Ksummit-Discuss Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: ksummit <ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] seccomp
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2019 10:48:38 -0700
Message-ID: <201908151034.CC0F7BD84@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXWWS-8t5udg593CoWP330L=W94xsvB_skL-oL2tUFH+g@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:54:49AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> After thinking about this a bit more, I think that deferring the main
> seccomp filter invocation until arguments have been read is too
> problematic.  It has the ordering issues you're thinking of, but it
> also has unpleasant effects if one of the reads faults or if
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE or SECCOMP_RET_TRAP is used.  I'm thinking that this

Right, I was actually thinking of the trace/trap as being the race.

> type of deeper inspection filter should just be a totally separate
> layer.  Once the main seccomp logic decides that a filterable syscall
> will be issued then, assuming that no -EFAULT happens, a totally
> different program should get run with access to arguments.  And there
> should be a way for the main program to know that the syscall nr in
> question is filterable on the running kernel.

Right -- this is how I designed the original prototype: it was
effectively an LSM that was triggered by seccomp (since LSMs don't know
anything about syscalls -- their hooks are more generalized). So seccomp
would set a flag to make the LSM hook pay attention.

Existing LSMs are system-owner defined, so really something like Landlock
is needed for a process-owned LSM to be defined. But I worry that LSM
hooks are still too "deep" in the kernel to have a process-oriented
filter author who is not a kernel developer make any sense of the
hooks. They're certainly oriented in a better position to gain the
intent of a filter. For example, if a filter says "you can't open(2)
/etc/foo", but it misses saying "you can't openat(2) /etc/foo", that's a
dumb exposure. The LSM hooks are positioned to say "you can't manipulate
/etc/foo through any means".

So, I'm not entirely sure. It needs a clear design that chooses and
justifies the appropriate "depth" of filtering. And FWIW, the two most
frequent examples of argument parsing requests have been path-based
checking and network address checking. So any prototype needs to handle
these two cases sanely...

Kees Cook

  reply index

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-19  9:35 Christian Brauner
2019-07-19 12:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-20  3:18   ` Kees Cook
2019-08-14 17:54     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 17:48       ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-08-15 18:26         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 18:31           ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-15 19:21             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-20  7:23 ` James Morris
2019-07-20  7:41   ` Christian Brauner
2019-07-25 14:18     ` Serge E. Hallyn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publically to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=201908151034.CC0F7BD84@keescook \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \


* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

Ksummit-Discuss Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/ksummit-discuss/0 ksummit-discuss/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 ksummit-discuss ksummit-discuss/ https://lore.kernel.org/ksummit-discuss \
	public-inbox-index ksummit-discuss

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:

AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git