kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Add AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST Kconfig for including SEV-ES support
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 16:25:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210116002517.548769-1-seanjc@google.com> (raw)

Introduce a new Kconfig, AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST, to control the inclusion of
support for running as an SEV-ES guest.  Pivoting on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT for
guest SEV-ES support is undesirable for host-only kernel builds as
AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is also required to enable KVM/host support for SEV and
SEV-ES.

A dedicated Kconfig also makes it easier to understand exactly what is
and isn't support in a given configuration.

Opportunistically update the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT help text to note that it
also enables support for SEV guests.

Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---

Tested everything except an actual SEV-ES guest, I don't yet have a
workflow for testing those.

 arch/x86/Kconfig                           | 13 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c          |  7 ++++---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h            |  5 ++++-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h            |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h         | 12 ++++++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h            |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h              |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c                   |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S                  |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c                      |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c                  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S              |  2 +-
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S       |  4 ++--
 18 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f851179ff0..5f03e6313113 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1527,12 +1527,14 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
 	select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
-	select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
 	help
 	  Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
 	  This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
 	  Encryption (SME).
 
+	  This also enables support for running as a Secure Encrypted
+	  Virtualization (SEV) guest.
+
 config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
 	bool "Activate AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) by default"
 	default y
@@ -1547,6 +1549,15 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
 	  If set to N, then the encryption of system memory can be
 	  activated with the mem_encrypt=on command line option.
 
+config AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
+	bool "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) Guest support"
+	depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
+	help
+	  Enable support for running as a Secure Encrypted Virtualization -
+	  Encrypted State (SEV-ES) Guest.  This enables SEV-ES boot protocol
+	  changes, #VC handling, SEV-ES specific hypercalls, etc...
+
 # Common NUMA Features
 config NUMA
 	bool "NUMA Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index e0bc3988c3fa..8c036b6fc0c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/idt_64.o $(obj)/idt_handlers_64.o
 	vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/mem_encrypt.o
 	vmlinux-objs-y += $(obj)/pgtable_64.o
-	vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += $(obj)/sev-es.o
+	vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST) += $(obj)/sev-es.o
 endif
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
index 804a502ee0d2..916dde4a84b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_64.c
@@ -33,8 +33,9 @@ void load_stage1_idt(void)
 	boot_idt_desc.address = (unsigned long)boot_idt;
 
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT))
-		set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage1_vc);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
+	set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage1_vc);
+#endif
 
 	load_boot_idt(&boot_idt_desc);
 }
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ void load_stage2_idt(void)
 
 	set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_PF, boot_page_fault);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 	set_idt_entry(X86_TRAP_VC, boot_stage2_vc);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
index 22890e199f5b..b2b1fad0d0e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/idt_handlers_64.S
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(\name)
 
 EXCEPTION_HANDLER	boot_page_fault do_boot_page_fault error_code=1
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 EXCEPTION_HANDLER	boot_stage1_vc do_vc_no_ghcb		error_code=1
 EXCEPTION_HANDLER	boot_stage2_vc do_boot_stage2_vc	error_code=1
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 901ea5ebec22..3a0393d50e92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static inline void console_init(void)
 
 void set_sev_encryption_mask(void);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void);
 extern bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address);
 #else
@@ -157,8 +157,11 @@ extern struct desc_ptr boot_idt_desc;
 
 /* IDT Entry Points */
 void boot_page_fault(void);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 void boot_stage1_vc(void);
 void boot_stage2_vc(void);
+#endif
 
 unsigned long sev_verify_cbit(unsigned long cr3);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index cad08703c4ad..98e52ec3cbf6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ _ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
 SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
 .endm
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 /**
  * idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC
  * @vector:		Vector number
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 247a60a47331..bc3a22d67741 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_DB,	xenpv_exc_debug);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_DF(X86_TRAP_DF,	exc_double_fault);
 
 /* #VC */
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(X86_TRAP_VC,	exc_vmm_communication);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 31c4df123aa0..a3f04b9b1a11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -50,10 +50,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
 void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
 
-void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
 bool sme_active(void);
 bool sev_active(void);
-bool sev_es_active(void);
 
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
 
@@ -75,10 +73,8 @@ static inline void __init sev_setup_arch(void) { }
 static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
-static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
 static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
 static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
-static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
 
 static inline int __init
 early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; }
@@ -91,6 +87,14 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
+bool sev_es_active(void);
+void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
+#else
+static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
+static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST */
+
 /*
  * The __sme_pa() and __sme_pa_nodebug() macros are meant for use when
  * writing to or comparing values from the cr3 register.  Having the
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
index 5db5d083c873..353449b26589 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct real_mode_header {
 	/* SMP trampoline */
 	u32	trampoline_start;
 	u32	trampoline_header;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 	u32	sev_es_trampoline_start;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern unsigned char real_mode_blob_end[];
 extern unsigned long initial_code;
 extern unsigned long initial_gs;
 extern unsigned long initial_stack;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 extern unsigned long initial_vc_handler;
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
index cf1d957c7091..146dc77dc67e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ extern void vc_no_ghcb(void);
 extern void vc_boot_ghcb(void);
 extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;
 extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void __sev_es_ist_exit(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 5eeb808eb024..d2119dc1e6f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)		+= unwind_orc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev-es.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST)		+= sev-es.o
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 5e9beb77cafd..dafe13db714c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
 	    early_make_pgtable(native_read_cr2()))
 		return;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST) &&
 	    trapnr == X86_TRAP_VC && handle_vc_boot_ghcb(regs))
 		return;
 
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static void startup_64_load_idt(unsigned long physbase)
 	gate_desc *idt = fixup_pointer(bringup_idt_table, physbase);
 
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST)) {
 		void *handler;
 
 		/* VMM Communication Exception */
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static void startup_64_load_idt(unsigned long physbase)
 void early_setup_idt(void)
 {
 	/* VMM Communication Exception */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST))
 		set_bringup_idt_handler(bringup_idt_table, X86_TRAP_VC, vc_boot_ghcb);
 
 	bringup_idt_descr.address = (unsigned long)bringup_idt_table;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 04bddaaba8e2..01243ec06ee6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(start_cpu0)
 SYM_CODE_END(start_cpu0)
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 /*
  * VC Exception handler used during early boot when running on kernel
  * addresses, but before the switch to the idt_table can be made.
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(vc_boot_ghcb)
 	.balign	8
 SYM_DATA(initial_code,	.quad x86_64_start_kernel)
 SYM_DATA(initial_gs,	.quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data))
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 SYM_DATA(initial_vc_handler,	.quad handle_vc_boot_ghcb)
 #endif
 
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
 	jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
 SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_common)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 /*
  * VC Exception handler used during very early boot. The
  * early_idt_handler_array can't be used because it returns via the
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index ee1a283f8e96..ab783e81b806 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data ist_idts[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
 	ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC,	asm_exc_machine_check,		IST_INDEX_MCE),
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 	ISTG(X86_TRAP_VC,	asm_exc_vmm_communication,	IST_INDEX_VC),
 #endif
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 5e78e01ca3b4..69efdd20836a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
 	x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init;
 }
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 static void kvm_sev_es_hcall_prepare(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	/* RAX and CPL are already in the GHCB */
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_kvm = {
 	.init.x2apic_available		= kvm_para_available,
 	.init.msi_ext_dest_id		= kvm_msi_ext_dest_id,
 	.init.init_platform		= kvm_init_platform,
-#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 	.runtime.sev_es_hcall_prepare	= kvm_sev_es_hcall_prepare,
 	.runtime.sev_es_hcall_finish	= kvm_sev_es_hcall_finish,
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c79e5736ab2b..a527537133d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -383,11 +383,13 @@ bool sev_active(void)
 	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
 bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
 {
 	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
 }
+#endif
 
 /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
 bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
index 8c1db5bf5d78..88b2435b52d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
 	/* SMP trampoline */
 	.long	pa_trampoline_start
 	.long	pa_trampoline_header
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 	.long	pa_sev_es_trampoline_start
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
index 84c5d1b33d10..9830f3a3a90c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ no_longmode:
 	jmp no_longmode
 SYM_CODE_END(trampoline_start)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST
 /* SEV-ES supports non-zero IP for entry points - no alignment needed */
 SYM_CODE_START(sev_es_trampoline_start)
 	cli			# We should be safe anyway
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(sev_es_trampoline_start)
 
 	jmp	.Lswitch_to_protected
 SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_trampoline_start)
-#endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+#endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST */
 
 #include "../kernel/verify_cpu.S"
 
-- 
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2021-01-16  0:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-16  0:25 Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-01-16  5:40 ` [PATCH] x86/sev: Add AMD_SEV_ES_GUEST Kconfig for including SEV-ES support Tom Lendacky
2021-01-18 18:03   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-18 18:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-18 17:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-18 20:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-18 20:30     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-18 20:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-18 20:32   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-18 20:47     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-19 16:23       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-19 17:09         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-19 17:12           ` Paolo Bonzini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210116002517.548769-1-seanjc@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).