From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv2 50/59] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2019 18:08:04 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190731150813.26289-51-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190731150813.26289-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
From: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Replace sme_ code with x86 memory encryption common code such that
Intel MKTME can be supported underneath generic DMA code.
dma_to_phys() & phys_to_dma() results will be runtime modified by
memory encryption code.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 2 +-
include/linux/dma-direct.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 23 ++++++++++-------------
4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 0c196c47d621..62a1493f389c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -52,8 +52,19 @@ bool sev_active(void);
#define __bss_decrypted __attribute__((__section__(".bss..decrypted")))
+/*
+ * The __sme_set() and __sme_clr() macros are useful for adding or removing
+ * the encryption mask from a value (e.g. when dealing with pagetable
+ * entries).
+ */
+#define __sme_set(x) ((x) | sme_me_mask)
+#define __sme_clr(x) ((x) & ~sme_me_mask)
+
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+#define __sme_set(x) (x)
+#define __sme_clr(x) (x)
+
#define sme_me_mask 0ULL
static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
@@ -94,4 +105,22 @@ extern char __start_bss_decrypted[], __end_bss_decrypted[], __start_bss_decrypte
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
+
+extern dma_addr_t __mem_encrypt_dma_set(dma_addr_t daddr, phys_addr_t paddr);
+extern phys_addr_t __mem_encrypt_dma_clear(phys_addr_t paddr);
+
+#else
+static inline dma_addr_t __mem_encrypt_dma_set(dma_addr_t daddr, phys_addr_t paddr)
+{
+ return daddr;
+}
+
+static inline phys_addr_t __mem_encrypt_dma_clear(phys_addr_t paddr)
+{
+ return paddr;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON */
+
+
#endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
index c11d70151735..588d6ea45624 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/mktme.h>
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/dma-direct.h b/include/linux/dma-direct.h
index adf993a3bd58..6ce96b06c440 100644
--- a/include/linux/dma-direct.h
+++ b/include/linux/dma-direct.h
@@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ static inline bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
*/
static inline dma_addr_t phys_to_dma(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr)
{
- return __sme_set(__phys_to_dma(dev, paddr));
+ return __mem_encrypt_dma_set(__phys_to_dma(dev, paddr), paddr);
}
static inline phys_addr_t dma_to_phys(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t daddr)
{
- return __sme_clr(__dma_to_phys(dev, daddr));
+ return __mem_encrypt_dma_clear(__dma_to_phys(dev, daddr));
}
u64 dma_direct_get_required_mask(struct device *dev);
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index 470bd53a89df..88724aa7c065 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline dma_addr_t __mem_encrypt_dma_set(dma_addr_t daddr, phys_addr_t paddr)
+{
+ return daddr;
+}
+
+static inline phys_addr_t __mem_encrypt_dma_clear(phys_addr_t paddr)
+{
+ return paddr;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */
static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void)
@@ -35,19 +45,6 @@ static inline u64 sme_get_me_mask(void)
return sme_me_mask;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-/*
- * The __sme_set() and __sme_clr() macros are useful for adding or removing
- * the encryption mask from a value (e.g. when dealing with pagetable
- * entries).
- */
-#define __sme_set(x) ((x) | sme_me_mask)
-#define __sme_clr(x) ((x) & ~sme_me_mask)
-#else
-#define __sme_set(x) (x)
-#define __sme_clr(x) (x)
-#endif
-
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-31 15:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-31 15:07 [PATCHv2 00/59] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 01/59] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 02/59] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 03/59] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 04/59] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 05/59] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 06/59] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 07/59] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 08/59] x86/mm: Introduce helpers to read number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 09/59] x86/mm: Store bitmask of the encryption algorithms supported by MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 10/59] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 11/59] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 12/59] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 13/59] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 14/59] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 15/59] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 16/59] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 17/59] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 18/59] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 19/59] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 20/59] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 21/59] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 22/59] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 23/59] x86/pconfig: Set an activated algorithm in all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 24/59] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 25/59] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-08-05 11:58 ` Ben Boeckel
2019-08-05 20:31 ` Alison Schofield
2019-08-13 13:06 ` Ben Boeckel
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 26/59] keys/mktme: Instantiate MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 27/59] keys/mktme: Destroy " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 28/59] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 29/59] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 30/59] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 31/59] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 32/59] keys/mktme: Clear the key programming from the MKTME hardware Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 33/59] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 34/59] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 35/59] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 36/59] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 37/59] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 38/59] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 39/59] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 40/59] keys/mktme: Block memory hotplug additions when MKTME is enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 41/59] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 42/59] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 43/59] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 44/59] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:07 ` [PATCHv2 45/59] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on hardware key usage " Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 46/59] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 47/59] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-08-06 20:26 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2019-08-07 14:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 48/59] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 49/59] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 51/59] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 52/59] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 53/59] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 54/59] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 55/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 56/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 57/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-08-05 11:58 ` Ben Boeckel
2019-08-05 20:44 ` Alison Schofield
2019-08-13 13:07 ` Ben Boeckel
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 58/59] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov
2019-07-31 15:08 ` [PATCHv2 59/59] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov
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