing
> > policy, but being unable to formulate the policy commands necessary
> > to
> > load them, the unseal will always fail unless the policy is
> > executed
> > in user space and a pre-formed policy session passed in.
> >
> > The key format is designed to be compatible with our two openssl
> > engine implementations as well as with the format used by
> > openconnect.
> > I've added seal/unseal to my engine so I can use it for
> > interoperability testing and I'll later use this for sealed
> > symmetric
> > keys via engine:
> >
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/
> >
> > James
> >
> > ---
> >
> > James Bottomley (5):
> > lib: add ASN.1 encoder
> > oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
> > security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
> > security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
> > security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
>
> This is online again in the master branch.
>
> I've mangled the commits as follows:
>
> 1. Fixed my emails to jarkko@kernel.org.
> 2. Adjusted the Makefile, i.e. separate lines for each entry.
> 3. Fixed the checkpatch issues.
>
> I guess we could potentially re-consider this to rc2 pull? With all
> the mangling required, did not make sense to include this to the
> first pull.
The way I usually do this in SCSI, because stuff always happens
immediately before the merge window that causes some pull material to
be held over, is an early push, which you've done followed by a late
push on the Friday before the merge window closes of the rest of the
stuff. This is an example from the last but one merge window:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/fdee2336d2a7eada3749e07c3cc6ea682f8200b3.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/4affd2a9c347e5f1231485483bf852737ea08151.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
Linus seems to be happy with this pattern as long as it's well
explained.
James
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v15 0/5] TPM 2.0 trusted key rework
2021-02-19 18:35 ` James Bottomley
@ 2021-02-20 2:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2021-02-20 2:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: linux-integrity, Mimi Zohar, David Woodhouse, keyrings, David Howells
On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 10:35:00AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2021-02-19 at 20:24 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 11:06:12AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > v15: fix 0day sign issue and add reviews and testeds
> > >
> > > General cover letter minus policy bit:
> > >
> > > This patch updates the trusted key code to export keys in the ASN.1
> > > format used by current TPM key tools (openssl_tpm2_engine and
> > > openconnect). The current code will try to load keys containing
> > > policy, but being unable to formulate the policy commands necessary
> > > to
> > > load them, the unseal will always fail unless the policy is
> > > executed
> > > in user space and a pre-formed policy session passed in.
> > >
> > > The key format is designed to be compatible with our two openssl
> > > engine implementations as well as with the format used by
> > > openconnect.
> > > I've added seal/unseal to my engine so I can use it for
> > > interoperability testing and I'll later use this for sealed
> > > symmetric
> > > keys via engine:
> > >
> > > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/openssl_tpm2_engine.git/
> > >
> > > James
> > >
> > > ---
> > >
> > > James Bottomley (5):
> > > lib: add ASN.1 encoder
> > > oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
> > > security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
> > > security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
> > > security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
> >
> > This is online again in the master branch.
> >
> > I've mangled the commits as follows:
> >
> > 1. Fixed my emails to jarkko@kernel.org.
> > 2. Adjusted the Makefile, i.e. separate lines for each entry.
> > 3. Fixed the checkpatch issues.
> >
> > I guess we could potentially re-consider this to rc2 pull? With all
> > the mangling required, did not make sense to include this to the
> > first pull.
>
> The way I usually do this in SCSI, because stuff always happens
> immediately before the merge window that causes some pull material to
> be held over, is an early push, which you've done followed by a late
> push on the Friday before the merge window closes of the rest of the
> stuff. This is an example from the last but one merge window:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/fdee2336d2a7eada3749e07c3cc6ea682f8200b3.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-scsi/4affd2a9c347e5f1231485483bf852737ea08151.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
>
> Linus seems to be happy with this pattern as long as it's well
> explained.
>
> James
OK, thanks, I'll keep this in mind.
/Jarkko
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread