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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.redhat.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
	David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>,
	cohuck@redhat.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.-rg, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: [RFC 17/18] spapr: Added PEF based guest memory protection
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 16:41:19 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200514064120.449050-18-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200514064120.449050-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected
Execution Framework) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to
run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor.  The
effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are
quite different.

Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the
ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu.  However qemu
does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs.

Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference
which depends on havint the right hardware and firmware, we don't
enable this by default.  In order to run a secure guest you need to
create a "pef-guest" object and set the guest-memory-protection machine property to point to it.

Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is
such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter
secure mode, so we can't know if the guest actually is secure until
well after machine creation time.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
---
 target/ppc/Makefile.objs |  2 +-
 target/ppc/pef.c         | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c

diff --git a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs
index e8fa18ce13..ac93b9700e 100644
--- a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs
+++ b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-y += machine.o mmu_helper.o mmu-hash32.o monitor.o arch_dump.o
 obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-hash64.o mmu-book3s-v3.o compat.o
 obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-radix64.o
 endif
-obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o pef.o
 obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o
 obj-y += dfp_helper.o
 obj-y += excp_helper.o
diff --git a/target/ppc/pef.c b/target/ppc/pef.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..823daf3e9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/target/ppc/pef.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * PEF (Protected Execution Framework) for POWER support
+ *
+ * Copyright David Gibson, Redhat Inc. 2020
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+
+#define TYPE_PEF_GUEST "pef-guest"
+#define PEF_GUEST(obj)                                  \
+    OBJECT_CHECK(PefGuestState, (obj), TYPE_SEV_GUEST)
+
+typedef struct PefGuestState PefGuestState;
+
+/**
+ * PefGuestState:
+ *
+ * The PefGuestState object is used for creating and managing a PEF
+ * guest.
+ *
+ * # $QEMU \
+ *         -object pef-guest,id=pef0 \
+ *         -machine ...,guest-memory-protection=pef0
+ */
+struct PefGuestState {
+    Object parent_obj;
+};
+
+static Error *pef_mig_blocker;
+
+static int pef_kvm_init(GuestMemoryProtection *gmpo, Error **errp)
+{
+    PefGuestState *pef = PEF_GUEST(gmpo);
+
+    if (!kvm_check_extension(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST)) {
+        error_setg(errp,
+                   "KVM implementation does not support Secure VMs (is an ultravisor running?)");
+        return -1;
+    } else {
+        int ret = kvm_vm_enable_cap(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST, 0, 1);
+
+        if (ret < 0) {
+            error_setg(errp,
+                       "Error enabling PEF with KVM");
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static void pef_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
+{
+    GuestMemoryProtectionClass *gmpc = GUEST_MEMORY_PROTECTION_CLASS(oc);
+
+    gmpc->kvm_init = pef_kvm_init;
+}
+
+static const TypeInfo pef_guest_info = {
+    .parent = TYPE_OBJECT,
+    .name = TYPE_PEF_GUEST,
+    .instance_size = sizeof(PefGuestState),
+    .class_init = pef_guest_class_init,
+    .interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) {
+        { TYPE_GUEST_MEMORY_PROTECTION },
+        { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
+        { }
+    }
+};
+
+static void
+pef_register_types(void)
+{
+    type_register_static(&pef_guest_info);
+}
+
+type_init(pef_register_types);
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-14  6:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-14  6:41 [RFC 00/18] Refactor configuration of guest memory protection David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 01/18] target/i386: sev: Remove unused QSevGuestInfoClass David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 02/18] target/i386: sev: Move local structure definitions into .c file David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 03/18] target/i386: sev: Rename QSevGuestInfo David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 04/18] target/i386: sev: Embed SEVState in SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 05/18] target/i386: sev: Partial cleanup to sev_state global David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 06/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 07/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant policy field David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 08/18] target/i386: sev: Remove redundant handle field David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 09/18] target/i386: sev: Unify SEVState and SevGuestState David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 10/18] guest memory protection: Add guest memory protection interface David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 11/18] guest memory protection: Handle memory encrption via interface David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 12/18] guest memory protection: Perform KVM init " David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 13/18] guest memory protection: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 14/18] guest memory protection: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 15/18] guest memory protection: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 16/18] use errp for gmpo kvm_init David Gibson
2020-05-14 17:09   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-05-15  0:14     ` David Gibson
2020-05-15  0:20     ` David Gibson
2020-05-14  6:41 ` David Gibson [this message]
2020-05-14  6:41 ` [RFC 18/18] guest memory protection: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson

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