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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kernel@pengutronix.de,
	jlu@pengutronix.de
Subject: Re: Migration to trusted keys: sealing user-provided key?
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2021 19:53:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6dc99fd9ffbc5f405c5f64d0802d1399fc6428e4.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de>

On Thu, 2021-01-28 at 18:31 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I've been looking into how a migration to using trusted/encrypted keys
> would look like (particularly with dm-crypt).
> 
> Currently, it seems the the only way is to re-encrypt the partitions
> because trusted/encrypted keys always generate their payloads from
> RNG.
> 
> If instead there was a key command to initialize a new trusted/encrypted
> key with a user provided value, users could use whatever mechanism they
> used beforehand to get a plaintext key and use that to initialize a new
> trusted/encrypted key. From there on, the key will be like any other
> trusted/encrypted key and not be disclosed again to userspace.
> 
> What are your thoughts on this? Would an API like
> 
>   keyctl add trusted dmcrypt-key 'set <content>' # user-supplied content
> 
> be acceptable?

Maybe it's the lack of knowledge with dm-crypt, but why this would be
useful? Just want to understand the bottleneck, that's all.

> Cheers,
> Ahmad

/Jarkko 

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-30 17:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-28 17:31 Migration to trusted keys: sealing user-provided key? Ahmad Fatoum
2021-01-30 17:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-01-30 18:07   ` James Bottomley
     [not found]   ` <d1bed49f89495ceb529355cb41655a208fdb2197.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2021-01-31 14:14     ` Jan Lübbe
2021-01-31 18:09       ` James Bottomley
2021-02-02 12:15         ` Sumit Garg
2021-02-02 12:34           ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-03 11:50             ` Sumit Garg
2021-02-03 13:46               ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-04  5:30                 ` Sumit Garg
     [not found]       ` <d4eeefa0c13395e91850630e22d0d9e3690f43ac.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2021-02-01 15:31         ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-01 16:11           ` Mimi Zohar
2021-02-01 16:38             ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-01 19:46               ` Mimi Zohar
2021-02-08 14:38                 ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-08 21:50                   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-02-09  7:16                     ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-01 11:36     ` David Howells
2021-02-01 15:50       ` Jan Lübbe
2021-02-01 17:04       ` David Howells

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