From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: wei.huang2@amd.com, cavery@redhat.com, vkuznets@redhat.com,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 08/22] KVM: x86: Make return for {interrupt_nmi,smi}_allowed() a bool instead of int
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 13:24:02 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200424172416.243870-9-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200424172416.243870-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Return an actual bool for kvm_x86_ops' {interrupt_nmi}_allowed() hook to
better reflect the return semantics, and to avoid creating an even
bigger mess when the related VMX code is refactored in upcoming patches.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20200423022550.15113-5-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 14 +++++++-------
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 372e6ea4af32..efaddc68a694 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1139,8 +1139,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*set_nmi)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*queue_exception)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*cancel_injection)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
- int (*interrupt_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
- int (*nmi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ bool (*interrupt_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ bool (*nmi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
bool (*get_nmi_mask)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void (*set_nmi_mask)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked);
void (*enable_nmi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
- int (*smi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+ bool (*smi_allowed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*pre_enter_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate);
int (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 8e732eb0b5c9..cdee634e961d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3062,11 +3062,11 @@ static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
set_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
}
-static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static bool svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
- int ret;
+ bool ret;
ret = !(vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK) &&
!(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_NMI_MASK);
@@ -3095,14 +3095,14 @@ static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
}
}
-static int svm_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static bool svm_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
if (!gif_set(svm) ||
(vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK))
- return 0;
+ return false;
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && (svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_VINTR_MASK))
return !!(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_HIF_MASK);
@@ -3755,23 +3755,23 @@ static void svm_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap &= 0x1ff;
}
-static int svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static bool svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
/* Per APM Vol.2 15.22.2 "Response to SMI" */
if (!gif_set(svm))
- return 0;
+ return false;
if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu) &&
svm->nested.intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_SMI)) {
/* TODO: Might need to set exit_info_1 and exit_info_2 here */
svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_SMI;
svm->nested.exit_required = true;
- return 0;
+ return false;
}
- return 1;
+ return true;
}
static int svm_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 455cd2c8dbce..c98194f04b04 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4511,21 +4511,21 @@ void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
}
}
-static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static bool vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
- return 0;
+ return false;
if (!enable_vnmi &&
to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
- return 0;
+ return false;
return !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI
| GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
}
-static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static bool vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
@@ -7675,12 +7675,12 @@ static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
~FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
}
-static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static bool vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return false;
+ return true;
}
static int vmx_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
--
2.18.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-24 17:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-24 17:23 [PATCH v2 00/22] KVM: Event fixes and cleanup Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:23 ` [PATCH v2 01/22] KVM: SVM: introduce nested_run_pending Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:23 ` [PATCH v2 02/22] KVM: SVM: leave halted state on vmexit Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:41 ` Oliver Upton
2020-04-24 17:23 ` [PATCH v2 03/22] KVM: SVM: immediately inject INTR vmexit Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-21 12:50 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-05-21 14:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-21 21:04 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:23 ` [PATCH v2 04/22] KVM: SVM: Implement check_nested_events for NMI Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:23 ` [PATCH v2 05/22] KVM: nVMX: Preserve exception priority irrespective of exiting behavior Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:24 ` [PATCH v2 06/22] KVM: nVMX: Open a window for pending nested VMX preemption timer Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:24 ` [PATCH v2 07/22] KVM: x86: Set KVM_REQ_EVENT if run is canceled with req_immediate_exit set Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:24 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2020-04-24 17:24 ` [PATCH v2 09/22] KVM: x86: replace is_smm checks with kvm_x86_ops.smi_allowed Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-24 17:29 ` [PATCH v2 00/22] KVM: Event fixes and cleanup Sean Christopherson
2020-04-24 21:02 ` Oliver Upton
2020-04-24 21:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-25 7:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 10/22] KVM: nVMX: Report NMIs as allowed when in L2 and Exit-on-NMI is set Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 11/22] KVM: nSVM: " Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 12/22] KVM: nSVM: Move SMI vmexit handling to svm_check_nested_events() Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 13/22] KVM: VMX: Split out architectural interrupt/NMI blocking checks Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 14/22] KVM: SVM: Split out architectural interrupt/NMI/SMI " Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 15/22] KVM: nVMX: Preserve IRQ/NMI priority irrespective of exiting behavior Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 16/22] KVM: nVMX: Prioritize SMI over nested IRQ/NMI Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 17/22] KVM: nSVM: Report interrupts as allowed when in L2 and exit-on-interrupt is set Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 18/22] KVM: nSVM: Preserve IRQ/NMI/SMI priority irrespective of exiting behavior Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:01 ` [PATCH v2 19/22] KVM: x86: WARN on injected+pending exception even in nested case Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:02 ` [PATCH v2 20/22] KVM: VMX: Use vmx_interrupt_blocked() directly from vmx_handle_exit() Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:02 ` [PATCH v2 21/22] KVM: VMX: Use vmx_get_rflags() to query RFLAGS in vmx_interrupt_blocked() Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-25 7:02 ` [PATCH v2 22/22] KVM: x86: Replace late check_nested_events() hack with more precise fix Paolo Bonzini
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200424172416.243870-9-pbonzini@redhat.com \
--to=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=cavery@redhat.com \
--cc=jmattson@google.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=oupton@google.com \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
--cc=wei.huang2@amd.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).