kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>,
	Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@android.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: Don't inherit exec permission across page-table levels
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 09:22:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200728082255.3864378-3-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200728082255.3864378-1-maz@kernel.org>

From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

If a stage-2 page-table contains an executable, read-only mapping at the
pte level (e.g. due to dirty logging being enabled), a subsequent write
fault to the same page which tries to install a larger block mapping
(e.g. due to dirty logging having been disabled) will erroneously inherit
the exec permission and consequently skip I-cache invalidation for the
rest of the block.

Ensure that exec permission is only inherited by write faults when the
new mapping is of the same size as the existing one. A subsequent
instruction abort will result in I-cache invalidation for the entire
block mapping.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200723101714.15873-1-will@kernel.org
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index 8c0035cab6b6..31058e6e7c2a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ static bool stage2_get_leaf_entry(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t addr,
 	return true;
 }
 
-static bool stage2_is_exec(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t addr)
+static bool stage2_is_exec(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t addr, unsigned long sz)
 {
 	pud_t *pudp;
 	pmd_t *pmdp;
@@ -1338,11 +1338,11 @@ static bool stage2_is_exec(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t addr)
 		return false;
 
 	if (pudp)
-		return kvm_s2pud_exec(pudp);
+		return sz <= PUD_SIZE && kvm_s2pud_exec(pudp);
 	else if (pmdp)
-		return kvm_s2pmd_exec(pmdp);
+		return sz <= PMD_SIZE && kvm_s2pmd_exec(pmdp);
 	else
-		return kvm_s2pte_exec(ptep);
+		return sz == PAGE_SIZE && kvm_s2pte_exec(ptep);
 }
 
 static int stage2_set_pte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *cache,
@@ -1958,7 +1958,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 	 * execute permissions, and we preserve whatever we have.
 	 */
 	needs_exec = exec_fault ||
-		(fault_status == FSC_PERM && stage2_is_exec(kvm, fault_ipa));
+		(fault_status == FSC_PERM &&
+		 stage2_is_exec(kvm, fault_ipa, vma_pagesize));
 
 	if (vma_pagesize == PUD_SIZE) {
 		pud_t new_pud = kvm_pfn_pud(pfn, mem_type);
-- 
2.27.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-28  8:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-28  8:22 [GIT PULL] KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.8, take #4 Marc Zyngier
2020-07-28  8:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: Prevent vcpu_has_ptrauth from generating OOL functions Marc Zyngier
2020-07-28  8:22 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2020-07-31 11:25 ` [GIT PULL] KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.8, take #4 Paolo Bonzini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200728082255.3864378-3-maz@kernel.org \
    --to=maz@kernel.org \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com \
    --cc=kernel-team@android.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=natechancellor@gmail.com \
    --cc=ndesaulniers@google.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=qperret@google.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).