From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F334CC4160E for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 01:53:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C872F206C0 for ; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 01:53:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728229AbhANBxn (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jan 2021 20:53:43 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:52005 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729681AbhAMX7K (ORCPT ); Wed, 13 Jan 2021 18:59:10 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DGPXQ4TQBz9sWP; Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:58:14 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1610582294; bh=/3Q4sEeOR4X9dZi9ZTw3f3cnX096S2u0KkWUMX2X/VM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=I4F2+9SCDPHP/lj6U2abnDcLOFwrhDDaPAp4o6MoPh3C59YMMjrz4C9y2L/c8NLh5 e0r/4kUKRT0hSN5v0X6laDc48kdrVzAHUbrzcPzB+x2AiPG09h+y/p8CvrXGiETISL VaEGB6D5YM8GL47ZBYFCGW9aB+2IuNL6F4XRmF9g= From: David Gibson To: brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: cohuck@redhat.com, Richard Henderson , Marcelo Tosatti , David Hildenbrand , borntraeger@de.ibm.com, Marcel Apfelbaum , Paolo Bonzini , mst@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Eduardo Habkost , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, Greg Kurz , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, David Gibson , berrange@redhat.com, andi.kleen@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v7 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:58:03 +1100 Message-Id: <20210113235811.1909610-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20210113235811.1909610-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20210113235811.1909610-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator. In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled. So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of the new property. Signed-off-by: David Gibson Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 5 +++-- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 +++-- hw/core/machine.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/hw/boards.h | 2 +- include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +- target/i386/sev.c | 32 ++------------------------------ 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index 260ed73ffe..28ab126f70 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -2181,8 +2181,9 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory * encryption context. */ - if (ms->memory_encryption) { - ret = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption); + if (ms->cgs) { + /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 5db9ab8f00..3d4787ae4a 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ #include "qemu-common.h" #include "sysemu/sev.h" -int sev_guest_init(const char *id) +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) { - return -1; + /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ + g_assert_not_reached(); } diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c index 8909117d80..94194ab82d 100644 --- a/hw/core/machine.c +++ b/hw/core/machine.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include "hw/mem/nvdimm.h" #include "migration/global_state.h" #include "migration/vmstate.h" +#include "exec/confidential-guest-support.h" GlobalProperty hw_compat_5_2[] = {}; const size_t hw_compat_5_2_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_5_2); @@ -427,16 +428,37 @@ static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object *obj, Error **errp) { MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj); - return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption); + if (ms->cgs) { + return g_strdup(object_get_canonical_path_component(OBJECT(ms->cgs))); + } + + return NULL; } static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) { - MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj); + Object *cgs = + object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), value); + + if (!cgs) { + error_setg(errp, "No such memory encryption object '%s'", value); + return; + } - g_free(ms->memory_encryption); - ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value); + object_property_set_link(obj, "confidential-guest-support", cgs, errp); +} + +static void machine_check_confidential_guest_support(const Object *obj, + const char *name, + Object *new_target, + Error **errp) +{ + /* + * So far the only constraint is that the target has the + * TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT interface, and that's checked + * by the QOM core + */ } static bool machine_get_nvdimm(Object *obj, Error **errp) @@ -836,6 +858,15 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) object_class_property_set_description(oc, "suppress-vmdesc", "Set on to disable self-describing migration"); + object_class_property_add_link(oc, "confidential-guest-support", + TYPE_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, + offsetof(MachineState, cgs), + machine_check_confidential_guest_support, + OBJ_PROP_LINK_STRONG); + object_class_property_set_description(oc, "confidential-guest-support", + "Set confidential guest scheme to support"); + + /* For compatibility */ object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption", machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption); object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption", @@ -1158,9 +1189,9 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine) cc->deprecation_note); } - if (machine->memory_encryption) { + if (machine->cgs) { /* - * With memory encryption, the host can't see the real + * With confidential guests, the host can't see the real * contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge * areas. */ diff --git a/include/hw/boards.h b/include/hw/boards.h index 17b1f3f0b9..1acd662fa5 100644 --- a/include/hw/boards.h +++ b/include/hw/boards.h @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ struct MachineState { bool iommu; bool suppress_vmdesc; bool enable_graphics; - char *memory_encryption; + ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs; char *ram_memdev_id; /* * convenience alias to ram_memdev_id backend memory region diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h index 7335e59867..3b5b1aacf1 100644 --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include "sysemu/kvm.h" -int sev_guest_init(const char *id); +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs); int sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp); int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret, uint64_t gpa, Error **errp); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 2a4b2187d6..5399a136ad 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -335,26 +335,6 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = { } }; -static SevGuestState * -lookup_sev_guest_info(const char *id) -{ - Object *obj; - SevGuestState *info; - - obj = object_resolve_path_component(object_get_objects_root(), id); - if (!obj) { - return NULL; - } - - info = (SevGuestState *) - object_dynamic_cast(obj, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); - if (!info) { - return NULL; - } - - return info; -} - bool sev_enabled(void) { @@ -682,10 +662,9 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) } } -int -sev_guest_init(const char *id) +int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs) { - SevGuestState *sev; + SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); char *devname; int ret, fw_error; uint32_t ebx; @@ -698,13 +677,6 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id) return -1; } - sev = lookup_sev_guest_info(id); - if (!sev) { - error_report("%s: '%s' is not a valid '%s' object", - __func__, id, TYPE_SEV_GUEST); - goto err; - } - sev_guest = sev; sev->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT; -- 2.29.2