From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43B93C433E0 for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:58:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F154D23103 for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:58:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388733AbhALJ6A (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:58:00 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([216.205.24.124]:20430 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726223AbhALJ6A (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:58:00 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1610445394; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=EoTYF3Nqzmbw5uYQk5er+PvY1Ren6/rSY6QOq324q5M=; b=Y77th/+dosejHvIUCC+sdW+dF9mmB1v5j5HkaXhaVjWk7SrD9X7yz6Y66IzxjZPXnYVyNM VnCXcnQ9RG9YgI3wWbpE6grTlkfmSohdC2v/XF6ZY+eQg2JBuIS+Qvh9rXyY86y/vW2qP1 cwi7ixHbd8h40z9Q1F9ZApdXC6Zm+oY= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-83-kqjjbDiVO2e2GbaY_oj61g-1; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 04:56:29 -0500 X-MC-Unique: kqjjbDiVO2e2GbaY_oj61g-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D8035803622; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:56:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (ovpn-115-107.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.115.107]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 70EEC10016F5; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:56:15 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2021 09:56:12 +0000 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: David Gibson Cc: pasic@linux.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, andi.kleen@intel.com, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Marcelo Tosatti , Greg Kurz , frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, Christian Borntraeger , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum , Eduardo Habkost , david@redhat.com, Cornelia Huck , mst@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support Message-ID: <20210112095612.GE1360503@redhat.com> Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= References: <20210112044508.427338-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> <20210112044508.427338-11-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210112044508.427338-11-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> User-Agent: Mutt/1.14.6 (2020-07-11) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 03:45:05PM +1100, David Gibson wrote: > Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected > Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to > run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The > effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are > quite different. > > Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the > ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu > does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs. > > Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference > which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't > enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to > create a "pef-guest" object and set the confidential-guest-support > property to point to it. > > Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is > such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter > secure mode. Qemu has no directl way of knowing if the guest is in > secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine > creation time. > > To start a PEF-capable guest, use the command line options: > -object pef-guest,id=pef0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0 > > Signed-off-by: David Gibson > --- > docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 2 + > docs/papr-pef.txt | 30 ++++++++ > hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 + > hw/ppc/pef.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > hw/ppc/spapr.c | 10 +++ > include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 26 +++++++ > target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 ----- > target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 -- > 8 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 docs/papr-pef.txt > create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c > create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h > > +static const TypeInfo pef_guest_info = { > + .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, > + .name = TYPE_PEF_GUEST, > + .instance_size = sizeof(PefGuestState), > + .interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) { > + { TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT }, > + { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE }, > + { } > + } > +}; IIUC, the earlier patch defines TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT as a object, but you're using it as an interface here. The later s390 patch uses it as a parent, which makes more sense given it is a declared as an object. Regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|