From: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, jmattson@google.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/11] KVM: SVM: Remove set_exception_intercept and clr_exception_intercept
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 18:38:46 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <159597952647.12744.15718760666138643079.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <159597929496.12744.14654593948763926416.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Remove set_exception_intercept and clr_exception_intercept.
Replace with generic set_intercept and clr_intercept for these calls.
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 18 ------------------
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 32037ed622a7..99cc9c285fe6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -988,11 +988,11 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
set_dr_intercepts(svm);
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PF_VECTOR);
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_UD_VECTOR);
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MC_VECTOR);
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_AC_VECTOR);
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_DB_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PF_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_UD_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MC_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_AC_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_DB_VECTOR);
/*
* Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
* trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
* as VMware does.
*/
if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_GP_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_GP_VECTOR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
- clr_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PF_VECTOR);
+ clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PF_VECTOR);
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
save->g_pat = svm->vcpu.arch.pat;
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm)) {
svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
- clr_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_UD_VECTOR);
+ clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_UD_VECTOR);
}
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
@@ -1631,11 +1631,11 @@ static void update_bp_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- clr_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_BP_VECTOR);
+ clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_BP_VECTOR);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
- set_exception_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_BP_VECTOR);
+ set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_BP_VECTOR);
} else
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index c7fbce738337..b95074971ea1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -264,24 +264,6 @@ static inline void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
recalc_intercepts(svm);
}
-static inline void set_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
-{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = get_host_vmcb(svm);
-
- __set_intercept(&vmcb->control.intercepts, bit);
-
- recalc_intercepts(svm);
-}
-
-static inline void clr_exception_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
-{
- struct vmcb *vmcb = get_host_vmcb(svm);
-
- __clr_intercept(&vmcb->control.intercepts, bit);
-
- recalc_intercepts(svm);
-}
-
static inline void set_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int bit)
{
struct vmcb *vmcb = get_host_vmcb(svm);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-28 23:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-28 23:37 [PATCH v3 00/11] SVM cleanup and INVPCID support for the AMD guests Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:37 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] KVM: SVM: Introduce __set_intercept, __clr_intercept and __is_intercept Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:50 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-29 23:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-07-30 16:34 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] KVM: SVM: Change intercept_cr to generic intercepts Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:56 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-29 16:08 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-29 23:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] KVM: SVM: Change intercept_dr " Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:59 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-29 16:15 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-29 23:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-07-30 16:38 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-30 22:41 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-30 22:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] KVM: SVM: Modify intercept_exceptions " Babu Moger
2020-07-29 20:47 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-29 21:31 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] KVM: SVM: Modify 64 bit intercept field to two 32 bit vectors Babu Moger
2020-07-29 21:06 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-29 21:31 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] KVM: SVM: Add new intercept vector in vmcb_control_area Babu Moger
2020-07-29 21:23 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-29 22:19 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] KVM: nSVM: Cleanup nested_state data structure Babu Moger
2020-07-29 0:02 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] KVM: SVM: Remove set_cr_intercept, clr_cr_intercept and is_cr_intercept Babu Moger
2020-07-29 0:01 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-28 23:38 ` Babu Moger [this message]
2020-07-29 22:17 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] KVM: SVM: Remove set_exception_intercept and clr_exception_intercept Jim Mattson
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] KVM: X86: Move handling of INVPCID types to x86 Babu Moger
2020-07-29 22:25 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-28 23:38 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] KVM:SVM: Enable INVPCID feature on AMD Babu Moger
2020-07-29 23:01 ` Jim Mattson
2020-07-30 16:32 ` Babu Moger
2020-07-29 0:09 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] SVM cleanup and INVPCID support for the AMD guests Jim Mattson
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