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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Reza Arbab <arbab@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Benjamin Herr
Subject: Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 12:51:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170828105119.xs73tinknqcmrgvk@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170724190757.11278-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 02:07:55PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Some KVM-specific custom MSRs shares the guest physical address with

s/shares/share/

> hypervisor.

"the hypervisor."

> When SEV is active, the shared physical address must be mapped
> with encryption attribute cleared so that both hypervsior and guest can
> access the data.
> 
> Add APIs to change memory encryption attribute in early boot code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  17 ++++++
>  arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 134 insertions(+)

...

> +static int __init early_set_memory_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
> +					   unsigned long size, bool enc)
> +{
> +	unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, vaddr_next;
> +	unsigned long psize, pmask;
> +	int split_page_size_mask;
> +	pte_t *kpte;
> +	int level;
> +
> +	vaddr = (unsigned long)__va(paddr);
> +	vaddr_next = vaddr;
> +	vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * We are going to change the physical page attribute from C=1 to C=0
> +	 * or vice versa. Flush the caches to ensure that data is written into
> +	 * memory with correct C-bit before we change attribute.
> +	 */
> +	clflush_cache_range(__va(paddr), size);
> +
> +	for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = vaddr_next) {
> +		kpte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
> +		if (!kpte || pte_none(*kpte))
> +			return 1;

Return before flushing TLBs? Perhaps you mean

			ret = 1;
			goto out;

here and out does

	__flush_tlb_all();
	return ret;

?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 

  reply	other threads:[~2017-08-28 10:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-24 19:07 [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-3-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 10:26     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170725102657.GD21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:29         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <7236d267-ebcb-8b45-b8d3-5955903e395f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:36             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 14:58               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:13                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-25 15:29                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-25 15:33                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-09 18:17                       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17  8:12                         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-4-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26  4:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-26 16:47       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <facf3ac6-ebda-57a7-f961-6029b3ac7be7-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 13:39           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-8-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-27 14:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-28  8:47       ` David Laight
     [not found]         ` <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD0045508-VkEWCZq2GCInGFn1LkZF6NBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:21           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 18:10       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-9-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-28 10:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:42       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-07-31  8:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-31 22:19   ` Kees Cook
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
     [not found]   ` <20170724190757.11278-12-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-02  4:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-07-25  9:51   ` David Laight
2017-07-26 10:45     ` Arnd Bergmann
     [not found]       ` <CAK8P3a3h7JpmkW7W=HwqAuWWmro=ngj6HSeiiML_=T82x-FtZQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 19:24         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 19:26           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-07-26 20:07             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27  7:45               ` David Laight
     [not found]               ` <589d65a4-eb09-bae9-e8b4-a2d78ca6b509-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-22 16:52                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 12:24                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:13                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-15 14:40                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-15 14:48                         ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]                           ` <ad628a45-8e4e-9cfc-2cc4-33dc6bf4613a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:22                             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]                               ` <20170915162256.7l4vyy4ee5zeqbir-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-15 16:27                                 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-08-28 10:51   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-08-28 11:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07 ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-08-29 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-30 16:18     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-08-30 17:46       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-01 22:52         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-02  3:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]             ` <CALCETrV+rv=9Rg5V1z8vHtVDW64eCNtZHQMW8DipRADvm+qP5A-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-03  2:34               ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found]           ` <8155b5b2-b2b3-bc8f-33ae-b81b661a2e38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-09-04 17:05             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-04 17:47               ` Brijesh Singh
     [not found] ` <20170724190757.11278-1-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-2-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25  5:45       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]         ` <20170725054522.GA21822-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-25 14:59           ` Brijesh Singh
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-26 14:44     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-6-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-26 16:03       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-10 13:03         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-07-27 13:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 18:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-07-28 15:23     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170728152342.GB11564-K5JNixvcfoxupOikMc4+xw@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-17 18:55         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-08-17 19:03           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-08-07  3:48     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-17 19:35       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-08-23 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-08-24 18:54       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <42cf82fc-03be-c4c7-eaab-b2306a049d20-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-25 12:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-07-24 19:07   ` [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
     [not found]     ` <20170724190757.11278-18-brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-08-31 15:06       ` Borislav Petkov

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