From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
To: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: "David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, ehabkost@redhat.com,
marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Richard Henderson" <rth@twiddle.net>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 20:29:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200910202924.3616935a.pasic@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200910133609.4ac88c25.cohuck@redhat.com>
On Thu, 10 Sep 2020 13:36:09 +0200
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 17:22:53 +0200
> Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, 24 Jul 2020 12:57:44 +1000
> > David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> >
> > > At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
> > > a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
> > > hypervisor.
> > >
> > > This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
> > > POWER's PEF, which are controlled bythe "host-trust-limitation"
> > > machine option. s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
> > > supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
> > > (S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
> > >
> > > To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
> > > implement the following compromise:
> > >
> > > - When the host-trust-limitation option is set, s390 will recognize
> > > it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not) and set
> > > virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected guests,
> > > as on other platforms. i.e. if host-trust-limitation is set, we
> > > will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode, or fail
> > > outright
> >
> > Shouldn't we also fail outright if the virtio features are not PV
> > compatible (invalid configuration)?
> >
> > I would like to see something like follows as a part of this series.
> > ----------------------------8<--------------------------
> > From: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> > Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2020 15:00:17 +0200
> > Subject: [PATCH] virtio: handle host trust limitation
> >
> > If host_trust_limitation_enabled() returns true, then emulated virtio
> > devices must offer VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM, because the device is not
> > capable of accessing all of the guest memory. Otherwise we are in
> > violation of the virtio specification.
> >
> > Let's fail realize if we detect that VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM feature is
> > obligatory but missing.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> > hw/virtio/virtio.c | 7 +++++++
> > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
> > index 5bd2a2f621..19b4b0a37a 100644
> > --- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
> > +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
> > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> > #include "hw/virtio/virtio-access.h"
> > #include "sysemu/dma.h"
> > #include "sysemu/runstate.h"
> > +#include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h"
> >
> > /*
> > * The alignment to use between consumer and producer parts of vring.
> > @@ -3618,6 +3619,12 @@ static void virtio_device_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
> > /* Devices should either use vmsd or the load/save methods */
> > assert(!vdc->vmsd || !vdc->load);
> >
> > + if (host_trust_limitation_enabled(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine()))
> > + && !virtio_host_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM)) {
> > + error_setg(&err, "devices without VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM are not compatible with host trust imitation");
> > + error_propagate(errp, err);
> > + return;
>
> How can we get here? I assume only if the user explicitly turned the
> feature off while turning HTL on, as otherwise patch 9 should have
> taken care of it?
>
Yes, we can get here only if iommu_platform is explicitly turned off.
Regards,
Halil
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-10 18:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-24 2:57 [for-5.2 v4 00/10] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 01/10] host trust limitation: Introduce new host trust limitation interface David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 02/10] host trust limitation: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 03/10] host trust limitation: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 04/10] host trust limitation: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 05/10] host trust limitation: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 06/10] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 07/10] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation David Gibson
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 08/10] spapr: PEF: block migration David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:01 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 09/10] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:05 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-08-13 7:43 ` Greg Kurz
2020-08-13 8:19 ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-07 15:10 ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-11 2:04 ` David Gibson
2020-09-11 13:49 ` Halil Pasic
2020-07-24 2:57 ` [for-5.2 v4 10/10] s390: Recognize host-trust-limitation option David Gibson
2020-07-27 15:50 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-08-03 7:40 ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-06 6:14 ` David Gibson
2020-08-06 7:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-03 7:49 ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03 7:54 ` David Gibson
2020-08-03 8:07 ` Janosch Frank
2020-08-03 8:14 ` David Gibson
2020-08-03 8:33 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-07 15:22 ` Halil Pasic
2020-09-10 11:36 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-09-10 18:29 ` Halil Pasic [this message]
2020-09-11 0:07 ` David Gibson
2020-09-11 6:25 ` Greg Kurz
2020-09-11 12:45 ` Halil Pasic
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