From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A360CC433EF for ; Thu, 16 Sep 2021 22:14:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7E9EF610E9 for ; Thu, 16 Sep 2021 22:14:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S240832AbhIPWPt (ORCPT ); Thu, 16 Sep 2021 18:15:49 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]:24858 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240764AbhIPWPt (ORCPT ); Thu, 16 Sep 2021 18:15:49 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1631830468; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=E0CG1ZeRgflAc20F7zcmBoOrMfwo5YGuJv5LLNqTMkY=; b=RUkrjnlNB71Q7S8ZyMixsP02D72FR71S/AnPvwoQMjMlwCV2uh42pp2FwmeTshsDSiFxKH tFKJIS/QwXIr8lK6GJf4gt+oxdVS8D5zCQ6M2tYbeUC/SObqdeWyPP7+2gzlQkvNZzOQCW cmwWy5NgQEkEjtOomN57/JbROwHCwj0= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-162-Yjm4HXchPxOivu-FlClMIQ-1; Thu, 16 Sep 2021 18:14:25 -0400 X-MC-Unique: Yjm4HXchPxOivu-FlClMIQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B08541084681; Thu, 16 Sep 2021 22:14:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (ovpn-112-133.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.112.133]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8637F7A5CF; Thu, 16 Sep 2021 22:14:18 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 18:14:16 -0400 From: Peter Jones To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: Eric Snowberg , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, "konrad.wilk@oracle.com" Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Message-ID: <20210916221416.onvqgz5iij3c7e6j@redhat.com> References: <20210914211416.34096-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: NeoMutt/20180716 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 06:15:50PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, 2021-09-15 at 15:28 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote: > > > On Sep 15, 2021, at 11:57 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, 2021-09-14 at 17:14 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: > > > > Back in 2013 Linus requested a feature to allow end-users to have the > > > > ability "to add their own keys and sign modules they trust". This was > > > > his *second* order outlined here [1]. There have been many attempts > > > > over the years to solve this problem, all have been rejected. Many > > > > of the failed attempts loaded all preboot firmware keys into the kernel, > > > > including the Secure Boot keys. Many distributions carry one of these > > > > rejected attempts [2], [3], [4]. This series tries to solve this problem > > > > with a solution that takes into account all the problems brought up in > > > > the previous attempts. > > > > > > > > On UEFI based systems, this series introduces a new Linux kernel keyring > > > > containing the Machine Owner Keys (MOK) called machine. It also defines > > > > a new MOK variable in shim. This variable allows the end-user to decide > > > > if they want to load MOK keys into the machine keyring. Mimi has suggested > > > > that only CA keys contained within the MOK be loaded into the machine > > > > keyring. All other certs will load into the platform keyring instead. > > > > > > > > By default, nothing changes; MOK keys are not loaded into the machine > > > > keyring. They are only loaded after the end-user makes the decision > > > > themselves. The end-user would set this through mokutil using a new > > > > --trust-mok option [5]. This would work similar to how the kernel uses > > > > MOK variables to enable/disable signature validation as well as use/ignore > > > > the db. Any kernel operation that uses either the builtin or secondary > > > > trusted keys as a trust source shall also reference the new machine > > > > keyring as a trust source. > > > > > > > > Secure Boot keys will never be loaded into the machine keyring. They > > > > will always be loaded into the platform keyring. If an end-user wanted > > > > to load one, they would need to enroll it into the MOK. > > > > > > > > Steps required by the end user: > > > > > > > > Sign kernel module with user created key: > > > > $ /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file sha512 \ > > > > machine_signing_key.priv machine_signing_key.x509 my_module.ko > > > > > > > > Import the key into the MOK > > > > $ mokutil --import machine_signing_key.x509 > > > > > > > > Setup the kernel to load MOK keys into the .machine keyring > > > > $ mokutil --trust-mok > > > > > > > > Then reboot, the MokManager will load and ask if you want to trust the > > > > MOK key and enroll the MOK into the MOKList. Afterwards the signed kernel > > > > module will load. > > > > > > > > I have included links to both the mokutil [5] and shim [6] changes I > > > > have made to support this new functionality. > > > > > > How hard it is to self-compile shim and boot it with QEMU (I > > > do not know even the GIT location of Shim)? > > > > It is not hard, that is the setup I use for my testing. Upstream shim > > is located here [1]. Or you can use my repo which contains the necessary > > changes [2]. > > > > [1] https://github.com/rhboot/shim > > [2] https://github.com/esnowberg/shim/tree/mokvars-v2 > > > > So, my 2nd Q would be: which order these should be upstreamed? > > Linux patch set cannot depend on "yet to be upstreamed" things. > > Code changes look good enough to me. We can carry this support in shim before it's in kernel. Eric's current patch for shim and mokutil looks mostly reasonable, though I see a few minor nits we'll have to sort out. -- Peter