From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D53BC54FD0 for ; Sun, 22 Mar 2020 12:31:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4572B20769 for ; Sun, 22 Mar 2020 12:31:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727289AbgCVMa5 (ORCPT ); Sun, 22 Mar 2020 08:30:57 -0400 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:58572 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727113AbgCVMak (ORCPT ); Sun, 22 Mar 2020 08:30:40 -0400 IronPort-SDR: gLZ/aqB3ozTnD/zW40HheZYk1alb+d9+OMGuZ/EVcQeZPFvB/Du9urn4k7AJg6u62Jw75mGpfE OE9gXCbsd9Hg== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga008.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.65]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Mar 2020 05:30:39 -0700 IronPort-SDR: /UWCFhhjSzkWUmhH16kN9TNz6wt1CA5Xw9SVpRut/yrNyw15hDWS28ojNb7ztEDnj1UjcspGz+ l1rS7MKbeoGg== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.72,292,1580803200"; d="scan'208";a="239664380" Received: from jacob-builder.jf.intel.com ([10.7.199.155]) by orsmga008.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 22 Mar 2020 05:30:38 -0700 From: Liu Yi L To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, alex.williamson@redhat.com, peterx@redhat.com Cc: eric.auger@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, david@gibson.dropbear.id.au, kevin.tian@intel.com, yi.l.liu@intel.com, jun.j.tian@intel.com, yi.y.sun@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, hao.wu@intel.com, jean-philippe@linaro.org, Jacob Pan , Yi Sun , Richard Henderson , Eduardo Habkost Subject: [PATCH v1 10/22] intel_iommu: add virtual command capability support Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2020 05:36:07 -0700 Message-Id: <1584880579-12178-11-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1584880579-12178-1-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> References: <1584880579-12178-1-git-send-email-yi.l.liu@intel.com> Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org This patch adds virtual command support to Intel vIOMMU per Intel VT-d 3.1 spec. And adds two virtual commands: allocate pasid and free pasid. Cc: Kevin Tian Cc: Jacob Pan Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Yi Sun Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Richard Henderson Cc: Eduardo Habkost Reviewed-by: Peter Xu Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L Signed-off-by: Yi Sun --- hw/i386/intel_iommu.c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h | 37 ++++++++++ hw/i386/trace-events | 1 + include/hw/i386/intel_iommu.h | 10 ++- 4 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c b/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c index 8d9204f..0c402e4 100644 --- a/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c +++ b/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c @@ -2651,6 +2651,129 @@ static void vtd_handle_iectl_write(IntelIOMMUState *s) } } +static int vtd_request_pasid_alloc(IntelIOMMUState *s, uint32_t *pasid) +{ + VTDHostIOMMUContext *vtd_dev_icx; + int ret = -1; + + vtd_iommu_lock(s); + QLIST_FOREACH(vtd_dev_icx, &s->vtd_dev_icx_list, next) { + HostIOMMUContext *host_icx = vtd_dev_icx->host_icx; + + /* + * We'll return the first valid result we got. It's + * a bit hackish in that we don't have a good global + * interface yet to talk to modules like vfio to deliver + * this allocation request, so we're leveraging this + * per-device iommu context to do the same thing just + * to make sure the allocation happens only once. + */ + ret = host_iommu_ctx_pasid_alloc(host_icx, VTD_MIN_HPASID, + VTD_MAX_HPASID, pasid); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + } + vtd_iommu_unlock(s); + + return ret; +} + +static int vtd_request_pasid_free(IntelIOMMUState *s, uint32_t pasid) +{ + VTDHostIOMMUContext *vtd_dev_icx; + int ret = -1; + + vtd_iommu_lock(s); + QLIST_FOREACH(vtd_dev_icx, &s->vtd_dev_icx_list, next) { + HostIOMMUContext *host_icx = vtd_dev_icx->host_icx; + + /* + * Similar with pasid allocation. We'll free the pasid + * on the first successful free operation. It's a bit + * hackish in that we don't have a good global interface + * yet to talk to modules like vfio to deliver this pasid + * free request, so we're leveraging this per-device iommu + * context to do the same thing just to make sure the free + * happens only once. + */ + ret = host_iommu_ctx_pasid_free(host_icx, pasid); + if (!ret) { + break; + } + } + vtd_iommu_unlock(s); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * If IP is not set, set it then return. + * If IP is already set, return. + */ +static void vtd_vcmd_set_ip(IntelIOMMUState *s) +{ + s->vcrsp = 1; + vtd_set_quad_raw(s, DMAR_VCRSP_REG, + ((uint64_t) s->vcrsp)); +} + +static void vtd_vcmd_clear_ip(IntelIOMMUState *s) +{ + s->vcrsp &= (~((uint64_t)(0x1))); + vtd_set_quad_raw(s, DMAR_VCRSP_REG, + ((uint64_t) s->vcrsp)); +} + +/* Handle write to Virtual Command Register */ +static int vtd_handle_vcmd_write(IntelIOMMUState *s, uint64_t val) +{ + uint32_t pasid; + int ret = -1; + + trace_vtd_reg_write_vcmd(s->vcrsp, val); + + if (!(s->vccap & VTD_VCCAP_PAS) || + (s->vcrsp & 1)) { + return -1; + } + + /* + * Since vCPU should be blocked when the guest VMCD + * write was trapped to here. Should be no other vCPUs + * try to access VCMD if guest software is well written. + * However, we still emulate the IP bit here in case of + * bad guest software. Also align with the spec. + */ + vtd_vcmd_set_ip(s); + + switch (val & VTD_VCMD_CMD_MASK) { + case VTD_VCMD_ALLOC_PASID: + ret = vtd_request_pasid_alloc(s, &pasid); + if (ret) { + s->vcrsp |= VTD_VCRSP_SC(VTD_VCMD_NO_AVAILABLE_PASID); + } else { + s->vcrsp |= VTD_VCRSP_RSLT(pasid); + } + break; + + case VTD_VCMD_FREE_PASID: + pasid = VTD_VCMD_PASID_VALUE(val); + ret = vtd_request_pasid_free(s, pasid); + if (ret < 0) { + s->vcrsp |= VTD_VCRSP_SC(VTD_VCMD_FREE_INVALID_PASID); + } + break; + + default: + s->vcrsp |= VTD_VCRSP_SC(VTD_VCMD_UNDEFINED_CMD); + error_report_once("Virtual Command: unsupported command!!!"); + break; + } + vtd_vcmd_clear_ip(s); + return 0; +} + static uint64_t vtd_mem_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned size) { IntelIOMMUState *s = opaque; @@ -2939,6 +3062,23 @@ static void vtd_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, vtd_set_long(s, addr, val); break; + case DMAR_VCMD_REG: + if (!vtd_handle_vcmd_write(s, val)) { + if (size == 4) { + vtd_set_long(s, addr, val); + } else { + vtd_set_quad(s, addr, val); + } + } + break; + + case DMAR_VCMD_REG_HI: + assert(size == 4); + if (!vtd_handle_vcmd_write(s, val)) { + vtd_set_long(s, addr, val); + } + break; + default: if (size == 4) { vtd_set_long(s, addr, val); @@ -3470,6 +3610,7 @@ static int vtd_dev_set_iommu_context(PCIBus *bus, void *opaque, vtd_dev_icx->devfn = (uint8_t)devfn; vtd_dev_icx->iommu_state = s; vtd_dev_icx->host_icx = host_icx; + QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->vtd_dev_icx_list, vtd_dev_icx, next); } vtd_iommu_unlock(s); @@ -3489,7 +3630,10 @@ static void vtd_dev_unset_iommu_context(PCIBus *bus, void *opaque, int devfn) vtd_iommu_lock(s); vtd_dev_icx = vtd_bus->dev_icx[devfn]; - g_free(vtd_dev_icx); + if (vtd_dev_icx) { + QLIST_REMOVE(vtd_dev_icx, next); + g_free(vtd_dev_icx); + } vtd_iommu_unlock(s); } @@ -3763,6 +3907,13 @@ static void vtd_init(IntelIOMMUState *s) * Interrupt remapping registers. */ vtd_define_quad(s, DMAR_IRTA_REG, 0, 0xfffffffffffff80fULL, 0); + + /* + * Virtual Command Definitions + */ + vtd_define_quad(s, DMAR_VCCAP_REG, s->vccap, 0, 0); + vtd_define_quad(s, DMAR_VCMD_REG, 0, 0xffffffffffffffffULL, 0); + vtd_define_quad(s, DMAR_VCRSP_REG, 0, 0, 0); } /* Should not reset address_spaces when reset because devices will still use @@ -3877,6 +4028,7 @@ static void vtd_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp) } QLIST_INIT(&s->vtd_as_with_notifiers); + QLIST_INIT(&s->vtd_dev_icx_list); qemu_mutex_init(&s->iommu_lock); memset(s->vtd_as_by_bus_num, 0, sizeof(s->vtd_as_by_bus_num)); memory_region_init_io(&s->csrmem, OBJECT(s), &vtd_mem_ops, s, diff --git a/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h b/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h index 862033e..1d997a1 100644 --- a/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h +++ b/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h @@ -85,6 +85,12 @@ #define DMAR_MTRRCAP_REG_HI 0x104 #define DMAR_MTRRDEF_REG 0x108 /* MTRR default type */ #define DMAR_MTRRDEF_REG_HI 0x10c +#define DMAR_VCCAP_REG 0xE00 /* Virtual Command Capability Register */ +#define DMAR_VCCAP_REG_HI 0xE04 +#define DMAR_VCMD_REG 0xE10 /* Virtual Command Register */ +#define DMAR_VCMD_REG_HI 0xE14 +#define DMAR_VCRSP_REG 0xE20 /* Virtual Command Reponse Register */ +#define DMAR_VCRSP_REG_HI 0xE24 /* IOTLB registers */ #define DMAR_IOTLB_REG_OFFSET 0xf0 /* Offset to the IOTLB registers */ @@ -312,6 +318,37 @@ typedef enum VTDFaultReason { #define VTD_CONTEXT_CACHE_GEN_MAX 0xffffffffUL +/* VCCAP_REG */ +#define VTD_VCCAP_PAS (1UL << 0) + +/* + * The basic idea is to let hypervisor to set a range for available + * PASIDs for VMs. One of the reasons is PASID #0 is reserved by + * RID_PASID usage. We have no idea how many reserved PASIDs in future, + * so here just an evaluated value. Honestly, set it as "1" is enough + * at current stage. + */ +#define VTD_MIN_HPASID 1 +#define VTD_MAX_HPASID 0xFFFFF + +/* Virtual Command Register */ +enum { + VTD_VCMD_NULL_CMD = 0, + VTD_VCMD_ALLOC_PASID = 1, + VTD_VCMD_FREE_PASID = 2, + VTD_VCMD_CMD_NUM, +}; + +#define VTD_VCMD_CMD_MASK 0xffUL +#define VTD_VCMD_PASID_VALUE(val) (((val) >> 8) & 0xfffff) + +#define VTD_VCRSP_RSLT(val) ((val) << 8) +#define VTD_VCRSP_SC(val) (((val) & 0x3) << 1) + +#define VTD_VCMD_UNDEFINED_CMD 1ULL +#define VTD_VCMD_NO_AVAILABLE_PASID 2ULL +#define VTD_VCMD_FREE_INVALID_PASID 2ULL + /* Interrupt Entry Cache Invalidation Descriptor: VT-d 6.5.2.7. */ struct VTDInvDescIEC { uint32_t type:4; /* Should always be 0x4 */ diff --git a/hw/i386/trace-events b/hw/i386/trace-events index e48bef2..71536a7 100644 --- a/hw/i386/trace-events +++ b/hw/i386/trace-events @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ vtd_reg_write_gcmd(uint32_t status, uint32_t val) "status 0x%"PRIx32" value 0x%" vtd_reg_write_fectl(uint32_t value) "value 0x%"PRIx32 vtd_reg_write_iectl(uint32_t value) "value 0x%"PRIx32 vtd_reg_ics_clear_ip(void) "" +vtd_reg_write_vcmd(uint32_t status, uint32_t val) "status 0x%"PRIx32" value 0x%"PRIx32 vtd_dmar_translate(uint8_t bus, uint8_t slot, uint8_t func, uint64_t iova, uint64_t gpa, uint64_t mask) "dev %02x:%02x.%02x iova 0x%"PRIx64" -> gpa 0x%"PRIx64" mask 0x%"PRIx64 vtd_dmar_enable(bool en) "enable %d" vtd_dmar_fault(uint16_t sid, int fault, uint64_t addr, bool is_write) "sid 0x%"PRIx16" fault %d addr 0x%"PRIx64" write %d" diff --git a/include/hw/i386/intel_iommu.h b/include/hw/i386/intel_iommu.h index 9b4fc0a..da0a5f7 100644 --- a/include/hw/i386/intel_iommu.h +++ b/include/hw/i386/intel_iommu.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ #define VTD_SID_TO_BUS(sid) (((sid) >> 8) & 0xff) #define VTD_SID_TO_DEVFN(sid) ((sid) & 0xff) -#define DMAR_REG_SIZE 0x230 +#define DMAR_REG_SIZE 0xF00 #define VTD_HOST_AW_39BIT 39 #define VTD_HOST_AW_48BIT 48 #define VTD_HOST_ADDRESS_WIDTH VTD_HOST_AW_39BIT @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ struct VTDHostIOMMUContext { uint8_t devfn; HostIOMMUContext *host_icx; IntelIOMMUState *iommu_state; + QLIST_ENTRY(VTDHostIOMMUContext) next; }; struct VTDBus { @@ -269,6 +270,9 @@ struct IntelIOMMUState { /* list of registered notifiers */ QLIST_HEAD(, VTDAddressSpace) vtd_as_with_notifiers; + /* list of VTDHostIOMMUContexts */ + QLIST_HEAD(, VTDHostIOMMUContext) vtd_dev_icx_list; + /* interrupt remapping */ bool intr_enabled; /* Whether guest enabled IR */ dma_addr_t intr_root; /* Interrupt remapping table pointer */ @@ -279,6 +283,10 @@ struct IntelIOMMUState { uint8_t aw_bits; /* Host/IOVA address width (in bits) */ bool dma_drain; /* Whether DMA r/w draining enabled */ + /* Virtual Command Register */ + uint64_t vccap; /* The value of vcmd capability reg */ + uint64_t vcrsp; /* Current value of VCMD RSP REG */ + /* * Protects IOMMU states in general. Currently it protects the * per-IOMMU IOTLB cache, and context entry cache in VTDAddressSpace. -- 2.7.4