From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F6DEC3F2C6 for ; Tue, 3 Mar 2020 21:51:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B71C20870 for ; Tue, 3 Mar 2020 21:51:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728787AbgCCVvz (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Mar 2020 16:51:55 -0500 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]:37937 "EHLO mga03.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725932AbgCCVvz (ORCPT ); Tue, 3 Mar 2020 16:51:55 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 03 Mar 2020 13:51:54 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,511,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="274395561" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.202]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 03 Mar 2020 13:51:53 -0800 Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2020 13:51:53 -0800 From: Sean Christopherson To: Yang Weijiang Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] KVM: VMX: Pass through CET related MSRs Message-ID: <20200303215153.GA1439@linux.intel.com> References: <20191227021133.11993-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> <20191227021133.11993-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20191227021133.11993-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Dec 27, 2019 at 10:11:29AM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote: > CET MSRs pass through Guest directly to enhance performance. > CET runtime control settings are stored in MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET, > Shadow Stack Pointer(SSP) are stored in MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP, > SSP table base address is stored in MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, > these MSRs are defined in kernel and re-used here. > > MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP are used for user mode protection, > the contents could differ from process to process, therefore, > kernel needs to save/restore them during context switch, it makes > sense to pass through them so that the guest kernel can > use xsaves/xrstors to operate them efficiently. Other MSRs are used > for non-user mode protection. See CET spec for detailed info. > > The difference between CET VMCS state fields and xsave components is that, > the former used for CET state storage during VMEnter/VMExit, > whereas the latter used for state retention between Guest task/process > switch. > > Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z > Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang > --- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h > index d78a61408243..1d77b880084d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h > @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ bool kvm_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, > > int cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > +u64 kvm_supported_xss(void); > + > static inline int cpuid_maxphyaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > { > return vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > index 477173e4a85d..61fc846c7ef3 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c > @@ -7091,6 +7091,52 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4)); > } > > +static void vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > +{ > + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); > + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; > + > + /* > + * U_CET is required for USER CET, per CET spec., meanwhile U_CET and > + * PL3_SPP are a bundle for USER CET xsaves. > + */ > + if ((kvm_supported_xss() & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER) && > + (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || > + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))) { > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW); > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW); > + } else { > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + } I prefer the style of pt_update_intercept_for_msr(), e.g. flag = (kvm_supported_xss() & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER) && (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); flag = (kvm_supported_xss() & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL) && (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); /* SSP_TAB only available for KERNEL SHSTK.*/ flag &= guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK); vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag); > + /* > + * S_CET is required for KERNEL CET, meanwhile PL0_SSP ... PL2_SSP are a bundle > + * for CET KERNEL xsaves. > + */ > + if ((kvm_supported_xss() & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL) && > + (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || > + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))) { > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW); > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW); > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW); > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW); > + > + /* SSP_TAB only available for KERNEL SHSTK.*/ > + if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, > + MSR_TYPE_RW); > + else > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, > + MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + } else { > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, MSR_TYPE_RW, true); > + } > +} > + > static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > { > struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); > @@ -7115,6 +7161,8 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) && > guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) > update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu); > + > + vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(vcpu); > } > > static void vmx_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry) > -- > 2.17.2 >