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From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs()
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 09:25:12 -0800
Message-ID: <20200124172512.GJ2109@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87lfpyq9bk.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com>

On Thu, Jan 23, 2020 at 08:09:03PM +0100, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> writes:
> >
> >> On 22/01/20 17:29, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> >>> Yes, in case we're back to the idea to filter things out in QEMU we can
> >>> do this. What I don't like is that every other userspace which decides
> >>> to enable eVMCS will have to perform the exact same surgery as in case
> >>> it sets allow_unsupported_controls=0 it'll have to know (hardcode) the
> >>> filtering (or KVM_SET_MSRS will fail) and in case it opts for
> >>> allow_unsupported_controls=1 Windows guests just won't boot without the
> >>> filtering.
> >>> 
> >>> It seems to be 1:1, eVMCSv1 requires the filter.
> >>
> >> Yes, that's the point.  It *is* a hack in KVM, but it is generally
> >> preferrable to have an easier API for userspace, if there's only one way
> >> to do it.
> >>
> >> Though we could be a bit more "surgical" and only remove
> >> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES---thus minimizing the impact on
> >> non-eVMCS guests.  Vitaly, can you prepare a v2 that does that and adds
> >> a huge "hack alert" comment that explains the discussion?
> >
> > Yes, sure. I'd like to do more testing to make sure filtering out
> > SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES is enough for other Hyper-V
> > versions too (who knows how many bugs are there :-)
> 
> ... and the answer is -- more than one :-)
> 
> I've tested Hyper-V 2016/2019 BIOS and UEFI-booted and the minimal
> viable set seems to be:
> 
> MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2: 
> 	~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES
> 
> MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS/MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
> 	~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL
> 
> MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS/MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
> 	~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL
>  
> with these filtered out all 4 versions are at least able to boot with >1
> vCPU and run a nested guest (different from Windows management
> partition).
> 
> This still feels a bit fragile as who knows under which circumstances
> Hyper-V might want to enable additional (missing) controls.

No strong opinion, I'm good either way.

> If there are no objections and if we still think it would be beneficial
> to minimize the list of controls we filter out (and not go with the full
> set like my RFC suggests), I'll prepare v2. (v1, actually, this was RFC).

One last idea, can we keep the MSR filtering as is and add the hack in
vmx_restore_control_msr()?  That way the (userspace) host and guest see
the same values when reading the affected MSRs, and eVMCS wouldn't need
it's own hook to do consistency checks.

@@ -1181,28 +1181,38 @@ static int
 vmx_restore_control_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
 {
        u64 supported;
-       u32 *lowp, *highp;
+       u32 *lowp, *highp, evmcs_unsupported;

        switch (msr_index) {
        case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
                lowp = &vmx->nested.msrs.pinbased_ctls_low;
                highp = &vmx->nested.msrs.pinbased_ctls_high;
+               if (vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled)
+                       evmcs_unsupported = EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
                lowp = &vmx->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_low;
                highp = &vmx->nested.msrs.procbased_ctls_high;
+               if (vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled)
+                       evmcs_unsupported = 0;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
                lowp = &vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_low;
                highp = &vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high;
+               if (vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled)
+                       evmcs_unsupported = EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
                lowp = &vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_low;
                highp = &vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high;
+               if (vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled)
+                       evmcs_unsupported = EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
                lowp = &vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_low;
                highp = &vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high;
+               if (vmx->nested.enlightened_vmcs_enabled)
+                       evmcs_unsupported = EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC;
                break;
        default:
                BUG();
@@ -1210,6 +1220,9 @@ vmx_restore_control_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr_index, u64 data)

        supported = vmx_control_msr(*lowp, *highp);

+       /* HACK! */
+       data &= ~(u64)evmcs_unsupported << 32;
+
        /* Check must-be-1 bits are still 1. */
        if (!is_bitwise_subset(data, supported, GENMASK_ULL(31, 0)))


  reply index

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-15 17:10 [PATCH RFC 0/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: fix enlightened VMCS & QEMU4.2 Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 17:10 ` [PATCH RFC 1/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: remove stale evmcs_already_enabled check from nested_enable_evmcs() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 22:50   ` Liran Alon
2020-01-15 17:10 ` [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 22:49   ` Liran Alon
2020-01-16  8:37     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-02-03 15:11       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 23:27   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-15 23:30     ` Liran Alon
2020-01-16  8:51       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-16 16:19         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-16 16:57           ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-17  6:31             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-18 21:42           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-19  8:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-22  5:47     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-22  9:37       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-22 14:33       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-22 15:08         ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-22 15:51           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-22 16:29             ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-22 16:40               ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-23  9:15                 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-23 19:09                   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-24 17:25                     ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-01-27 15:38                       ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-27 17:53                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-27 21:52                           ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-27 18:17                         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-15 17:10 ` [PATCH RFC 3/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: don't allow to turn on unsupported VMX controls for nested guests Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 22:59   ` Liran Alon
2020-01-16  8:55     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-16 16:21       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-19  8:57         ` Paolo Bonzini

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