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From: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	Kevin Kevin <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	Lei Cao <lei.cao@stratus.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM: X86: Implement ring-based dirty memory tracking
Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 10:29:59 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200110152959.GC53397@xz-x1> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200109171154-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

On Thu, Jan 09, 2020 at 05:18:24PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 09, 2020 at 03:19:16PM -0500, Peter Xu wrote:
> > > > while for virtio, both sides (hypervisor,
> > > > and the guest driver) are trusted.
> > > 
> > > What gave you the impression guest is trusted in virtio?
> > 
> > Hmm... maybe when I know virtio can bypass vIOMMU as long as it
> > doesn't provide IOMMU_PLATFORM flag? :)
> 
> If guest driver does not provide IOMMU_PLATFORM, and device does,
> then negotiation fails.

I mean it's still possible to specify "!IOMMU_PLATFORM" for the virtio
device even if vIOMMU is enabled in the guest (rather than the
negociation procedures).  Again I think it's fair, just the same
reason as why we tend to even make "iommu=pt" by default for all the
kernel drivers, because we should trust all the drivers as kernel
itself.  The only thing we want to protect using vIOMMU is the
userspace driver because we do have a line between the userspace and
the kernel, and IMHO it's the same thing here for the new kvm
interface.

> 
> > I think it's logical to trust a virtio guest kernel driver, could you
> > guide me on what I've missed?
> 
> 
> guest driver is assumed to be part of guest kernel. It can't
> do anything kernel can't do anyway.

Right, I think all things belongs to the kernel will have the same
level of trust.  However again, userspace should be differently
treated, and that's why I tend to prefer the index solution that we
expose less to userspace to write (read is far safer comparing to
writes from userspace).

> 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > >  Above means we need to do these to
> > > > change to the new design:
> > > > 
> > > >   - Allow the GFN array to be mapped as writable by userspace (so that
> > > >     userspace can publish bit 2),
> > > > 
> > > >   - The userspace must be trusted to follow the design (just imagine
> > > >     what if the userspace overwrites a GFN when it publishes bit 2
> > > >     over a valid dirty gfn entry?  KVM could wrongly unprotect a page
> > > >     for the guest...).
> > > 
> > > You mean protect, right?  So what?
> > 
> > Yes, I mean with that, more things are uncertain from userspace.  It
> > seems easier to me that we restrict the userspace with one index.
> 
> Donnu how to treat vague statements like this.  You need to be specific
> with threat models. Otherwise there's no way to tell whether code is
> secure.
> 
> > > 
> > > > While if we use the indices, we restrict the userspace to only be able
> > > > to write to one index only (which is the reset_index).  That's all it
> > > > can do to mess things up (and it could never as long as we properly
> > > > validate the reset_index when read, which only happens during
> > > > KVM_RESET_DIRTY_RINGS and is very rare).  From that pov, it seems the
> > > > indices solution still has its benefits.
> > > 
> > > So if you mess up index how is this different?
> > 
> > We can't mess up much with that.  We simply check fetch_index (sorry I
> > meant this when I said reset_index, anyway it's the only index that we
> > expose to userspace) to make sure:
> > 
> >   reset_index <= fetch_index <= dirty_index
> > 
> > Otherwise we fail the ioctl.  With that, we're 100% safe.
> 
> safe from what? userspace can mess up guest memory trivially.
> for example skip sending some memory or send junk.

Yes, QEMU can mess the guest up, but it should never mess the host up,
am I right?  Regarding to QEMU as an userspace, KVM should see it as
untrusted as well from host-wise.  However guest security is another
thing, imho.

> 
> > > 
> > > I agree RO page kind of feels safer generally though.
> > > 
> > > I will have to re-read how does the ring works though,
> > > my comments were based on the old assumption of mmaped
> > > page with indices.
> > 
> > Yes, sorry again for a bad cover letter.
> > 
> > It's basically the same as before, just that we only have per-vcpu
> > ring now, and the indices are exposed from kvm_run so we don't need
> > the extra page, but we still expose that via mmap.
> 
> So that's why changelogs are useful.
> Can you please write a changelog for this version so I don't
> need to re-read all of it? Thanks!

Sure, actually I've got a changelog in the cover letter for this
version [1]... it's:

V3 changelog:

- fail userspace writable maps on dirty ring ranges [Jason]
- commit message fixups [Paolo]
- change __x86_set_memory_region to return hva [Paolo]
- cacheline align for indices [Paolo, Jason]
- drop waitqueue, global lock, etc., include kvmgt rework patchset
- take lock for __x86_set_memory_region() (otherwise it triggers a
  lockdep in latest kvm/queue) [Paolo]
- check KVM_DIRTY_LOG_PAGE_OFFSET in kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_dirty_log_ring
- one more patch to drop x86_set_memory_region [Paolo]
- one more patch to remove extra srcu usage in init_rmode_identity_map()
- add some r-bs for Paolo

I didn't have detailed changelog for v2 because it could be a long
list with trivial details which can hide the major things, but I've
got a small write-up in the cover letter trying to mention the major
changes [2].

Again, I'm very sorry for either missing a complete changelog in v2,
or the high-level overview of v3 in the cover letter.  I'll make it
better in v4.

Thanks,

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200109145729.32898-1-peterx@redhat.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20191220211634.51231-1-peterx@redhat.com/

-- 
Peter Xu


  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-10 15:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-09 14:57 [PATCH v3 00/21] KVM: Dirty ring interface Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] vfio: introduce vfio_iova_rw to read/write a range of IOVAs Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] drm/i915/gvt: subsitute kvm_read/write_guest with vfio_iova_rw Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] KVM: Remove kvm_read_guest_atomic() Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] KVM: Add build-time error check on kvm_run size Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] KVM: X86: Change parameter for fast_page_fault tracepoint Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM: X86: Don't take srcu lock in init_rmode_identity_map() Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM: Cache as_id in kvm_memory_slot Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM: X86: Drop x86_set_memory_region() Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM: X86: Don't track dirty for KVM_SET_[TSS_ADDR|IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR] Peter Xu
2020-01-19  9:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-20  6:45     ` Peter Xu
2020-01-21 15:56   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-21 16:14     ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-28  5:50     ` Peter Xu
2020-01-28 18:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-31 15:08         ` Peter Xu
2020-01-31 19:33           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-31 20:28             ` Peter Xu
2020-01-31 20:36               ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-31 20:55                 ` Peter Xu
2020-01-31 21:29                   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-31 22:16                     ` Peter Xu
2020-01-31 22:20                       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM: Pass in kvm pointer into mark_page_dirty_in_slot() Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM: Move running VCPU from ARM to common code Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM: X86: Implement ring-based dirty memory tracking Peter Xu
2020-01-09 16:29   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 16:56     ` Alex Williamson
2020-01-09 19:21       ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 19:36         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 19:15     ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 19:35       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 20:19         ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 22:18           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-10 15:29             ` Peter Xu [this message]
2020-01-12  6:24               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-14 20:01         ` Peter Xu
2020-01-15  6:50           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-15 15:20             ` Peter Xu
2020-01-19  9:09       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-19 10:12         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-20  7:29           ` Peter Xu
2020-01-20  7:47             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-21  8:29               ` Peter Xu
2020-01-21 10:25                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-21 10:24             ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-11  4:49   ` kbuild test robot
2020-01-11 23:19   ` kbuild test robot
2020-01-15  6:47   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-15 15:27     ` Peter Xu
2020-01-16  8:38   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-16 16:27     ` Peter Xu
2020-01-17  9:50       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-20  6:48         ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM: Make dirty ring exclusive to dirty bitmap log Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM: Don't allocate dirty bitmap if dirty ring is enabled Peter Xu
2020-01-09 16:41   ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM: selftests: Always clear dirty bitmap after iteration Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM: selftests: Sync uapi/linux/kvm.h to tools/ Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM: selftests: Use a single binary for dirty/clear log test Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM: selftests: Introduce after_vcpu_run hook for dirty " Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM: selftests: Add dirty ring buffer test Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM: selftests: Let dirty_log_test async for dirty ring test Peter Xu
2020-01-09 14:57 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM: selftests: Add "-c" parameter to dirty log test Peter Xu
2020-01-09 15:59 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] KVM: Dirty ring interface Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 16:17   ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 16:40     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 17:08       ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 19:08         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 19:39           ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 20:42             ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-09 22:28             ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-10 15:10               ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 16:47 ` Alex Williamson
2020-01-09 17:58   ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 19:13     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 19:23       ` Peter Xu
2020-01-09 19:37         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-09 20:51       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-09 22:21         ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-01-19  9:11 ` Paolo Bonzini

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