From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com,
nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org,
nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
glin@suse.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 07/14] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2021 22:18:48 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210812021855.3083178-8-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210812021855.3083178-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through
the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the
new mok keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys.
Introduce a new keyring handler specific for mok keys. If mok keys are
trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
---
v1: Initial version
v3: Only change the keyring handler if the secondary is enabled
---
.../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
.../integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 5 +++++
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index 5604bd57c990..b6daeb1e3de5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
/*
* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
- * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
+ * the UEFI db tables.
*/
__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
{
@@ -75,6 +75,21 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the MokListRT tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+ if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
+ return add_to_mok_keyring;
+ else
+ return add_to_platform_keyring;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
* the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 2462bfa08fe3..284558f30411 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
*/
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the mok.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
/*
* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
*/
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index f290f78c3f30..c1bfd1cd7cc3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
mokvar_entry->data,
mokvar_entry->data_size,
- get_handler_for_db);
+ get_handler_for_mok);
/* All done if that worked. */
if (!rc)
return rc;
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
if (mok) {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
- mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+ mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok);
kfree(mok);
if (rc)
pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
--
2.18.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-12 2:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-12 2:18 [PATCH v3 00/14] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 18:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-12 22:16 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-13 18:26 ` Nayna
2021-08-12 21:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 22:36 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-13 0:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 19:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-12 22:04 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] integrity: accessor function to get trust_moklist Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] KEYS: change link restriction for secondary to also trust mok Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 19:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 22:10 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] integrity: change ima link restriction to include mok keys Eric Snowberg
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