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From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 12/20] i386: kvm: Add support for exposing PROVISIONKEY to guest
Date: Tue,  6 Aug 2019 11:56:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190806185649.2476-13-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190806185649.2476-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

KVM (and the Linux kernel in general) restricts access to a subset of
enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised
kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure
its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a
stable fingerprint.  Currently, only the PROVISIONKEY is restricted by
KVM/Linux.

To expose privileged attributes to a KVM guest, QEMU must prove to KVM
that it is allowed to access an attribute by passing KVM an open file
descriptor pointing at the associated SGX attribute file, e.g.
/dev/sgx/provision, using the capability ioctl() KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE.

If requested by the user (via its CPUID bit), attempt to enable guest
access to the PROVISIONKEY.  Do not error out if /dev/sgx/provision is
inaccessible, i.e. treat failure like any other unavailable feature.
Exit immediately if enabling fails as KVM should report support for
PROVISIONKEY via CPUID if and only if it supports KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
---
 target/i386/cpu.c      |  5 ++++-
 target/i386/kvm-stub.c |  5 +++++
 target/i386/kvm.c      | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/kvm_i386.h |  3 +++
 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index 1bb9586230..a951a02baa 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -4560,7 +4560,10 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
             *ecx |= XSTATE_FP_MASK | XSTATE_SSE_MASK;
 
             /* Access to PROVISIONKEY requires additional credentials. */
-            *eax &= ~(1U << 4);
+            if ((*eax & (1U << 4)) &&
+                !kvm_enable_sgx_provisioning(cs->kvm_state)) {
+                *eax &= ~(1U << 4);
+            }
         }
 #endif
         break;
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm-stub.c b/target/i386/kvm-stub.c
index 872ef7df4c..b4708386b5 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm-stub.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm-stub.c
@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ uint32_t kvm_arch_get_supported_cpuid(KVMState *env, uint32_t function,
 {
     abort();
 }
+
+bool kvm_enable_sgx_provisioning(void)
+{
+    return false;
+}
 #endif
 
 bool kvm_hv_vpindex_settable(void)
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm.c
index e40c4fd673..dcda0bb0e9 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm.c
@@ -4111,6 +4111,31 @@ void kvm_arch_update_guest_debug(CPUState *cpu, struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
     }
 }
 
+static bool has_sgx_provisioning;
+
+static bool __kvm_enable_sgx_provisioning(KVMState *s)
+{
+    int fd, ret;
+
+    fd = open("/dev/sgx/provision", O_RDONLY);
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    ret = kvm_vm_enable_cap(s, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, 0, fd);
+    if (ret) {
+        error_report("Could not enable SGX PROVISIONKEY: %s", strerror(-ret));
+        exit(1);
+    }
+    close(fd);
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool kvm_enable_sgx_provisioning(KVMState *s)
+{
+    return MEMORIZE(__kvm_enable_sgx_provisioning(s), has_sgx_provisioning);
+}
+
 static bool host_supports_vmx(void)
 {
     uint32_t ecx, unused;
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm_i386.h b/target/i386/kvm_i386.h
index 06fe06bdb3..d9c3018744 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm_i386.h
+++ b/target/i386/kvm_i386.h
@@ -66,4 +66,7 @@ bool kvm_enable_x2apic(void);
 bool kvm_has_x2apic_api(void);
 
 bool kvm_hv_vpindex_settable(void);
+
+bool kvm_enable_sgx_provisioning(KVMState *s);
+
 #endif
-- 
2.22.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-06 18:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-06 18:56 [RFC PATCH 00/20] i386: Add support for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 01/20] hostmem: Add hostmem-epc as a backend for SGX EPC Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 02/20] i386: Add 'sgx-epc' device to expose EPC sections to guest Sean Christopherson
2019-08-07  5:57   ` [Qemu-devel] " Markus Armbruster
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 03/20] vl: Add "sgx-epc" option to expose SGX " Sean Christopherson
2019-09-06 21:49   ` [Qemu-devel] " Larry Dewey
2019-09-10 19:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 04/20] i386: Add primary SGX CPUID and MSR defines Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 05/20] i386: Add SGX CPUID leaf FEAT_SGX_12_0_EAX Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 06/20] i386: Add SGX CPUID leaf FEAT_SGX_12_1_EAX Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 07/20] i386: Add SGX CPUID leaf FEAT_SGX_12_1_EBX Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 08/20] i386: Add get/set/migrate support for SGX LE public key hash MSRs Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 09/20] i386: Add feature control MSR dependency when SGX is enabled Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 10/20] i386: Update SGX CPUID info according to hardware/KVM/user input Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 11/20] linux-headers: Add temporary placeholder for KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 13/20] i386: Propagate SGX CPUID sub-leafs to KVM Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 14/20] i386: Adjust min CPUID level to 0x12 when SGX is enabled Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 15/20] hw/i386/pc: Set SGX bits in feature control fw_cfg accordingly Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 16/20] hw/i386/pc: Account for SGX EPC sections when calculating device memory Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 17/20] i386/pc: Add e820 entry for SGX EPC section(s) Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 18/20] i386: acpi: Add SGX EPC entry to ACPI tables Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 19/20] q35: Add support for SGX EPC Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 18:56 ` [RFC PATCH 20/20] i440fx: " Sean Christopherson
2019-08-06 19:28 ` [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH 00/20] i386: Add support for Intel SGX no-reply
2019-08-06 20:48 ` no-reply

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