From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: ksummit <ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] seccomp
Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2019 05:32:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVpbSDraiwJRmOj28wepTjEPiSDQz=DUuSig_P1rSGZ6Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190719093538.dhyopljyr5ns33qx@brauner.io>
On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 2:35 AM Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> wrote:
>
> In light of all this, I would argue that we should seriously look into
> extending seccomp to allow filtering on pointer arguments.
I won't be at LPC this year, but I was thinking about this anyway. I
have the following suggestion that might be a bit unorthodox: have
syscalls opt into this filtering. Specifically, a syscall that
supports pointer filtering would be refactored the way a bunch of our
syscalls are already refactored. The baseline situation is:
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(syscallname, struct foo __user *, buf) { ... }
Instead, we would do:
SYSCALL_FILTERABLE(syscallname, struct foo __user *, buf)
{
int ret;
struct foo kbuf;
ret = copy_from_user(&kbuf, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = seccomp_deep_filter(syscallname, 0, &kbuf);
if (ret)
return ret;
return do_syscallname(&kbuf);
}
In principle, if we know we're doing a FILTERABLE syscall, we could
skip the initial seccomp invocation and just defer it until
seccomp_deep_filter(), although this might interact badly with any
SECCOMP_RET_PTRACE handles that change nr.
To make this robust, it might help a lot if the generation of these
stubs was mostly automated.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-19 12:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-19 9:35 [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] seccomp Christian Brauner
2019-07-19 12:32 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-07-20 3:18 ` Kees Cook
2019-08-14 17:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 17:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-08-15 18:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 18:31 ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-15 19:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-20 7:23 ` James Morris
2019-07-20 7:41 ` Christian Brauner
2019-07-25 14:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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