From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
karahmed@amazon.de, sironi@amazon.de, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
peterz@infradead.org, jmattson@google.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2018 19:50:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180211185057.rest4bf2ydx7slrk@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1518362359-1005-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
* David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> wrote:
> + /*
> + * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
> + * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
> + pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
> + }
I have changed this text to say:
pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Restricting branch speculation (enabling IBRS) for firmware calls\n");
In fact while at it I found and improved a few other details as well, such as:
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ * branches. But we don't know whether the firmware is safe, so
+ * use IBRS to protect against that:
most Spectre related messages are now harmonized:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)\n");
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Restricting branch speculation (enabling IBRS) for firmware calls\n");
Find the full patch below.
Thanks,
Ingo
=========================>
>From 82c2b2f29691143a05181333f387e786646aa28b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 10 Feb 2018 11:51:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details
Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a:
dmesg | grep -i spectre
... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages.
Also fix a few other details:
- clarify a comment about firmware speculation control
- s/KPTI/PTI
- remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6f6d763225c8..eff45477fcca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -162,8 +162,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
else {
- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
- sizeof(arg));
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -175,8 +174,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n",
- mitigation_options[i].option);
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
}
@@ -185,8 +183,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
- pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
- mitigation_options[i].option);
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@@ -256,14 +253,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
}
- pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return;
retpoline_auto:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
- pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+ pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
@@ -281,7 +278,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
- * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
+ * If neither SMEP or PTI are available, there is a risk of
* hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
* from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
* the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
@@ -295,30 +292,30 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
- pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
- pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)\n");
}
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ * branches. But we don't know whether the firmware is safe, so
+ * use IBRS to protect against that:
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
- pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre mitigation: Restricting branch speculation (enabling IBRS) for firmware calls\n");
}
}
#undef pr_fmt
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
@@ -327,16 +324,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
- struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-11 18:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-10 23:39 [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 9:50 ` Darren Kenny
2018-02-12 14:16 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 14:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] Revert "x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()" David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range() David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] KVM/nVMX: Set the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS if we have a valid L02 MSR bitmap David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 10:19 ` Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <1518345844.3677.365.camel@amazon.co.uk>
2018-02-11 10:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 11:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-11 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <1518362359-1005-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
2018-02-11 18:50 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2018-02-11 19:25 ` [PATCH] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 19:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-12 15:30 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 8:04 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-12 8:27 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13 7:59 ` Ingo Molnar
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