From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 594E8C3F68F for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 204A32082F for ; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728182AbgBNW1x (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:27:53 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:46668 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728148AbgBNW1l (ORCPT ); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:27:41 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098394.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 01EMPT8w086217; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:27:40 -0500 Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2y4qyunbry-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:27:39 -0500 Received: from m0098394.ppops.net (m0098394.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.36/8.16.0.36) with SMTP id 01EMRdDF092908; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:27:39 -0500 Received: from ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com (1b.90.2fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.47.144.27]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2y4qyunbrk-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:27:39 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id 01EMRINF020141; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:38 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.19]) by ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 2y5bbysw22-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:38 +0000 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.233]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 01EMRYWv19595590 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:34 GMT Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E4B9136093; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95B44136091; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:33 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.114.17.106]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Fri, 14 Feb 2020 22:27:33 +0000 (GMT) From: Christian Borntraeger To: Christian Borntraeger , Janosch Frank Cc: KVM , Cornelia Huck , David Hildenbrand , Thomas Huth , Ulrich Weigand , Claudio Imbrenda , linux-s390 , Michael Mueller , Vasily Gorbik , Janosch Frank Subject: [PATCH v2 36/42] DOCUMENTATION: Protected virtual machine introduction and IPL Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 17:26:52 -0500 Message-Id: <20200214222658.12946-37-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.0 In-Reply-To: <20200214222658.12946-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> References: <20200214222658.12946-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138,18.0.572 definitions=2020-02-14_08:2020-02-14,2020-02-14 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1015 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2001150001 definitions=main-2002140165 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org From: Janosch Frank Add documentation about protected KVM guests and description of changes that are necessary to move a KVM VM into Protected Virtualization mode. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: fixing and conversion to rst] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger --- Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 2 + Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-boot.rst | 83 +++++++++++++++++ Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv.rst | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 1 + 4 files changed, 202 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-boot.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv.rst diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst index 774deaebf7fa..dcc252634cf9 100644 --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ KVM nested-vmx ppc-pv s390-diag + s390-pv + s390-pv-boot timekeeping vcpu-requests diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-boot.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-boot.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b762df206ab7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv-boot.rst @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +====================================== +s390 (IBM Z) Boot/IPL of Protected VMs +====================================== + +Summary +------- +The memory of Protected Virtual Machines (PVMs) is not accessible to +I/O or the hypervisor. In those cases where the hypervisor needs to +access the memory of a PVM, that memory must be made accessible. +Memory made accessible to the hypervisor will be encrypted. See +:doc:`s390-pv` for details." + +On IPL (boot) a small plaintext bootloader is started, which provides +information about the encrypted components and necessary metadata to +KVM to decrypt the protected virtual machine. + +Based on this data, KVM will make the protected virtual machine known +to the Ultravisor(UV) and instruct it to secure the memory of the PVM, +decrypt the components and verify the data and address list hashes, to +ensure integrity. Afterwards KVM can run the PVM via the SIE +instruction which the UV will intercept and execute on KVM's behalf. + +As the guest image is just like an opaque kernel image that does the +switch into PV mode itself, the user can load encrypted guest +executables and data via every available method (network, dasd, scsi, +direct kernel, ...) without the need to change the boot process. + + +Diag308 +------- +This diagnose instruction is the basic mechanism to handle IPL and +related operations for virtual machines. The VM can set and retrieve +IPL information blocks, that specify the IPL method/devices and +request VM memory and subsystem resets, as well as IPLs. + +For PVMs this concept has been extended with new subcodes: + +Subcode 8: Set an IPL Information Block of type 5 (information block +for PVMs) +Subcode 9: Store the saved block in guest memory +Subcode 10: Move into Protected Virtualization mode + +The new PV load-device-specific-parameters field specifies all data +that is necessary to move into PV mode. + +* PV Header origin +* PV Header length +* List of Components composed of + * AES-XTS Tweak prefix + * Origin + * Size + +The PV header contains the keys and hashes, which the UV will use to +decrypt and verify the PV, as well as control flags and a start PSW. + +The components are for instance an encrypted kernel, kernel parameters +and initrd. The components are decrypted by the UV. + +After the initial import of the encrypted data, all defined pages will +contain the guest content. All non-specified pages will start out as +zero pages on first access. + + +When running in protected virtualization mode, some subcodes will result in +exceptions or return error codes. + +Subcodes 4 and 7, which specify operations that do not clear the guest +memory, will result in specification exceptions. This is because the +UV will clear all memory when a secure VM is removed, and therefore +non-clearing IPL subcodes are not allowed." + +Subcodes 8, 9, 10 will result in specification exceptions. +Re-IPL into a protected mode is only possible via a detour into non +protected mode. + +Keys +---- +Every CEC will have a unique public key to enable tooling to build +encrypted images. +See `s390-tools `_ +for the tooling. diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..27fe03eaeaad --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/s390-pv.rst @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========================================= +s390 (IBM Z) Ultravisor and Protected VMs +========================================= + +Summary +------- +Protected virtual machines (PVM) are KVM VMs that do not allow KVM to +access VM state like guest memory or guest registers. Instead, the +PVMs are mostly managed by a new entity called Ultravisor (UV). The UV +provides an API that can be used by PVMs and KVM to request management +actions. + +Each guest starts in the non-protected mode and then may make a +request to transition into protected mode. On transition, KVM +registers the guest and its VCPUs with the Ultravisor and prepares +everything for running it. + +The Ultravisor will secure and decrypt the guest's boot memory +(i.e. kernel/initrd). It will safeguard state changes like VCPU +starts/stops and injected interrupts while the guest is running. + +As access to the guest's state, such as the SIE state description, is +normally needed to be able to run a VM, some changes have been made in +the behavior of the SIE instruction. A new format 4 state description +has been introduced, where some fields have different meanings for a +PVM. SIE exits are minimized as much as possible to improve speed and +reduce exposed guest state. + + +Interrupt injection +------------------- +Interrupt injection is safeguarded by the Ultravisor. As KVM doesn't +have access to the VCPUs' lowcores, injection is handled via the +format 4 state description. + +Machine check, external, IO and restart interruptions each can be +injected on SIE entry via a bit in the interrupt injection control +field (offset 0x54). If the guest cpu is not enabled for the interrupt +at the time of injection, a validity interception is recognized. The +format 4 state description contains fields in the interception data +block where data associated with the interrupt can be transported. + +Program and Service Call exceptions have another layer of +safeguarding; they can only be injected for instructions that have +been intercepted into KVM. The exceptions need to be a valid outcome +of an instruction emulation by KVM, e.g. we can never inject a +addressing exception as they are reported by SIE since KVM has no +access to the guest memory. + + +Mask notification interceptions +------------------------------- +In order to be notified when a PVM enables a certain class of +interrupt, KVM cannot intercept lctl(g) and lpsw(e) anymore. As a +replacement, two new interception codes have been introduced: One +indicating that the contents of CRs 0, 6, or 14 have been changed, +indicating different interruption subclasses; and one indicating that +PSW bit 13 has been changed, indicating that a machine check +intervention was requested and those are now enabled. + +Instruction emulation +--------------------- +With the format 4 state description for PVMs, the SIE instruction already +interprets more instructions than it does with format 2. It is not able +to interpret every instruction, but needs to hand some tasks to KVM; +therefore, the SIE and the ultravisor safeguard emulation inputs and outputs. + +The control structures associated with SIE provide the Secure +Instruction Data Area (SIDA), the Interception Parameters (IP) and the +Secure Interception General Register Save Area. Guest GRs and most of +the instruction data, such as I/O data structures, are filtered. +Instruction data is copied to and from the Secure Instruction Data +Area (SIDA) when needed. Guest GRs are put into / retrieved from the +Secure Interception General Register Save Area. + +Only GR values needed to emulate an instruction will be copied into this +save area and the real register numbers will be hidden. + +The Interception Parameters state description field still contains the +the bytes of the instruction text, but with pre-set register values +instead of the actual ones. I.e. each instruction always uses the same +instruction text, in order not to leak guest instruction text. +This also implies that the register content that a guest had in r +may be in r from the hypervisor's point of view. + +The Secure Instruction Data Area contains instruction storage +data. Instruction data, i.e. data being referenced by an instruction +like the SCCB for sclp, is moved via the SIDA. When an instruction is +intercepted, the SIE will only allow data and program interrupts for +this instruction to be moved to the guest via the two data areas +discussed before. Other data is either ignored or results in validity +interceptions. + + +Instruction emulation interceptions +----------------------------------- +There are two types of SIE secure instruction intercepts: the normal +and the notification type. Normal secure instruction intercepts will +make the guest pending for instruction completion of the intercepted +instruction type, i.e. on SIE entry it is attempted to complete +emulation of the instruction with the data provided by KVM. That might +be a program exception or instruction completion. + +The notification type intercepts inform KVM about guest environment +changes due to guest instruction interpretation. Such an interception +is recognized, for example, for the store prefix instruction to provide +the new lowcore location. On SIE reentry, any KVM data in the data areas +is ignored and execution continues as if the guest instruction had +completed. For that reason KVM is not allowed to inject a program +interrupt. + +Links +----- +`KVM Forum 2019 presentation `_ diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 38fe2f3f7b6f..115956e9ac8f 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9209,6 +9209,7 @@ L: kvm@vger.kernel.org W: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux.git S: Supported +F: Documentation/virt/kvm/s390* F: arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm* F: arch/s390/include/asm/gmap.h F: arch/s390/include/asm/kvm* -- 2.25.0