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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/11] tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend()
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 12:55:12 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230124175516.5984-8-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230124175516.5984-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

We use tpm2_pcr_extend() in trusted keys to extend a PCR to prevent a
key from being re-loaded until the next reboot.  To use this
functionality securely, that extend must be protected by a session
hmac.

Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 28 +++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 056dad3dd5c9..001360d5956d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -216,13 +216,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-struct tpm2_null_auth_area {
-	__be32  handle;
-	__be16  nonce_size;
-	u8  attributes;
-	__be16  auth_size;
-} __packed;
-
 /**
  * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value
  *
@@ -236,24 +229,23 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 		    struct tpm_digest *digests)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area;
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
 	int rc;
 	int i;
 
-	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip, &auth);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
+	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm2_end_auth_session(auth);
+		return rc;
+	}
 
-	auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW);
-	auth_area.nonce_size = 0;
-	auth_area.attributes = 0;
-	auth_area.auth_size = 0;
+	tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, pcr_idx, NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, 0, NULL, 0);
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area));
-	tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area,
-		       sizeof(auth_area));
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, chip->nr_allocated_banks);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
@@ -262,7 +254,9 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
 			       chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size);
 	}
 
+	tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth);
 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value");
+	rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc);
 
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
-- 
2.35.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-01-24 17:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-24 17:55 [PATCH v2 00/11] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 01/11] tpm: move buffer handling from static inlines to real functions James Bottomley
2023-01-24 19:57   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-25 14:01     ` James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 02/11] tpm: add buffer handling for TPM2B types James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 03/11] tpm: add cursor based buffer functions for response parsing James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 04/11] tpm: add buffer function to point to returned parameters James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 05/11] tpm: export the context save and load commands James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 06/11] tpm: Add full HMAC and encrypt/decrypt session handling code James Bottomley
2023-01-24 20:48   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-24 23:11   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-25 12:59     ` James Bottomley
2023-02-03  6:06       ` Yujie Liu
2023-02-08  2:49         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-10 14:48           ` James Bottomley
2023-02-13  7:45             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-13  9:31               ` Yujie Liu
2023-02-14 13:54               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-02-14 14:28                 ` James Bottomley
2023-02-14 14:36                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-02-16 14:52                     ` James Bottomley
2023-02-17  8:49                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-02-14 14:34                 ` James Bottomley
2023-02-17 21:51                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-02-08  4:35         ` James Bottomley
2023-01-25  6:03   ` kernel test robot
2023-01-24 17:55 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 08/11] tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 09/11] KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2023-01-29 13:06   ` Ben Boeckel
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 10/11] tpm: add the null key name as a sysfs export James Bottomley
2023-01-24 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 11/11] Documentation: add tpm-security.rst James Bottomley

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