From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de, sironi@amazon.de,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
jmattson@google.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 09:50:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180212095016.i5w3iimemu74ypf6@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1518305967-31356-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:39:22PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
>Intel have retroactively blessed the 0xc2 microcode on Skylake mobile
>and desktop parts, and the Gemini Lake 0x22 microcode is apparently fine
>too. We blacklisted the latter purely because it was present with all
>the other problematic ones in the 2018-01-08 release, but now it's
>explicitly listed as OK.
>
>We still list 0x84 for the various Kaby Lake / Coffee Lake parts, as
>that appeared in one version of the blacklist and then reverted to
>0x80 again. We can change it if 0x84 is actually announced to be safe.
>
>Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 4 ----
> 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
>index 319bf98..f73b814 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
>@@ -123,8 +123,6 @@ static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
> { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 },
> { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
> { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c },
>- { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 },
>- { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 },
> { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 },
> { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b },
> { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
>@@ -136,8 +134,6 @@ static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
> { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
> { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
> { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
>- /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */
>- { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 },
> /* Observed in the wild */
> { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b },
> { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 },
>--
>2.7.4
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-12 9:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-10 23:39 [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 9:50 ` Darren Kenny [this message]
2018-02-12 14:16 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 14:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] Revert "x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()" David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KVM: x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range() David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] KVM/nVMX: Set the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS if we have a valid L02 MSR bitmap David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 10:19 ` Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <1518345844.3677.365.camel@amazon.co.uk>
2018-02-11 10:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-10 23:39 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 11:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-11 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <1518362359-1005-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
2018-02-11 18:50 ` [PATCH] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details Ingo Molnar
2018-02-11 19:25 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-11 19:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-12 15:30 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 8:04 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-12 8:27 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Spectre v2 updates Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13 7:59 ` Ingo Molnar
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