From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:06:57 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e1c072eba237e75fc687e9318f65e7395e2ca00b.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210114151909.2344974-10-mic@digikod.net>
Hi Mickaël,
On Thu, 2021-01-14 at 16:19 +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
>
> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
> trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
> key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
> provided as the key payload.
>
> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
> is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
>
> Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
> make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
> * forbids key update;
> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
> root user rights.
>
> See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a
> following commit.
The design looks good. I'm hoping to review/test at least this patch
next week.
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-15 13:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-14 15:18 [PATCH v3 00/10] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 01/10] certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 3:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 02/10] certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 3:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 11:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 23:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 03/10] PKCS#7: Fix missing include Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 3:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 04/10] certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 3:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 11:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 23:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 05/10] certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 5:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 11:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 23:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 06/10] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 4:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 11:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 07/10] certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 08/10] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 5:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 11:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-20 23:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-21 9:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-21 15:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-15 13:06 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2021-01-20 5:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 11:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-14 15:19 ` [PATCH v3 10/10] tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh Mickaël Salaün
2021-01-15 9:28 ` [PATCH v3 00/10] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring Jarkko Sakkinen
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