From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 227F1C433DB for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 04:14:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E808964DE1 for ; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 04:14:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231609AbhBBEOR (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Feb 2021 23:14:17 -0500 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:42555 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231520AbhBBEOB (ORCPT ); Mon, 1 Feb 2021 23:14:01 -0500 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 4DVBHx5DVZz9tkS; Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:17 +1100 (AEDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1612239197; bh=C/CvveZV8v771qNCTCPNypMV4EecUIQrKmjTMt5Ss1Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=iMNCFAV8ljlf/pbAHHb047ThAznHrYrhFTvKrtL5L0KsjKYYNbcCk21iEfOGgPNOZ VDYZksrxZdQKqsuOQJH86C7IUVYT3Fq28N4VFxW4/qb+DbxTSliABghh8EQrv+F8hR yCfcd7gBhXMw5L/x5qCRpiw9pj7s/ojJ3X4nzTZA= From: David Gibson To: dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com Cc: pragyansri.pathi@intel.com, Greg Kurz , richard.henderson@linaro.org, berrange@redhat.com, David Hildenbrand , mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum , pbonzini@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, Cornelia Huck , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, David Gibson , qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, thuth@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, jun.nakajima@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com, Eduardo Habkost Subject: [PATCH v8 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 15:13:02 +1100 Message-Id: <20210202041315.196530-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the=0D hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order=0D to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.=0D =0D AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has=0D its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism=0D to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection=0D level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected=0D execution environment.=0D =0D The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each=0D platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem=0D ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.=0D =0D AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option=0D "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other=0D than SEV.=0D =0D This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration=0D for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's=0D "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a=0D "confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific=0D object which configures and manages the specific details.=0D =0D Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very=0D minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be=0D very helpful.=0D =0D Changes since v7:=0D * Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag=0D * Polished the interface to the PEF internals=0D * Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got=0D this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be)=0D Changes since v6:=0D * Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros=0D * Assorted minor fixes=0D Changes since v5:=0D * Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest=0D support"=0D * Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption=0D * Added a bunch of documentation=0D * Fixed some compile errors on POWER=0D Changes since v4:=0D * Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory",=0D which I think is marginally more descriptive=0D * Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at=0D kvm_init didn't work for s390=0D * Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing=0D (gitlab CI) only=0D Changes since v3:=0D * Rebased=0D * Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization=0D Changes since RFCv2:=0D * Rebased=0D * Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged)=0D * Changed name to "host trust limitation"=0D * Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version)=0D Changes since RFCv1:=0D * Rebased=0D * Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert=0D =0D David Gibson (12):=0D confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support=0D class=0D sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption=0D confidential guest support: Move side effect out of=0D machine_set_memory_encryption()=0D confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property=0D sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init()=0D confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag=0D confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific=0D code=0D confidential guest support: Update documentation=0D spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support=0D spapr: PEF: prevent migration=0D confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for=0D protected guests=0D s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option=0D =0D Greg Kurz (1):=0D qom: Allow optional sugar props=0D =0D accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 38 ------=0D accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 10 +-=0D accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 10 --=0D backends/confidential-guest-support.c | 33 +++++=0D backends/meson.build | 1 +=0D docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 2 +-=0D docs/confidential-guest-support.txt | 49 ++++++++=0D docs/papr-pef.txt | 30 +++++=0D docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst | 19 ++-=0D hw/core/machine.c | 63 ++++++++--=0D hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 17 +--=0D hw/ppc/meson.build | 1 +=0D hw/ppc/pef.c | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++++=0D hw/ppc/spapr.c | 8 +-=0D hw/s390x/pv.c | 62 ++++++++++=0D hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c | 3 +=0D include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h | 62 ++++++++++=0D include/hw/boards.h | 2 +-=0D include/hw/ppc/pef.h | 17 +++=0D include/hw/s390x/pv.h | 17 +++=0D include/qemu/typedefs.h | 1 +=0D include/qom/object.h | 3 +-=0D include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 ---=0D include/sysemu/sev.h | 4 +-=0D qom/object.c | 4 +-=0D softmmu/rtc.c | 3 +-=0D softmmu/vl.c | 27 ++++-=0D target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++=0D target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 +=0D target/i386/sev.c | 95 ++++++---------=0D target/ppc/kvm.c | 18 ---=0D target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 6 -=0D 32 files changed, 595 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-)=0D create mode 100644 backends/confidential-guest-support.c=0D create mode 100644 docs/confidential-guest-support.txt=0D create mode 100644 docs/papr-pef.txt=0D create mode 100644 hw/ppc/pef.c=0D create mode 100644 include/exec/confidential-guest-support.h=0D create mode 100644 include/hw/ppc/pef.h=0D =0D -- =0D 2.29.2=0D =0D