From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com,
pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: cohuck@redhat.com,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
mst@redhat.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, thuth@redhat.com,
pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org,
frankja@linux.ibm.com, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
berrange@redhat.com, andi.kleen@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 10:58:05 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210113235811.1909610-8-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210113235811.1909610-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, relatively late in boot, where we verify that cgs has
been initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify just before the machine
specific initialization function.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
---
hw/core/machine.c | 8 ++++++++
include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 2 ++
target/i386/sev.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
index 94194ab82d..5a7433332b 100644
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
@@ -1190,6 +1190,14 @@ void machine_run_board_init(MachineState *machine)
}
if (machine->cgs) {
+ /*
+ * Where confidential guest support is initialized depends on
+ * the specific mechanism in use. But, we need to make sure
+ * it's ready by now. If it isn't, that's a bug in the
+ * implementation of that cgs mechanism.
+ */
+ assert(machine->cgs->ready);
+
/*
* With confidential guests, the host can't see the real
* contents of RAM, so there's no point in it trying to merge
diff --git a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
index 5f131023ba..bcaf6c9f49 100644
--- a/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
+++ b/include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(ConfidentialGuestSupport, CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)
struct ConfidentialGuestSupport {
Object parent;
+
+ bool ready;
};
typedef struct ConfidentialGuestSupportClass {
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index e2b41ef342..3d94635397 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -737,6 +737,8 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev);
+ cgs->ready = true;
+
return 0;
err:
sev_guest = NULL;
--
2.29.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-14 1:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-13 23:57 [PATCH v7 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:57 ` [PATCH v7 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-01-14 9:34 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 10:42 ` David Gibson
2021-01-18 18:51 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-21 1:06 ` David Gibson
2021-01-21 9:08 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-29 2:32 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-01-15 12:54 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18 2:59 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2021-01-15 12:56 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-01-15 13:06 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` David Gibson [this message]
2021-01-14 8:55 ` [PATCH v7 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag Greg Kurz
2021-01-15 13:12 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18 19:47 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-19 8:16 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-02-02 1:41 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-01-15 13:24 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18 3:03 ` David Gibson
2021-01-18 8:03 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-29 3:12 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-01-14 10:07 ` Greg Kurz
2021-01-15 15:36 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-29 2:36 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-01-15 15:41 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-29 2:43 ` David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-01-13 23:58 ` [PATCH v7 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
2021-01-14 9:10 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 9:19 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 9:24 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-15 0:13 ` David Gibson
2021-01-14 11:45 ` David Gibson
2021-01-15 16:36 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-18 17:06 ` Christian Borntraeger
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