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From: Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@suse.com>
To: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Malte Gell <malte.gell@gmx.de>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8,2/4] PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification
Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 16:19:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <333b0737-8cd2-244d-b6f5-52d9702315a8@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210524021540.18736-3-jlee@suse.com>

Hi Joey,

On 5/24/21 4:15 AM, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> This patch adds the logic for checking the CodeSigning extended
> key usage when verifying signature of kernel module or
> kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
> 
> Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
> ---
>  certs/blacklist.c                    |  6 +++--
>  certs/system_keyring.c               |  4 ++--
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig       |  9 ++++++++
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  include/crypto/pkcs7.h               |  4 +++-
>  include/keys/system_keyring.h        |  7 ++++--
>  6 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
> index c9a435b15af4..a4ef26286584 100644
> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
>  #include <linux/seq_file.h>
>  #include <linux/uidgid.h>
>  #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
>  #include "blacklist.h"
>  #include "common.h"
>  
> @@ -181,11 +182,12 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
>   * is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked
>   * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check
>   */
> -int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
> +int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> +			      enum key_being_used_for usage)
>  {
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
> +	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring, usage, false);
>  
>  	if (ret == 0)
>  		return -EKEYREJECTED;
> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
> index 692365dee2bd..394cf4e0feed 100644
> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
> @@ -221,13 +221,13 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
>  			goto error;
>  		}
>  
> -		ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
> +		ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7, usage);
>  		if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
>  			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
>  			goto error;
>  		}
>  	}
> -	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
> +	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, true);
>  	if (ret < 0) {
>  		if (ret == -ENOKEY)
>  			pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
> index 1f1f004dc757..1754812df989 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
> @@ -96,4 +96,13 @@ config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
>  	  This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a
>  	  signed PE binary.
>  
> +config CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU
> +	bool "Check codeSigning extended key usage"
> +	depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
> +	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
> +	help
> +	  This option provides support for checking the codeSigning extended
> +	  key usage when verifying the signature in PKCS#7. It affects kernel
> +	  module verification and kexec PE binary verification.
> +
>  endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> index b531df2013c4..c6ebf3e6adfd 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> @@ -16,12 +16,40 @@
>  #include <crypto/public_key.h>
>  #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU
> +static bool check_eku_by_usage(struct key *key, enum key_being_used_for usage)

Can this check fit into the existing find_asymmetric_key call (or, a new
find_asymmetric_key_by_usage call) instead? pkcs7_validate_trust_one
needs to match the signature against an EKU_codeSigning key on trust_keyring.

Thanks,
Varad

> +{
> +	struct public_key *public_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
> +	bool ret = true;
> +
> +	switch (usage) {
> +	case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
> +	case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
> +		ret = !!(public_key->eku & EKU_codeSigning);
> +		if (!ret)
> +			pr_warn("The signer '%s' key is not CodeSigning\n",
> +				key->description);
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		break;
> +	}
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +#else
> +static bool check_eku_by_usage(struct key *key, enum key_being_used_for usage)
> +{
> +	return true;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
>   */
>  static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>  				    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
> -				    struct key *trust_keyring)
> +				    struct key *trust_keyring,
> +				    enum key_being_used_for usage,
> +				    bool check_eku)
>  {
>  	struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
>  	struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
> @@ -112,6 +140,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>  	return -ENOKEY;
>  
>  matched:
> +	if (check_eku && !check_eku_by_usage(key, usage)) {
> +		key_put(key);
> +		return -ENOKEY;
> +	}
>  	ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
>  	key_put(key);
>  	if (ret < 0) {
> @@ -135,6 +167,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>   * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
>   * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
>   * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
> + * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
> + * @check_eku: Check EKU (Extended Key Usage)
>   *
>   * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
>   * keys we already know and trust.
> @@ -156,7 +190,9 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>   * May also return -ENOMEM.
>   */
>  int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> -			 struct key *trust_keyring)
> +			 struct key *trust_keyring,
> +			 enum key_being_used_for usage,
> +			 bool check_eku)
>  {
>  	struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
>  	struct x509_certificate *p;
> @@ -167,7 +203,8 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>  		p->seen = false;
>  
>  	for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
> -		ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
> +		ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring,
> +					       usage, check_eku);
>  		switch (ret) {
>  		case -ENOKEY:
>  			continue;
> diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
> index 38ec7f5f9041..5d87b8a02f79 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
> @@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>   * pkcs7_trust.c
>   */
>  extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> -				struct key *trust_keyring);
> +				struct key *trust_keyring,
> +				enum key_being_used_for usage,
> +				bool check_eku);
>  
>  /*
>   * pkcs7_verify.c
> diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> index 6acd3cf13a18..434a9b41d3a5 100644
> --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>  #define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
>  
>  #include <linux/key.h>
> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
>  
> @@ -59,13 +60,15 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
>  extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size);
> -extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
> +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> +				     enum key_being_used_for usage);
>  #else
>  static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> -static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
> +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> +					    enum key_being_used_for usage)
>  {
>  	return -ENOKEY;
>  }
> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-01 14:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-24  2:15 [PATCH v8 0/4] Check codeSigning extended key usage extension Lee, Chun-Yi
2021-05-24  2:15 ` [PATCH v8,1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing Lee, Chun-Yi
2021-05-24 21:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-25 10:35     ` joeyli
2021-05-28 13:58   ` Varad Gautam
2021-05-24  2:15 ` [PATCH v8,2/4] PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification Lee, Chun-Yi
2021-06-01 14:19   ` Varad Gautam [this message]
2021-05-24  2:15 ` [PATCH v8,3/4] modsign: Add codeSigning EKU when generating X.509 key generation config Lee, Chun-Yi
2021-05-24  2:15 ` [PATCH v8,4/4] Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst: add openssl command option example for CodeSign EKU Lee, Chun-Yi

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