From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_MUTT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CE23C28CC0 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 18:16:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62A5224054 for ; Wed, 29 May 2019 18:16:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727524AbfE2SQP (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 14:16:15 -0400 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:36716 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725917AbfE2SQO (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 May 2019 14:16:14 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNSCANNABLE X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 29 May 2019 11:16:13 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 Received: from alison-desk.jf.intel.com ([10.54.74.53]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 29 May 2019 11:16:13 -0700 Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:20:04 -0700 From: Alison Schofield To: Mike Rapoport Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , David Howells , Kees Cook , Dave Hansen , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Message-ID: <20190529182004.GA525@alison-desk.jf.intel.com> References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20190529073006.GG3656@rapoport-lnx> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190529073006.GG3656@rapoport-lnx> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 10:30:07AM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote: > On Wed, May 08, 2019 at 05:43:20PM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > = Intro = > > > > The patchset brings enabling of Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption. > > It consists of changes into multiple subsystems: > > > > * Core MM: infrastructure for allocation pages, dealing with encrypted VMAs > > and providing API setup encrypted mappings. > > * arch/x86: feature enumeration, program keys into hardware, setup > > page table entries for encrypted pages and more. > > * Key management service: setup and management of encryption keys. > > * DMA/IOMMU: dealing with encrypted memory on IO side. > > * KVM: interaction with virtualization side. > > * Documentation: description of APIs and usage examples. > > > > The patchset is huge. This submission aims to give view to the full picture and > > get feedback on the overall design. The patchset will be split into more > > digestible pieces later. > > > > Please review. Any feedback is welcome. > > It would be nice to have a brief usage description in cover letter rather > than in the last patches in the series ;-) > Thanks for making it all the way to the last patches in the set ;) Yes, we will certainly include that usage model in the cover letters of future patchsets. Alison