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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org, haitao.huang@intel.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	hpa@zytor.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 04/23] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 20:09:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210111190901.GG25645@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <X/yQyUx4+veuSO0e@google.com>

On Mon, Jan 11, 2021 at 09:54:17AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Yes, but KVM including the bug caps in kvm_cpu_caps is extremely unlikely, and
> arguably flat out wrong.  Currently, kvm_cpu_caps includes only CPUID-based
> features that can be exposed direcly to the guest.  I could see a scenario where
> KVM exposed "bug" capabilities to the guest via a paravirt interface, but I
> would expect that KVM would either filter and expose the kernel's bug caps
> without userspace input, or would add a KVM-defined paravirt CPUID leaf to
> enumerate the caps and track _that_ in kvm_cpu_caps.
> 
> Anyways, I agree that overlapping the bug caps it's a bit of unnecessary
> cleverness.  I'm not opposed to incorporating NBUGINTS into KVM, but that would
> mean explicitly pulling in even more x86_capability implementation details.

Also, the kernel and kvm being part of it :) kinda tries to fix those
bugs and not expose them to the guest so exposing a bug would probably
be only for testing purposes...

> That part is deliberate and isn't a dependency so much as how things are
> implemented.  The true dependency is on the bit offsets within each word. 

Right.

> The kernel could completely rescramble the word numbering and KVM
> would chug along happily. What KVM won't play nice with is if the
> kernel broke up a hardware- defined, gathered CPUID leaf/word into
> scattered features spread out amongst multiple Linux-defined words.

Yes, kvm wants the bits just as they are in the CPUID leafs from the hw.

> It's mostly historical; before the kvm_cpu_caps concept was introduced, the code
> had grown organically to include both boot_cpu_data and raw CPUID info.  The
> vast, vast majority of the time, doing CPUID is likely redundant.  But, as noted
> in commit d8577a4c238f ("KVM: x86: Do host CPUID at load time to mask KVM cpu
> caps"), the code is quite cheap and runs once at KVM load.  My argument back
> then was, and still is, that an extra bit of paranoia is justified since the
> code and operations are quite nearly free.

Ok.

> This particular dependency can be broken, and quite easily at that.  Rather than
> memcpy() boot_cpu_data.x86_capability, it's trivially easy to redefine the F()
> macro to invoke boot_cpu_has(), which would allow dropping the memcpy().  The
> big downside, and why I didn't post the code, is that doing so means every
> feature routed through F() requires some form of BT+Jcc (or CMOVcc) sequence,
> whereas the mempcy() approach allows the F() features to be encoded as a single
> literal by the compiler.
> 
> From a latency perspective, the extra code is negligible.  The big issue is that
> all those extra checks add 2k+ bytes of code.  Eliminating the mempcy() doesn't
> actually break KVM's dependency on the bit offsets, so we'd be bloating kvm.ko
> by a noticeable amount without providing substantial value.
> 
> And, this behavior is mostly opportunistic; the true justification/motiviation
> for taking a dependency on the X86_FEATURE_* bit offsets is for communication
> with userspace, querying the guest CPU model, and runtime checks.

Ok, I guess we'll try to find a middle ground here and not let stuff
grow too ugly to live.

> It's effectively for communication with userspace.  Userspace, via ioctl(),
> dictates the vCPU model to KVM, including the exact CPUID results. 

And using the CPUID leafs with the exact bit positions is sort of an
"interface" there, I see.

> to properly
> virtualize/emulate the defined vCPU model, KVM must query the dictated CPUID
> results to determine what features are supported, what guest operations
> should fault, etc...  E.g. if the vCPU model, via CPUID, states that SMEP isn't
> supported then KVM needs to inject a #GP if the guest attempts to set CR4.SMEP.
> 
> KVM also uses the hardware-defined CPUID ABI to advertise which features are
> supported by both hardware and KVM.  This is the kvm_cpu_cap stuff, where KVM
> reads boot_cpu_data to see what features were enabled by the kernel.

Right.

> It would be possible for KVM to break the dependency on X86_FEATURE_* bit
> offsets by defining a translation layer, but I strongly feel that adding manual
> translations will do more harm than good as it increases the odds of us botching
> a translation or using the wrong feature flag, creates potential namespace
> conflicts, etc...

Ok, lemme see if we might encounter more issues down the road...

+enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
+       CPUID_12_EAX     = NCAPINTS,
+       NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS,
+
+       NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
+};
+

What happens when we decide to allocate a separate leaf for CPUID_12_EAX
down the road?

You do it already here

Subject: [PATCH 04/13] x86/cpufeatures: Assign dedicated feature word for AMD mem encryption

for the AMD leaf.

I'm thinking this way around - from scattered to a hw one - should be ok
because that should work easily. The other way around, taking a hw leaf
and scattering it around x86_capability[] array elems would probably be
nasty but with your change that should work too.

Yah, I'm just hypothesizing here - I don't think this "other way around"
will ever happen...

Hmm, yap, I can cautiously say that with your change we should be ok...

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-11 19:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-06  1:55 [RFC PATCH 00/23] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:55 ` [RFC PATCH 01/23] x86/sgx: Split out adding EPC page to free list to separate helper Kai Huang
2021-01-11 22:38   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-12  0:19     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12 21:45       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-13  1:15         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-13 17:05         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-06  1:55 ` [RFC PATCH 02/23] x86/sgx: Add enum for SGX_CHILD_PRESENT error code Kai Huang
2021-01-06 18:28   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 21:40     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12  0:26     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-11 23:32   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-12  0:16     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12  1:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-06  1:55 ` [RFC PATCH 03/23] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Kai Huang
2021-01-06 19:35   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 20:35     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-07  0:47       ` Kai Huang
2021-01-07  0:52         ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-07  1:38           ` Kai Huang
2021-01-07  5:00             ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-07  1:42     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-07  5:02       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-15 14:07         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-15 15:39           ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-15 21:33             ` Kai Huang
2021-01-15 21:45               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-15 22:30                 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-11 23:38   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-12  0:56     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12  1:50       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-12  2:03         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:55 ` [RFC PATCH 04/23] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Kai Huang
2021-01-06 19:39   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 22:12     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06 22:21       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 22:56         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06 23:19           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-06 23:33             ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 23:56             ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06 23:40         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06 23:43           ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 23:56             ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06 22:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-06 23:09     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-07  6:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-08  2:00         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-08  5:10           ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-08  7:03             ` Kai Huang
2021-01-08  7:17               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-08  8:06                 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-08  8:13                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-08  9:00                     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-08 23:55                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  0:35                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-09  1:01                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-09  1:19                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-11 17:54                     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-11 19:09                       ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-01-11 19:20                         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-12  2:01                           ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12 12:13                           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-12 17:15                             ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-12 17:51                               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-12 21:07                                 ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12 23:17                                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-13  1:05                                     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-11 23:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-06  1:55 ` [RFC PATCH 05/23] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Kai Huang
2021-01-06 19:54   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 22:34     ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06 22:38       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 06/23] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 07/23] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 08/23] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 09/23] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 10/23] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Kai Huang
2021-01-06 19:56   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 11/23] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Kai Huang
2021-01-06 20:12   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 21:04     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-06 21:23       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-06 22:58         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 12/23] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 13/23] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 14/23] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 15/23] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 16/23] KVM: x86: Add SGX feature leaf to reverse CPUID lookup Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 17/23] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 18/23] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 19/23] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 20/23] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 21/23] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:56 ` [RFC PATCH 22/23] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Kai Huang
2021-01-06  1:58 ` [RFC PATCH 23/23] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute Kai Huang
2021-01-06  2:22 ` [RFC PATCH 00/23] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-01-06 17:07 ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-07  0:34   ` Kai Huang
2021-01-07  0:48     ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-07  1:50       ` Kai Huang
2021-01-07 16:14         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-08  2:16           ` Kai Huang
2021-01-11 17:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-11 18:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-12  1:58     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-12  1:14   ` Kai Huang
2021-01-12  2:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-12  2:07       ` Kai Huang
2021-01-15 14:43         ` Kai Huang
2021-01-16  9:31           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-16  9:50             ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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