From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0BF06C63777 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 03:46:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD37320866 for ; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 03:46:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="RiYq5Rlx" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726663AbgKXDqL (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 22:46:11 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:43762 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726315AbgKXDqK (ORCPT ); Mon, 23 Nov 2020 22:46:10 -0500 Received: from kernel.org (83-245-197-237.elisa-laajakaista.fi [83.245.197.237]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F072720857; Tue, 24 Nov 2020 03:46:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1606189569; bh=RSXTf9SubKcd85uMsg6Gbq1+/EGRW74DKmlEXBxEEbs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=RiYq5Rlx74PZztgXDLzdCzbhSdvsCj6d6r+v53pxUGZJllBF0QLIYt+ru+pX6DvLh MnSHyM7QtVBnG3E89ms6+F6rFma9uyuNCigE6xkzlt5xJwPW0VB8tJZn9PHIbZckz4 XVHpybvgYZoa3WYB/bH/Jf+5bTy6NpBv9gC6GRUI= Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 05:46:01 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Sumit Garg Cc: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, janne.karhunen@gmail.com, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, lhinds@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Message-ID: <20201124034601.GB40379@kernel.org> References: <1604419306-26105-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> <1604419306-26105-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1604419306-26105-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 09:31:44PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality > to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. > > Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE. > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg > --- > include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 55 ++++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 278 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 338 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..2e2bb15 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h > @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Linaro Ltd. > + * > + * Author: > + * Sumit Garg > + */ > + > +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H > +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H > + > +#include > + > +#define DRIVER_NAME "tee-trusted-key" > + > +/* > + * Get random data for symmetric key > + * > + * [out] memref[0] Random data > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 > + > +/* > + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key > + * > + * [in] memref[0] Plain key > + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 > + > +/* > + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key > + * > + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob > + * [out] memref[1] Plain key > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 > + > +/** > + * struct trusted_key_private - TEE Trusted key private data > + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. > + * @ctx: TEE context handler. > + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. > + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. > + */ > +struct trusted_key_private { > + struct device *dev; > + struct tee_context *ctx; > + u32 session_id; > + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; > +}; > + > +extern struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops; > + > +#endif > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > index 49e3bcf..012dd78 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o > trusted-y += trusted_core.o > trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o > trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o > +trusted-y += trusted_tee.o > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > index aa4f2a0..15b1b0f3 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -29,6 +30,9 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { > #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) > { "tpm", &tpm_trusted_key_ops }, > #endif > +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) > + { "tee", &tee_trusted_key_ops }, > +#endif > }; > > DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..da8785a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Linaro Ltd. > + * > + * Author: > + * Sumit Garg > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include > +#include > + > +static struct trusted_key_private pvt_data; > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key > + */ > +static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, > + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); > + } > + > + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, > + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); > + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); > + goto out; > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; > + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; > + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); > + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; > + } > + > +out: > + if (reg_shm_out) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); > + if (reg_shm_in) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key > + */ > +static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, > + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); > + } > + > + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, > + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); > + goto out; > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; > + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; > + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); > + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; > + } > + > +out: > + if (reg_shm_out) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); > + if (reg_shm_in) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key > + */ > +static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) > +{ > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, > + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; > + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; > + } > + > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) > +{ > + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) > + return 1; > + else > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) > +{ > + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); > + int ret; > + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; > + > + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); > + > + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, > + NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) > + return -ENODEV; > + > + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); > + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; > + sess_arg.num_params = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); > + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", > + sess_arg.ret); > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_ctx; > + } > + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; > + > + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_sess; > + > + pvt_data.dev = dev; > + > + return 0; > + > +out_sess: > + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); > +out_ctx: > + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) > +{ > + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); > + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { > + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, > + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, > + {} > +}; > +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); > + > +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { > + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, > + .driver = { > + .name = DRIVER_NAME, > + .bus = &tee_bus_type, > + .probe = trusted_key_probe, > + .remove = trusted_key_remove, > + }, > +}; > + > +static int trusted_tee_init(void) > +{ > + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); > +} > + > +static void trusted_tee_exit(void) > +{ > + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); > +} > + > +struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops = { Nit: trusted_key_tee_ops > + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ > + .init = trusted_tee_init, > + .seal = trusted_tee_seal, > + .unseal = trusted_tee_unseal, > + .get_random = trusted_tee_get_random, > + .exit = trusted_tee_exit, > +}; > -- > 2.7.4 > > /Jarkko