From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 16:19:49 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations Message-Id: <20200227161949.GD5140@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable List-Id: References: <20200130101812.6271-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200130101812.6271-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com> <1582765091.4245.33.camel@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <1582765091.4245.33.camel@HansenPartnership.com> To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 04:58:11PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2020-02-25 at 18:48 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:18:09AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote: > > > In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec > > > actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use > > > the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't > > > require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is > > > a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in > > > of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should > > > allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' > > > parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text > > > passwords for the keys. > > >=20 > > > so before > > >=20 > > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 > > > blobauth=F572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" > > >=20 > > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > > > directly supplied password: > > >=20 > > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=3Dhello keyhandle=81000001" > > >=20 > > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > > > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator > > > for which form is input. > > >=20 > > > Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM > > > 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty > > > authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing > > > in > > > 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the > > > Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this > > > patch > > > makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. > > >=20 > > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley > > om> > >=20 > > Should have a fixes tag. >=20 > I made all the other changes, but I'm not sure what to identify in the > fixes tag. The problem is the code I updated was simply carried over > unaltered from TPM 1.2 >=20 > You could certainly argue that commit >=20 > commit 0fe5480303a1657b328a0a389f8d99249d9961f5 > Author: Jarkko Sakkinen > Date: Fri Jun 26 22:28:26 2015 +0300 >=20 > keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips >=20 > Should have updated the blobauth handling ... is that the one you'd > like fixes: to identify? What I'm thinking is to have fixes tag w/o cc to stable. I'm not sure at this point whether we want to backport this but it still makes sense to tag it. /Jarkko