From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
To: Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com, hch@lst.de, m.szyprowski@samsung.com,
robin.murphy@arm.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, joro@8bytes.org,
kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
robert.buhren@sect.tu-berlin.de, file@sect.tu-berlin.de,
mathias.morbitzer@aisec.fraunhofer.de,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] swiotlb: Validate bounce size in the sync/unmap path
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 12:30:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210113113017.GA28106@lst.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <X/27MSbfDGCY9WZu@martin>
On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 04:07:29PM +0100, Martin Radev wrote:
> The size of the buffer being bounced is not checked if it happens
> to be larger than the size of the mapped buffer. Because the size
> can be controlled by a device, as it's the case with virtio devices,
> this can lead to memory corruption.
>
I'm really worried about all these hodge podge hacks for not trusted
hypervisors in the I/O stack. Instead of trying to harden protocols
that are fundamentally not designed for this, how about instead coming
up with a new paravirtualized I/O interface that is specifically
designed for use with an untrusted hypervisor from the start?
next parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-13 11:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <X/27MSbfDGCY9WZu@martin>
2021-01-13 11:30 ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2021-01-18 11:44 ` [PATCH] swiotlb: Validate bounce size in the sync/unmap path Martin Radev
2021-01-18 15:14 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-01-25 18:33 ` Martin Radev
2021-02-02 16:37 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-02-02 22:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-02-02 23:13 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-02-03 12:49 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-02-03 19:36 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-02-05 17:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-02-08 17:14 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2021-02-09 8:26 ` Christoph Hellwig
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